“Cops are Wonderful”: Ed Koch and the Refusal to Contest Police Brutality
In a July 2011 interview Ed Koch, who served as Mayor from 1978 to 1989, reflected on his relationship with the police during his mayoralty. “Cops are wonderful. I always believed that when we had a settlement in union negotiations—I thought the cops should get a fraction more, maybe half a point, whatever that might be in dollars, by way of a settlement, over and above what the non-uniform” workers. [1] Koch’s professed admiration for police officers was, in large part, hyperbole. During his administration, there were many demonstrations led by the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association in opposition to the Mayor. In July of 1982, for example, the PBA and thousands of its members joined firefighters and correction officers in a demonstration at City Hall protesting the Koch’s Administration’s proposed wage increase of 4 percent. Philip Caruso, President of the PBA labeled the proposed increase a “disgrace.” The PBA was seeking a 14 percent increase. [2]
Koch attempted to nurture a congenial relationship with the police. Unlike Lindsay and Beame, Koch never publicly criticized the police or the PBA or did he take steps to undermine their authority. Instead, he went out of his way to praise police. In remarks made on May 9, 1987, UFT Spring Conference in Manhattan, Koch said, “that police and education have been my highest priority.” [3]
John Lindsay and Abraham Beame contested police power and were both severely damaged by PBA led campaigns. Koch’s professed enthusiastic admiration for police officers was not solely based on the view that they performed their duty better than other city employees, therefore deserved a greater wage increase. The Mayor was conscious of Lindsay and Beame’s experiences and attempted to end the adversarial relationship between City Hall and the police. Even though he reduced the size of the police force, it was mainly through a hiring freeze and attrition and not massive layoffs. [4] And while there were some police protests over wages and other actions, Koch never faced the accusation that he was anti-police and endangering the safety of citizens. It should be noted that the PBA endorsed Koch for his run for reelection in 1989. Phil Caruso, declared to a crowd of police who were chanting, Eddie, Eddie, Eddie,” the Mayor has been good to cops. “No one, no mayor in recent history, has been more supportive of police officers.” [5] One important reason why Koch never faced such a PBA led campaign accusing him of being against police officers was he managed to create the perception that he was pro-cop. The one way he forged an image that he was in supportive of police officers was not to criticize them in high-profile brutality cases. Instead, in several cases, the mayor defended the actions of the police.
Koch’s refusal to address the issue of police brutality in any serious manner had severe consequences for blacks and Latinos of the City. There were many sensational cases of blacks either killed or brutality assaulted by police officers. These incidents and Koch’s attempt to foster good relations with police by not seriously addressing brutality sent the message to people of color that they were on their own.
Blaming Black People
In July 1983 when the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the U.S. House of Representatives held hearings in New York City to hear complaints about police brutality, Koch said that the hearings were politically motivated. In his testimony before the Subcommittee, the Mayor claimed that the “quality of the relationship between our police and our minority communities,” was “excellent.” But he did not credit the action of the black and Latino communities for the “excellent” relationship. Instead, he gave sole credit to the police. “The police have radically reduced violent crime in the minority neighborhoods of the City.” The NYPD has “broadly increased representation of blacks and Hispanics at all ranks in the department.” In addition, the NYPD “has the largest most comprehensive and best-funded community outreach program in the country.” He also claimed that police officers’ restraint of firearms was superior to all other police forces in major cities. Koch even praised the department’s Civilian Complaint Review Board for providing “direct public access to an investigative process supervised by civilians. [6]
While Koch defended the police before the Subcommittee, the NAACP accused the police of increasing violence against black New Yorkers. It asserted that the increasing killing of blacks by police was due to racism, poor police training, and the Federal Government’s refusal to prosecute police involved in brutality cases. Thomas Atkins, the General Counsel of the civil rights organizations, proclaimed that: “Policemen feel they have authority to execute street justice.” According to Atkins, “They make a determination a person is guilty and needs to be punished. And sometimes the punishment results in death.” According to an NAACP study, forty-seven to fifty percent of those killed by the police were black. Atkins blamed Koch, accusing the Mayor of “shooting off his mouth without the facts.” [7]
Atkins was not exaggerating about the Mayor’s rhetoric. Koch maintained that the real culprit when it came to the tension between the police and black communities of the city were blacks. When testifying before the Subcommittee, Koch accused black leaders of sowing division thus, subverting the “alliance” between police offers and citizens. “They should know that they do this at a terrible cost to their community.” [8] Thus, not only were black people the blame for the poor relationship with the police, their action was detrimental to their communities.
Koch’s blaming blacks for the tense relationship with the police was part of an overall pattern of accusing blacks for adverse race relations. During his mayoralty, Koch developed a reputation for using racially inflammatory language. For example, he once said that blacks were “basically anti-Semitic.” He then clarified his remarks by declaring that among “substantial” numbers of black leaders there “is a lot of Anti-Semitism.” [9] He maintained that blacks supported an agenda that simply harmful to Jews. In a 2011 interview when discussing affirmative action, Koch said, “I did not believe in racial quotas or preferential treatment, based on race. The black community’s position was that fairness required quotas to overcoming prior discrimination. The Jewish community, historically, has been against quotas.” He noted that Jews were two-percent of the population in the United States. “If you used a quota, they’d be two-percent. As opposed to meritocracy, where you can rise irrespective of your race, religion, etc.” [10]
He once referred to blacks receiving welfare assistance as “poverty pimps.” When addressing crime, he wrote: “An individual commits crime because of enduring personal characteristics. These include the level of intelligence, genetic inheritance, anatomical configuration, gender, age, and early developmental pressures rooted in the nature of parental influence.” [11]
But the issue that created the greatest animosity between black New Yorkers and Koch was police brutality. There were a number of police brutality incidents during Koch’s mayoralty that deepened the divide between the Mayor and black people, including the June 1978 death of 36-year old businessman and community leader, Arthur Miller, the September 1983 killing of 25-year old Graffiti artist Michael Stewart, the police murder of 66-year-old Eleanor Bumpers in October 1983.
Arthur Miller
On the evening of June 14, 1978, two police officers came to the home of the deputy chief medical examiner Dr. Milton Wald requesting that he examine the body of a man they had in their squad car. The dead man was Arthur Miller, a 35-year-old African American businessman, and father of four who was killed by the police in a confrontation. Mr. Miller witnessed two white police officers, arresting his brother who had been driving with a suspended driver’s license. Miller, who had a licensed revolver strapped to his waist, had his hands in the air when he was approaching the police officers, according to witnesses. However, he became involved in a struggle with the officers who called for assistance and about 16 police officers came on the scene. In their attempt to “restrain” Miller and his 21-year old brother, he was beaten and his larynx was crushed. [12] Dr. Wald performed an autopsy that evening and reported his findings to the detective in charge of the case the following morning. According to Dr. Wald, Miller did not die of natural causes but from asphyxia due to compression of the neck. Wald later informed by phone Assistant District Attorney Aiello who was in charge of the Brooklyn Homicide Division. It was Wald’s understanding that his finding was relayed to pertinent police department and District Attorney officials prior to the press notification later that evening. [13]
The following day the acting city chief medical examiner, Michael Baden, was called by the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner of Suffolk County, Donald Jason, that he had been retained by the attorney of Arthur Miller’s widow to perform another autopsy that would be independent of the city. According to Baden, a second autopsy was done on June 17 in the Brooklyn Medical Examiner’s office in the presence of Brooklyn medical examiners. Dr. Jason agreed that the second autopsy was in line with the first one. [14]
Baden asserted that he “advised Health Commissioner Reinaldo Ferrer by telephone and then Deputy Mayor David Brown’s office, of the autopsy findings and cause of death and also indicated to them that newspaper accounts of Mr. Miller having been ‘choked’ were misleading in that there was no autopsy evidence of hands having compressed the neck—rather than the postmortem findings were most consistent with neck compression by a blunt object such as a forearm or a nightstick pressed against the neck.” But Baden argued that the autopsy alone could not determine if Miller died before or after he was placed in the police car. [15]
Realizing the potential negative response from Crown Heights community in opposing two autopsy reports that agreed that Miller had been killed by suffocation, Baden attempted to portray him and his office as an impartial source. He noted the June 21st death of Luis Mena in the 26th Precinct. Mena had been “subdued by police during an altercation at his residence and required stitches before his being brought to the station house a few hours before his death.” Baden claimed that his office was contacted by the press, asking if the police killed Mena. “We performed an autopsy immediately and the community and press were fully satisfied at our conclusion the same day that death was due to pre-existing natural heard disease and not the police intervention.” [16] Mayor Koch was so elated by Baden’s memo, he wrote to the Acting City Chief Medical Examiner telling him that, “It [the memo] is excellent.” [17]
None of the officers involved in the killing had been arrested although the police had launched an investigation. Community people reacted by organizing a protest. Some 600 people came to the auditorium of PS. 289 at St. Marks and Kingston Avenues under the leadership of Reverend Herbert Daughtry of House of Our Lord Church. After meeting at PS. 289 to protest the murder of Miller, several hundred marched on the 77th Precinct but were met by several police officers wearing helmets. Activists from the Four Star Block Association of which Miller founded called for the immediate suspension of the officers. [18]
The NYPD’s investigation was severely hampered when nine of the fifteen police officers who were at the scene of Arthur Miller’s killing refused to speak with the investigators. Assistant Chief and commander of Brooklyn North William F. Bracey said that the nine officers had been advised by their lawyer not to make statements until they testified before a grand jury. [19]
Activists, under the leadership of Rev. Herbert Daughtry, formed The Arthur Miller Community Defense Committee, circulated a petition for the suspension of all officers who had been at the scene of Miller’s killing and murder charges against all the officers who had put their “hands” on Miller. The committee also demanded that departmental charges be brought against those who did not try to restrain other officers who were responsible for Miller’s death and conspiracy charges against cops covering up the killing of Miller. [20] Despite the pressure from community and civil rights groups, a grand jury ruled in November that Miler’s death was a “tragic unforeseeable accident which occurred during a lawful arrest.” Concerned about unrest, Koch asked Edward R. Korman, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District for New York, issued in his report that there was no sufficient evidence that New York City police violated the civil rights of Arthur Miller. Enraged by both the grand jury and the U.S. Attorney’s report, David. E. Bryan, executive secretary of the NAACP New York City Metropolitan Council, said to the press: “These findings by the U.S. Attorney are another indication to local law enforcement authorities that the lives of black citizens of this city are not worth a damn.” [21]
Fearful of unrest Koch appointed Deputy Mayor Herman Badillo to set up a committee to help reduce tensions in Crown Heights and other places in the city. U.S. Representative Shirley Chisholm was one of the persons Badillo reached out for assistance. Chisholm noted that Badillo was creating an intergroup meeting and that she recommended that he invite black elected officials, State Senator Vader L. Beatty, Assemblyman Woodrow T. Lewis, and Brooklyn Councilwoman Mary Pinkett. According to Chisholm, she didn’t “want to see extremists on the right or the left take over in the community and see further deterioration of relationships that must be built” between the blacks and whites who live in the area. [22] Koch, Badillo, and Chisholm seemed to be more concerned with the potential of unrest than assuring justice for a black person who had been killed by the police. Koch made no public statement expressing concern about how the police brutally murdered Arthur Miller or said nothing about addressing police brutality in the wake of the Miller incident. Koch’s decision to remain silent in a police killing was a deliberate message to the police that the Mayor would not stand against them in disputes with the black community. The approach not to criticize the police was evident a few years later in the Eleanor Bumpers case.
Eleanor Bumpers
In late October 1983 Eleanor Bumpers, a sixty-six-year-old mentally disturbed woman, was shot to death by the police when she held up a knife resisting their attempt to evict her from her apartment because she failed to pay her rent.[23] Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward, the first African American to serve in that position, expressed “remorse over the shooting of Bumpers. However, the police officers, according to Ward, did nothing wrong. Six police officers from the Emergency Service Unit were called to assist the housing authority police to remove Bumpers from her apartment. Her psychiatrist noted that she suffered from psychotic episodes and needed hospitalization. The police claimed that there were reports that Bumpers was heating lye to use against anyone who attempted to evict her. Bumpers did not have lye but when police entered the apartment they reported that she was holding a large knife. [24]
Two officers first entered the apartment wearing gas masks and helmets, carrying plastic face shields. Other officers entered the apartment, one carrying a shotgun. Bumpers was ordered to drop the knife. However, according to Commissioner Ward, she was within a couple of feet of stabbing one of the officers who was attempting to restrain her. The officer with the shotgun fired twice. One-shot turns off her hand holding the knife and the other The fact that six officers broke into Bumpurs’ apartment and used a shotgun to kill her, Ward maintained, was the proper procedure. According to Ward, it would have been easy for him to suspend the officer firing the shot to protect the life of a fellow officer. “In our system of laws, police officers are given the enormous discretionary power, in extreme situations, to use lethal force when life is endangered. In this case, where Mrs. Bumpers appeared about to stab the unprotected officer, I cannot conclude that the officer with the shotgun acted improperly. Therefore, I cannot suspend him.” [25] The Mayor also expressed remorse but never criticized the actions of the police. [26]
The Black press challenged the official reports. The Amsterdam News claimed that the first shot hit her in the left hand essentially disarming Bumpers and removing the hand. According to the paper, the “issue of self-defense is moot. Because a 67-year old, diabetic, arthritic, 300-pound woman with her hand and weapon blown away effectively disarmed with the first shot.” The City Sun, a black weekly accused the police of murdering Bumpers in her apartment. But it also blamed her death on a “dysfunctional operatives within the city’s Human Resources Administration. [27]
Victor Botnick’s report focused on the events that led to the Bumpers murder. Botnick, special assistant to Koch wrote that the Emergency Unit was not on hand to evict Bumpers. That was the job of the city marshals. The police were on hand to assure the peace during the eviction. In July Bumpers stopped paying her rent, claiming that there were a number of problems in the apartment that needed to be repaired. However, she refused to allow anyone in her apartment. But on July 3 she was served a 14-day notice and by July 23 she was personally given a notice demanding rent. That day two housing authority administrators called her to find out why she refused to pay rent. A notice was also slipped under her door on July 25 and authorities attempted to contact one of her daughters but the number was disconnected.
A letter was sent to two daughters asking to contact the management of Sedgwick housing management. An assistant manager spoke to Bumpers on phone asking her for the rent. Bumpers told her that people are coming through the walls and she needs a number of repairs. Eventually, the assistant manager went to the apartment. Bumpers answered the door with a knife in her hand and complained about feces in the bathroom and cannot light her oven. The assistant manager asked Bumpers to allow a repair person to come in. However, she refused to allow the maintenance person to enter.
On Oct 2 Mary Bumpers, one of Eleanor’s daughters called Sedgwick Management office and said she will talk to her mother. However, by October 11, Bumpers had not paid rent. The Sedgwick management contacted the General Social Services (GSS) on October 11 asking for assistance. GSS contacted Bumpers to set up an appointment. But Bumpers denied owning rent. On October 12 an assistant manager of the Sedgwick and a person from maintenance went to the apartment and found cans of excrement in the bathroom. Bumpers complained that President Reagan came to through the walls. By the middle of October GSS and administrators from Sedgwick tried to reenter the apartment bur Bumpers refused to allow them in. By October 17, the Housing Authority decided to proceed with the eviction. The Marshall decides that October 29, Bumpers would be evicted. Bumpers received notice on Oct. 22 that she would be evicted on Oct. 29. [28]
On October 24, Bumpers daughters Mary and Terry were informed about the eviction and asked for assistance. An Assistant Manager at Sedgwick called housing police to ask that they be present at eviction. On October 25, a GSS social worker and an HRA psychiatrist convinced Bumpers to allow them to enter the apartment. They found her to be psychotic and hallucinating. They recommend that she be hospitalized and GSS agreed to hospitalize her after she was evicted. The Marshal was informed to have police emergency services and an ambulance at site. The day of the eviction, housing authority police asked police emergency services to assist in eviction. [29]
Botnick noted that the Marshal acted “within appropriate procedures and protocols.” However, HRS and GSS made a series of errors in judgment. There were an array of services that could have helped her. He also blamed her family for not taking action even though they were asked by HRA to assist. “Had the family responded and involved themselves with the Housing Authority and HRA, these tragic events may have been avoided. [30] Human Resource Administration and GSS were obligated to help the elderly, physical and mentally handicapped. The manager of NYCHA Sedgwick contacted the GSS. Botnick pointed out that there was no attempt to hospitalize Bumpers on October 26, the day GSS was able to enter her house despite the deplorable conditions and the diagnosis that she was psychotic. More disturbing was the fact that HRA did not receive the written psychiatric report until the day of the eviction. The psychiatric report noted that Bumper was incapable of understanding the implications of the eviction proceedings. Botnick contended that the danger that Bumpers posed to herself and others was not appreciated. [31]
In one case that gave a signal to police officers that the administration was on their side was the Stanley Malone incident. On June 1, 1985, 29-year old police officer Charles F. Ferranti and his 34-year partner, Francis T. Sancineto beat Malone outside of a grocery store at Amsterdam Ave and 92nd Street. The officers also forced Malone to swallow a small packet of cocaine. Deputy Trials Commissioner Ted Poretz described the polices’ action as “sadistic.” The department claimed that Ferranti and Sancineto were assigned to used excessive force on an innocent man. The Trials Commissioner recommended that the officers be fired. However, in a surprising move, Benjamin Ward rejected the recommendation and instead placed them on disciplinary probation for thirty days. [32]
Michael Stewart
Michael Jerome Stewart, a 25-year old African American graffiti artist, left a lower Manhattan nightclub on the evening of September 15, 1983, and headed to the subway on East 14th Street and First Avenue. While waiting for a train, he allegedly began scrawling a wall with graffiti unaware that transit police were watching him. He was confronted by the police and arrested. After being in the custody of the police for over 30 minutes he was brought to Bellevue hospital unconscious, hogtied with an elastic band, full of bruises and he had no pulse. He never regained consciousness and died 13 days later.
On September 29, Dr. Elliot Gross, Chief Medical Examiner for the City conducted an autopsy of Stewart between 1:30 and 8:15 p.m. The Stewart family hired Dr. Grauerholz was present at the autopsy. Dr. Goss concluded that he died of a cardiac arrest. After the autopsy that evening, Dr. Gross held a press conference and stated: “The autopsy disclosed findings consistent with the hospital course of coma, following a cardiac arrest. While there was evidence of healing injuries on the body, the autopsy demonstrated no evidence of physical injury resulting or contributing to death.” He did note that his findings were preliminary and further study was needed, including examination of Stewart’s brain and spinal cord.[33]
When asked if the cardiac arrest could have been brought about due to strangulation, Gross responded, “With regard to this particular case, there is no evidence of injury reflecting strangulation.” However, he said he was not giving an opinion until all tests were completed. When asked to explain the origins of the facial injuries, Gross conjectured that they were caused by “blunt force trauma” but could not be attributed as a cause of death. Gross’s autopsy report received approval from the District Attorney’s office. Apparently, Dr. Grauerholz wanted the report to include death by strangulation. Michael Warren, one of the attorneys for the Stewart family, said that Gross’s autopsy was a “coverup.”
The Koch administration was defensive on how the Stewart case was handled. In a memo to the Mayor Doron Gopstein, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel attempted to present a defense of Dr. Gross and a criticism of the media. On October 17, 1983, Gross performed another autopsy and concluded that the cause of death was, “Upper cervical transverse necrotizing myelopathy” or physical injury to the spinal cord and ischemic cerebral or absence of oxygen from the brain. It was an injury to the upper spinal cord that caused cardiac arrest. At a press conference, Dr. Gross defended what seemed to be a contradiction between what he said on September 29 after the first autopsy that the cause of death was not due to physical injury and his claim after the autopsy that the cause of death was an injury to the spinal cord. He noted on September 29 he said the cause of death was cardiac arrest pending further study to the brain and spinal cord. Moreover, the spinal cord had been removed before the September 29th autopsy for later examination by a neuropathologist. So, it was impossible for Gross to know that the spinal cord had been injured. However, Gross did not provide the manner of death.
Grauerholz criticized Gross for listing the cause of death but not listing the manner of death. “Gross’ duty as a medical examiner is not just to list the cause of death but also to list the manner of death.” The media criticized Gross for not providing the manner of death. Gabe Pressman of NBC News called it a coverup. His defense for not listing a manner of death, Gross said at a November 2 press conference that a certificate of death is not a conclusion that is always reached. (Dr. Robert Wolff called it a “purposeful deception”.)
The Koch administration criticized the media for taking the view of the doctors and attorneys hired by the Stewart family and not being objective. Not “enough to aggressively inquire or test the correctness of such charges.” “A person making such a charge should be either be required to substantiate the claim of willful wrongdoing or be shown to have made such an irresponsible charge.”
In August 1984 Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau brought charges against three transit police officers, John Kostick, Anthony Piscola, Henry Boerner, claiming that they handcuffed and beat Stewart with their clubs or nightsticks while he lay helpless on the sidewalk. He was then hogtied and forcefully thrown into a police van according to witnesses. The cops claimed that while attempting to arrest Stewart he ran. Kostick ran after him, wrestled him to the ground while four other officers arrived and helped restrain Stewart. One officer with one of his hands pulled him Stewart clothes picking his upper body off the sidewalk while using the other hand to beat him in the head. The officer eventually released Stewart letting his head hit the ground. The District Attorney’s office maintained that Stewart was put in the van and taken to District 4 Police Precinct. However, when they arrived and the police opened the van, Stewart tried to run but was caught by the officers and thrown to the ground. The prosecutors asserted that the four officers began to beat him with either nightclubs or belly clubs, even using a club to choke him, according to a witness. While handcuffed and screaming he was kicked by the officers. Once he became silent the officers then hogtied him. According to a witness the police used such force to toss him in the van he seemed to fly in the air. [34] None of the officers were suspended. Instead, they were all placed on restricted duty.
In late November 1995, all six officers were acquitted of all charges in the death of Michael Stewart. Family members of the officers and their colleagues applauded and cheered. Koch in a telephone interview said that it was difficult to “criticize a jury.” Even though the medical examiner from Massachusetts testified said that trauma to the neck and asphyxia were the cause of death and a cardiologist from Boston said it was a blow to Stewart’s chest that led to his death, the 12 white jurors still found the officers “not guilty.” The Transit Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association spent $300,000 in the defense of the officers. Louis Clayton Jones said the verdict was a “farce.” Jones pointed out that all the jurors were white. [35]
Robert R. Kiley, chairman of the New York City Transit Authority notified Koch on January 14th, 1985 that the MTA retained former U.S. District Attorney Judge Harold Tyler of the law firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb, and Tyler as a special counsel for the Michael Stewart murder. Kiley would be conducting an inquiry if the MTA followed proper procedures and if those procedures were acceptable, how much procedures should be revised, and if the officers involved in his death violated Transit Authority Police Department rules. [36]
In an October 3, 1986 letter to Mayor Koch, Ward maintained that he would have been “remiss in my duties had “rubber-stamped” the recommendation of dismissal. I evaluated all aspects of the case and I made what I believe to be the correct and fair decision.” Besides the suspension, Ferranti lost $15,866,63 and Sancineto lost over 16,000. Ward claimed he could have “unfairly” terminated them and “denied them their pensions. I chose to adjudicate their disciplinary cases on its own merits. [37]
Reverend Lee Johnson
Koch’s defense of police officers was so unbending that he even accused a Christian minister of lying about his accusation that the police brutalized him. In early May of 1983, the Reverend Lee Johnson, who was a graduate student at Union Theological Seminary and assistant pastor of Concord Baptist Church in Brooklyn was stopped by police officers while he was driving on Lenox Avenue. One of the police officers demanded to see Johnson’s driver’s license, registration, and insurance card. The minister asked permission to get out of the car so he could provide the officer with the documents. The cop told him no and locked the car door. Johnson surprised by the police officer’s response asked him why he had ben stopped. According to the seminarian, the officer cursed at him. When Johnson told him that he belonged to the clergy and said that the officer’s response indicated that he was simply inexperience in addressing citizens in such a fashion. The cop then unlocked the door and first tried to strike Johnson in the face. He did strike him in the leg with his flashlight and then pulled the minister from the car. [38]
Another officer assisted the first. They handcuffed Johnson then began striking repeatedly with a nightstick. He was eventually thrown into a van and take to the 28th precinct where he was informed that he was under arrests. He was not told the charge. Johnson also claimed that the precinct was verbally assaulted. He was called a “nigger,” and the police for his faith. He was taken to a cell where he was beaten, choked and kicked by the two police officers who had arrested him. Johnson was released from police custody at 9:30 P.M. He was never charged but given three summonses for motor vehicle violations. He went back to his apartment at the seminary where he, his wife along with their baby daughter went to St. Luke’s Hospital Emergency Room to receive treatment for his injuries he sustained while in police custody. [39]
The Reverend Donald S. Shriver, Jr., President of Union Theological Seminary expressed his outrage in a press release shortly after Johnson’s encounter. “I feel outraged that this young man was threatened, insulted, humiliated and beaten by the police of this city. He also felt “shame” that Union Theological Seminary, which invited Johnson to “join its community,” was unable to assure his safety. Johnson, according to Shriver had become just another black person who had been “subjected to unlawful violence, carried out by those appointed to uphold the law.” [40]
Isaiah E. Robinson, head of the City’s Commission on Human Rights informed the Mayor that his department’s investigation of the Johnson matter that three eyewitnesses corroborated Johnson’s version of events. [41] Despite Robinson’s memo and Reverend Shriver’s comments, Koch was quoted to say, “I find it certainly possible, but nevertheless strange, that in the heart of Harlem two white cops would intentionally, in violation of the law harass a minister.” [42]
The PBA’s battle in 1966 with Lindsay and 1975 with Beame’s indicated the organization’s political strength. Koch’s defense of police in brutality cases also demonstrated the political power of the PBA and NYPD.
Restructuring the Civilian Complaint Review Board
The Arthur Miller, Michael Stewart, Eleanor Bumpers and other incidents involving black citizens killed by the police led to a chorus of criticism of both the NYPD and the Koch Administration. The mayor attempted to ward off criticism by supporting the restructuring of the civilian complaint review board. In 1986, Councilmen Jerry Crispino and Fernando Ferrer, both from the Bronx, by request of Koch, sponsored a bill that would create a board of twelve members. Six would be “members of the public selected so that one resident from each of the five boroughs of the city and one citywide representative.” The mayor would appoint those representing the public in consultation with the City Council for two terms. The other six would be appointed by the Police Commissioner. Each of the members selected by the police would have had to serve at least one year a full-time administrative employee of the NYPD. [43]
Koch, speaking before the City Council’s Committee on Public Safety noted that the bill extending the civilian complaint review board “will give more public credibility” to what he claimed was an “already effective board. The selection of six highly qualified civilians, whose approval will be subject to the advice and consent of the City Council can only serve to strengthen the public’s confidence in the police department.” Koch called this ‘moderate and reasonable proposal, should not be divisive or destabilizing.” It was now time to act on the proposal “because discussion will not be fueled by any particular incident of alleged police misconduct or review of an incident. To wait for the next incident, when tempers will be high, and willingness and ability to agree will be low, would only insure paralyzation of any reform proposal.” [44]
New York City law enforcement saw the new structure as dangerous, therefore expressed their opposition to it. Phil Caruso, President of the PBA, called the restructuring “partial civilianization of the Civilian Complaint Review Board.” Caruso adopted the professionalization narrative by arguing that non-police officers were not qualified to determine the actions of police officers. A number of studies in major cities, Caruso maintained, have found that “police personnel should determine whether or not charges should be brought against a police officer since expertise in the field properly qualifies them” to make such a determination. The “civilianization” of the review board would only make police officers reluctant to perform their jobs because they would be judged by “Monday-morning quarterbacks.” [45] Joseph V. Toal, Vice President of the Sergeants Benevolent Association, was even more critical of the restructuring of the review board. “Civilians who are not trained in police procedures and the methods of law enforcement are not equipped to evaluate the actions of a police officer.” But Toal went beyond the professionalization narrative by invoking anti-police sentiment of advocates of a civilian operated review board. “Our experience tells us that few civilians, even though they are knowledgeable about police procedures, can be relied upon to judge allegations with total impartiality and without bias in favor of the constituencies they necessarily represent.” Political allegiance to those with an anti-police agenda was far more dangerous than having those on the board who lacked knowledge of police work. [46] While those who lacked knowledge were honest and could be expected to make decisions they thought were right, those with political alliances could be expected to hurt police. Toal echoed Cassese’s argument twenty years earlier when he claimed that “these people will never be satisfied should you put in civilian review board unless there were nine Negroes and Puerto Ricans browbeating and finding every policeman who goes before them guilty.” [47]
Koch’s support for the restructuring of the review board may seem that he had taken a position unfavorable to the police. However, this was not the case. The Mayor’s position for which he testified was moderate and reasonable, was to fend off attempts to create an all-civilian complaint review board that was independent of the police department. Representative John Conyers asserted after the 1984 Congressional hearings looking into police brutality in the city, that the civilian complaint review board operated by the NYPD was a ‘police department front and called for an all-civilian complaint review board. Koch and the City Council’s proposal was a means of stopping such a review board. [48]
Koch’s racist rhetoric and his refusal to criticize police action was a political goldmine for the Mayor. Despite the fact that he had supported restructuring the board, that he actually reduced the police force, and during his tenure as Mayor crime rates climbed, he maintained a good relationship with the police. When Caruso called for Ward’s resignation and the PBA initiated a six-day slow down to protest the Commissioner’s call to rotate officers in precincts to curtail corruption, the Mayor intervene by bringing the two men together to work address their differences. Ward eventually dropped the idea but complained that Caruso was too powerful and Koch does not dare challenge him because he wanted his political support. [49] And indeed, the Mayor obtained it. In 1989, for example, Koch received the endorsement of the PBA in the Democratic Primary. Arnold H. Lubasch writing for the New York Times reported on August 1, 1989, that Koch, surrounded by fifty policemen on the steps of City Hall, “accepted the endorsement amid loud applause, cheers of chants, “Eddie, Eddie, Eddie.” PBA President Phil Caruso claimed that no mayor in recent history has been more supportive of police officers.” No person, “has been more aggressive in terms of law enforcement in terms of law enforcement on all issues—drugs, the death penalty, and putting more police officers on patrol.”
Asked why the PBA endorsed Koch over former U.S. federal prosecutor Rudolph Giuliani, Caruso responded, “We have been consistent supporters of Mayor Koch because he has been supportive of us.” It was not surprising why the PBA supported Koch instead of Giuliani. The Mayor had proven his loyalty of the police and his unwillingness to challenge the power of the PBA. In 1989 the PBA decided to stick with a sure thing instead of embracing a candidate who had yet had the chance to reveal himself to the organization. Koch made it clear that he would continue his loyalty to the PBA when he asserted: “You stand between us and the murderers and the rapists and the assaulters. You are that thin blue line.”[50]
Koch loyalty to the police remained unmovable even in one of the worse cases of police brutality to hit the city during his reign in the summer of 1988. Tompkins Square Park located in East Greenwich Village had become an area where homeless people congregated and slept. But many people came to the park for social gathering and recreation. Many local residents near the park complained to the police about the drug trafficking and the loud noise and music played by those who inhabited the park well into the evening hours. As a measure to address the problem the Local Community Board voted at its June 28, 1988, to request more police presence in the park and for a 1 A.M. to 6 A.M. curfew. The adoption of the curfew angered many folks who accused board members of attempting to rid the park of working-class and poor in favor of the more affluent who were moving into the area. For many people who used the park, the action of the Community Board was nothing more than an effort to gentrify the East Village.
Anger among those opposed to the curfew heightened when park workers painted on the grounds in the Park that it would be closed every day at 1 A.M. And on July 11, police officers from the Ninth Precinct removed all those in the park except the homeless. As a means of protest, many vowed to defy the Community Board’s decision. Protesters held a July 30th demonstration held live music events as a means of protesting the curfew. Fifty police entered the park that evening ordering the protester to leave. A confrontation took place between around 100 protesters and the police when the protesters refused to leave the park. [51]
After the July confrontation, the police met with community leaders on August 2 and agreed to enforce the 1 A.M. to 6 A.M. curfew. The Board claimed that flyers appeared in the park calling for a demonstration against the curfew and threatening to destroy the homes of those who voted for the curfew. On August 6th 86 police officers on foot and 11 who were horseback attempted to enforce the noise curfew by trying to clear the park out of “disruptive elements.” Close to 200 protesters had entered the park, some carrying signs that denounced gentrification. That evening the actions of members of the NYPD was nothing more than a police riot. [52]
The 1988 Tompkins Park Riot demonstrated that police brutality casts a wide net. The commanding officer on the scene called for more reinforcement. More police officers arrived at the park and they viciously beat demonstrators and innocent bystanders who were observing the event. News crews filmed police beating and kicking people while coving their badges to avoid being identified. Some people were beaten by waves of cops. When one wave finished beating demonstrators and bystanders, another wave moved in and began attacking them. According to witnesses and reporters, and an examination of hours of videotape taken by a resident revealed that some protesters threw bottles and other objects at the police. The police who either wore no badges or covered them viciously attacked innocent bystanders without arresting them. Police officers pursued and physically assaulted many people who had left the park. One bystander had been clubbed so badly that he needed 44 stitches to close a three-inch gash in his head.
In its report of the police riot, the New York Civil Liberties Union claimed that dozens of people, mostly bystanders, had been beaten with clubs, kicked, shoved and punched by the police. The group reported on one bystander who was standing just across the street from the park when police approached him and started hitting him. He was beaten over the head and back without provocation. To make matters worse, the 100 of the 121 people who filed a complaint with the Civilian Complaint Review Board, according to the NYCLU, “did not win the slightest form of redress, even though many of them committed hours to the complaint process.” [53]
Koch’s first reaction to the riot was to blame demonstrators for provoking the police. However, once news stations began release tapes of police violently attacking demonstrators and bystanders, the mayor changed his tone. He referred to the police riot as disturbing but took little action. Eventually, the NYPD issued a report that blamed the event on a breakdown in the line of command. It blamed the melee on the lack of training in crowd control among the officers on the scene that evening. [54]
Conclusion
Mayor Ed Koch’s unwillingness to take on police brutality in any serious manner, demonstrated, in large part, the extraordinary political power of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association. Koch was fully cognizant of the extraordinary power of the police and was thus, was reluctant to take it on.
For decades New York City’s black activists have waged a campaign against police brutality. Organized campaigns to stop police brutality have met strong resistance from the police and their allies in City Hall, thus making police brutality one of the most difficult civil rights issues black people face. One reason the PBA and the police have been such an effective opponent of the campaign to end police brutality is because the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association has gained a great deal of political power. The PBA has employed a false narrative that maintains that any attempt to empower citizens by giving them an opportunity to determine how police operate in their communities, only empowered criminals and handcuffed the police. The false narrative has provided the police with a weapon they could employ anytime there is an effort to curtail their power. The False narrative is used today to stop any attempt to curtail the power of the police.
Police resistance to reducing their power is ongoing. Reform measures such as hiring additional black and brown police, wearing body cameras, and creating civilian dominated investigative bodies without power to punish police offers who are found guilty of abuse, are useless. Citizens must have the authority to determine how police operate in their communities.
Dr. Clarence Taylor is Distinguished Professor of History & African-American Studies and Director, African-American Studies, Baruch College
NOTES
[1] Robert K. Lieberman Interview with Ed Koch, July 28, 2011, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives
[2] Michael Oreskes, “Uniformed Unions Rally to Protest City’s Wage Officer,” New York Times, July 8, 1982, p. A1
[3] Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch U.F.T. Spring Conference, Sheraton Centre, Manhattan, Saturday May 9, 1987 at 9:00 A.M., Edward I. Koch Collection, Speeches Series, Box #080078, Folder #03 Education [United Federation of Teachers; High School Commencement Addresses] January, 1987—November, 1987
[4] Praynay Gupte, “500 Fewer Uniformed Policemen Termed Likely in Next Fiscal Year,” New York Times, April 15, 1979, p. 37
[5] Arnold Lubrach, “Koch Endorsed by Police Union for Reelection,” New York Times, August 1, 1989
[6] “Testimony of the Honorable Edward I. Koch, Mayor of the City of New York, Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary,” New York, City, July 18, 1983, in Edward I. Koch Documents Collection, Departmental Correspondence Series, Box #0000118, LaGuardia-Wagner Archives
[7] “NAACP Report Hits Violence by Policemen,” New York Daily News, July 14, 1983, p. 7
[8] “Testimony of the Honorable Edward I. Koch, Mayor of the City of New York, Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary”
[9] Michael Kramer, Blacks and Jews: How Wide the Rift,” New York Magazine, February 4, 1985, p. 26
[10] Robert K. Lieberman’s Interview with Edward Koch, July 28, 2011
[11] John L. Hess, My Times: A Memoir of Dissent (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), p. 133.
[12] Fact Sheet, “Stop Killer Cops,” freddeomarchives.org/Documents/Finder…/.flyer.stop.killer.cops.factsheet.pdf; Joseph B. Treaster, “Brooklyn Businessman Strangled In a Struggle with Police Officers,” New York Times, June 17, 1978, p. 25
[13] Memo: Michael Baden to Victor Botnick, June 26, 1978, Medical Examiner, Officer of Chief [Michael Baden Appointment; Death of Arthur Miller] Edward I. Koch Documents Collection, Box # 000215, Folder #01, LaGuardia, Wagner Archives
[17] Koch to Baden, July 10, 1978, Medical Examiner, Office of Chief [Michael Baden Appointment; Death of Arthur Miller] Edward I. Koch Documents Collection Box # 0000215, Folder #01,
[18] Joseph B. Treaster, “Brooklyn Businessman Strangled In a Struggle with Police Officers,” New York Times, June 17, 1978, p. 25
[19] Peter Kihss, ‘9 Police Officers Silent on Death of Businessman in Crown Heights,” June 22, 1978, p. D.18; Flyer, “Stop Killer Cops! Fact Sheet,” Freedom Archives, freedomarchives.org/Documents Finder/…/43.flyer.stop.killer.cops.fact.sheet.pdf
[20] Peter Kihss, “9 Police Officers Silent on Death of Businessman in Crown Heights,” New York Times, June 22, 1978
[21] Joseph Fried, U.S. Inquiry Acquits In 78 Death of Black Leader, New York Times, August 3, 1979
[22] See Herman Badillo Committee on Intergroup Relations, Box 0000031, Folder 07, December 1978)
[23] “Businessman’s Killing Stirs Area,” Washington Afro, June 20, 1978, p. 12; Erik Nielson “It Could Have Be Me: the 1983 Death of a NYC Graffiti Artist,” Transcript, National Public Radio, September 16, 2013; Nicolaus Mills “Howard Beach—Anatomy of a Lynching: New York Racism in the 1980s” in Jim Sleeper, ed., In Search of New York (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1989), pp. 73-75
[24] Benjamin Ward to Wilbert Tatum, December 18, 1984, Edward I. Koch Collection Police Department, Fatal Police Shootings; Monthly Reports; Portable Radios, Attacks on Ward, Eleanor Bumpers Case Box # 000239, Folder # 08
[26] Selwyn Raab, “Ward Defends Police Actions in Bronx Death.” New York Times, November 3, 1984
[27] Bumpers: The Charade Continues,” Amsterdam News, December 8, 1984; “Reports Avoids The Central Question: Was Excessive Force Used?” The City Sun, November 28-December 4, 1984
[28] Victor Botnick to Ed Koch, November 9, 1984, Ed Koch Collection, Box 0000190, Folder #05, Eleanor Bumpers Report of Death
[30] Victor Botnick to Ed Koch, November 9, 1984, Ed Koch Collection Box 0000190, Folder #05 Eleanor Bumpers Report of Death)
[32] ‘2 Dismissals Overruled by Ward,” New York Times, September 18, 1986; Cy Egan, “Ward Blocks Firing of 2 ‘sadistic’ cops, New York Post, September 17, 1986
[33] Memo from Doron Gopstein to Ed Koch (n.d.) Law Department [NYC Council Redistricting Plan; Raden Case; Legal Briefings; INC./Prison Pop.; M. Stewart & Med. Examiner ], Box # 000209, Folder # 03 May 1983-June 1983 Ed. I. Koch Documents Collection; Eliot M. Gross, appellant, v. New York Times Company et. al. Respondents Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Department, June 16, 1992
[34] Philip Shenon, “Police Beat Cuffed Man, Inquiry on Death Finds,” New York Times August 24, 1984
[35] Isabel Wilkerson, “Jury Acquits All Transit Officers in 1983 Death of Michael Stewart,” New York Times, November 25, 1985
[36] Criminal Justice Coordinator [MTA/Michael Stewart Case; Death Penalty Propos -sals; Narcotics Prosecutions, Federal VS. NYS Stats Box 0000120, Folder #04, April 1986-June 1986
[37] Benjamin Ward to Ed Koch, October 3, 1986, Edward I. Koch Collection, Police Department [License Premises; Monthly Reports; Police Brutality; Over—Time; Wash. Sq. Park; Corruption; Crime Index; Bias Crimes, September, 1986—December, 1986 Box #000231, Folder # 06
[38] Statement by The Reverend Donald W. Shriver, Jr., President, Union Theological Seminary, New York, May 5, 1983, Edward I. Koch Documents Collection Departmental Correspondence Series, Box # 0000230, Police Department [Curtis SLIWA Case; Co-Terminality; Police Coordination Disability Pensions; Rev. Lee Johnson Beating Incident] April 1983June, 1983
[41] Isaiah E. Robinson to Edward I. Koch, May 26, 1983, Edward I. Koch Collection, Box # 0000230
[42] Peter Noel, “Pastor: Cop: Beat Him Without Mercy,” New York Amsterdam News, May 14, 1983, p. 1
[43] Local Laws of the City of New York for the Year of 1986. No. 55, Introduced by Council Members Crispiano and Ferrer (by request of the Mayor) Series: Local Laws Box # 050016, Folder # 14, Civilian Review—Police Actions, 1986
[44] Statement of Honorable Edward I. Koch, Mayor of the City of New York, Before the City Council Committee on Public Safety,” October 21, 1986, Series: Local Laws, Box #050016, Folder # 14, Civilian Review Police Actions, 1986, LaGuardia-Wagner Archives
[45] Memorandum in Opposition to Bill, City Council INT. No. 13, 13-A, and 307, October 21, 1986, Series: Local Laws Box # 050016, Folder # 14, Civilian Review Police Actions, 1986
[46] Statement by Joseph V. Toal, Vice President, Sergeants Benevolent Association Police Department, the City of New York before the Committee on Public Safety of the New York City Council, October 21, 1986, Series: Local Laws Box # 14, Civilian Review Police Actions, LaGuardia, Wagner Archives
[47] “Police Abuse: The Need for Civilian Investigation and Oversight,” New York Civil Liberties Union, June 1990, p. 14
[49] Tod Purdum P.B.A. Chief: A Conciliator Gets Tough” March 31, 1987
[50] Arnold H. Lubacsh, Koch Endorsed by Police Union for Re-Election,” New York Times, August 1, 1989, p.
[51] Community Board #3 Statement on the Tompkins Square Park (TSP) Melee of 8/6/68Edward I. Koch Documents Collection, Departmental Correspondence Series, Box # 0000232, Folder # ^, Police Department [PD-FD Relations; TNT Tompkins Square Park Melee, Crown Height; Transit Police Merger; Anti-Drug Task Force] August 1988; “Melee in Tompkins Sq. Part: Violence and its Provocation,” New York Times, August 14, 1988
[53] “Police Abuse: The Need for Civilian Investigation and Oversight,” New York Civil Liberties Union, June 1990, pp. 39-45
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