Table of Contents
Editorial:
Southern Africa
By Gloria Emeagwali - Chief Editor
Many are the challenges facing South Africa at the present
time. Should the victims of Apartheid seek revenge or render forgiveness?
Should there be reparations to the victims of Apartheid as Wole Soyinka
suggests in The Burden of Memory; The Muse of Forgiveness (OUP, 1999)?
Should desegregation of education take place by force or through progressive
legislation? What about land? Should South Africa follow an aggressive
policy of land redistribution or should Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe
in his earlier years be the definitive guide? What about apartheid
debt, 90% of which is owed to four creditor nations, namely, the United
States, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom? South Africa's
problems do not end there. The survivors of apartheid terrorism have
to consider the impact of biological warfare and the various sterilization
programs, mind altering substances and drugs and toxins developed
and utilized against apartheid activists and the Black population
in general. What are the long term effects of the chemical and biological
agents deployed in the past? To what extent have race-based genetic
engineering programs been completely eradicated?
In this issue of Africa Update we focus on some of these
issues to some extent. Our main thrust, however, is the socio-historical
and political context of South Africa's history. Dr. Warren Perry,
an outstanding archeologist in his field, challenges the conventional
settler model account of late 18th century and early nineteenth century
South Africa. Perry combined his findings from his own research in
Swaziland with those of other archeologists on the basis of ecological
and geopolitical categories. He discovered there were major discrepancies
between the expectations of the conventional settler model and material
and archeological reality
Gani Yoroms of the Center for Democratic Studies, Abuja,
Nigeria leaps into the last decade of the 20th century and the feverish
political activities following the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990.
He discusses the role of CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South
Africa) and the African National Congress exploring in the process
some of the mechanisms of constitutional democracy and the 1994 elections.
We thank Gani for his excellent analysis of aspects
of "the tortuous road" to democratization.
South Africa goes to the polls in June this year to
hold its second democratic election since the dismantling of the apartheid
state. Thabo Mbeki seems the likely winner. He is a pragmatist and
so continues a trend begun by Mandela. It will be interesting to see
what happens.
Return to Table of Contents
An
Archaeological Test of the Settler Model Account
of the Mfecane/Difaqane
By Dr. Warren R. Perry, Central Connecticut State
University
INTRODUCTION
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
the political and cultural form of southeastern Africa changed in
an irrevocable way. Social relations were drastically reorganized
from kin-based ranked social relations to age-grade units of state
society. Productive cycles were disrupted and trade relations realigned.
People shifted their allegiances and reformulated group identities
many times as warfare and famine swept the region. By all accounts
it was a period of great strife, suffering, sorrow and, for some,
triumph. This period, known as the Mfecane or the Difaqane is characterized
by the rise of the Zulu State under Shaka.
This paper considers the political and economic forces
underlying state formation in southeastern Africa. Most of the work
on this topic is based on documentary and oral sources. However, an
increasing body of information from archaeological contexts can be
brought to bear on examining various hypotheses on the causes of the
Mfecane/ Difaqane. Key to many of these theories is an underlying
model, ironically named the settler model. In this model the European
settlers have been excluded as a major cause of the dislocations of
the Mfecane/Difaqane. When subjected to archaeological data, this
model serves as a poor basis for understanding this crucial period
of history.
THE SETTLER MODEL AND THE MFECANE/ DIFAQANE
The standard versions suggests that conflict between
different groups in the Mfolozi-Phongola region over the need for
grazing land resulted in livestock raiding by the more powerful polities,
and extensive migrations by the less powerful. Refugees on the move
were attacking other polities in their path as they fled the Mfolozi-Phongola
region. The scale of devastation is said to have been heretofore unknown
in southern Africa. The state of contention among the groups in this
region culminated in the emergence of a hierarchy of centralized military
polities, at the apex of which stood the Zulu State.
Most explanations of these events have been posed in
terms of African internal dynamics, emphasizing catastrophic population
pressures, ecological conditions and increasing cattle herds resulting
in depleting resources and overgrazing. Several Africanist historians
have tried to relate conflicts over control of the ivory trade at
Delagoa Bay to the rise of the Zulu State.
Despite the fact that each of these models draws on
different variables, and has obviously different sympathies, at root,
all these propositions share a set of assumptions that are common
to the settler model. The first assumption is the idea that South
African society was composed of discrete ethnic groups that had their
origin in the past and persisted into recent times. The second assumption
is that there was little systemic interaction between these groups.
The third assump-
tion is the Zulucentric focus, namely that these social
relations were disrupted in the early 19th century by the Mfecane/Difaqane.
An alternative analysis that undermines the geographic
localization and European passivity of the settler model can be found
in the work of Cobbing. He contends that the Mfecane/ Difaqane is
linked to disruptive European forces, specifically slave raiding,
emanating from the Cape, and other European colonies in southern Africa.
In sum, the settler model sees the rise of the Zulu
state as a local development and ultimately responsible for the Mfecane/Difaqane.
The result of Zulu state formation appears to be the conquest of and
disruption of life for the various independent African people of southeastern
Africa. Cobbing's vision suggests a more fluid set of cultural interactions
among the various African groups with Europeans playing an active
role in a complex colonial field.
The scale of the phenomena
as well as the timing of disruptions is open to archaeological analysis.
It is to the archaeological assessment of these ideas that I next
turn.
ARCHAEOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MFECANE/DIFAQANE
A broad survey of mostly published and some unpublished
archaeological materials from the period of the Mfecane/Difaqane was
conducted and combined with data from a site survey in Swaziland.
A database of 159 sites was established to evaluate the utility of
the settler model in explaining Southeast African political economy.
The sites have been grouped into the major ecological and geopolitical
regions of Southeastern Africa: Zulu land, Swaziland, the Eastern
and Western Transvaal, and the Free State. Dating the sites is particularly
problematic; nonetheless, I attempted to further group sites into
pre and post Mfecane/ Difaqane, i.e. sites from the eighteenth century
or earlier and sites from the nineteenth century.
The settler model has specific temporal and spatial
trajectory that compares with archaeological results from these times
and places. Key changes proposed by the model include population growth,
ecological degradation, social hierarchy, state formation, European
trade, and settlement disruption all begin in the areas of Zululand
and spread from there to the other areas. Moreover, the settler model
assumes a general change from local scale social interactions to larger
spatial interactions integrating southeastern Africa relative to the
Zulu core region.
The table summarizes both the expectations for key archaeologically
recoverable variables under the assumptions of the settler model and
the results of the archaeological analyses.
DEMOGRAPHY
The settler model predicts a large population in the
core areas of Zulu state formation with the rest of southeastern Africa
showing relatively low population sizes that increase with the arrival
of the Zulu state.
Population sizes were measured by using the correlate
of site size. The results show some significant discrepancies from
the settler model expectations. The demographic situations in Eastern
Transvaal and the Free State are perhaps the most interesting. In
terms of regional demographics, it seems that during the earlier periods
the Eastern Transvaal and Free State populations were significantly
larger than that of Zululand, but during the later periods as the
Zululand population increased, the Eastern Transvaal and Free State
populations underwent an overall reduction suggesting a possible population
shift from these areas into Zululand and Swaziland.
SOCIAL HIERARCHY
The settler model assumes that with the exception of
Zululand and Swaziland (which might exhibit slightly greater degrees
of social inequality prior to state formation), the existence of relatively
egalitarian agropastoral communities prior to the formation of the
Zulu state.
Social hierarchy can be assessed from the Southern African
data with such indicators as the existence of exotic materials, the
form of socially central settlements, the size of cattle enclosures,
the culling patterns of herds from more and less prestigious settlements,
and the overall organization of the settlement hierarchy. My studies
drew on all of these variables, most systematically investigating
the organization of the regional settlement hierarchies, as seen in
the site-size histograms, and differential control over cattle, as
seen in stock enclosure sizes.
The general results of the regional site size analysis
and artifactual analysis are complex and varied. Only the settlement
hierarchies from Zululand, show an increase in social hierarchy, with
all other regional hierarchies decreasing. Simultaneously, there are
other kinds of archaeological evidence in all regions, that indicate
discrepancies from the settler model. The most intriguing area is
the Free State whose early bimodal distribution contained a very large
site which is 4 times larger than the largest in Zululand and is the
largest site in the entire southeast African sample. The faunal assemblage,
although dominated by wild game is characterized by an elite cattle-culling
pattern. Glass beads, rock gongs and miniature pots suggesting ritual
significance and burials with stone-lined tombs and many grave goods
are present. Finally, stone tools, red ochre chunks, bored stones
and undecorated grass-tempered pottery typical of ethnographic pastroforagers
is also present.
The most provocative regional relationship is seen in
the transition from earlier to later periods accompanied by a 34%
decrease in total sites for all areas except for Zululand and Swaziland
which showed a 33% increase in total sites. This strongly suggests
that Zululand and Swaziland were experiencing similar transformations
which were having the opposite affect upon the other regions.
Thus the settler model's prediction of increasing social
hierarchy after the Mfecane/Difaqane is not supported. The evidence
from these limited analyses indicates that the situation was far more
complex.
CATTLE ENCLOSURES
Differential possession of cattle and their accumulation
are key indicators of social inequality among Southern African polities.
Consequently, cattle enclosure size can heuristically be used as a
surrogate to inform on status, wealth and power, and hence class and
state formation in southern African societies. The cattle enclosure
sizes were estimated from the archaeologically recovered remains,
and from them an estimate of the number of animal units was developed.
The Settler Model predicts that as prestige items, cattle should become
increasingly concentrated in the hands of state elite in the Zululand
and Swaziland state formation areas and should generally decline in
both number and level of concentration in other areas.
The cattle enclosure analysis shows that all areas had
unimodal enclosure size distributions during both periods except for
eastern Transvaal which had a tri-modal distribution for both periods.
This suggests differential possession of cattle in the Eastern Transvaal
before and after the Mfecane/Difaqane. In addition, every region,
except Eastern Transvaal showed a decrease in the number of cattle
enclosures through time. However, if we look at each region in terms
of total enclosure areas presumably housing livestock, mean enclosure
size, and estimates of animal units a different more complex pattern
emerges. Zululand and Eastern Transvaal showed an increase in all
of these categories while Swaziland and Free State exhibit a decrease
in these categories.
This suggests the existence of a long and continuous
social hierarchy in the Eastern Transvaal unlike Zululand where state
formation appears to have begun after the Mfecane/Difaqane. This evidence
is also at odds with the settler model and suggests that state formation
in Zululand was not the first such incident in Southeast Africa and
may indicate interaction with Europeans in the Delagoa Bay area well
before the Mfecane/Difaqane.
In Swaziland, Western Transvaal, and Free State there
was a decrease in the very categories that increased in Zululand and
eastern Transvaal. Though consistent with the settler model for the
Western Transvaal and the Free State, it is a surprising result for
Swaziland.
RANK SIZE
The settler model argues that social interactions went
from the scale of regional integration to the scale of multi-regional
integration with the onset of state formation among the Zulu. Thus
the settler model would be most consistent with log-linear distributions
in each of the areas except for Free State prior to the Mfecane/Difaqane
and a variety of distributions indicative of Zulucentric accumulation
after the Mfecane/Difaqane.
As can be seen from Table 1 the results hardly are consistent
with the settler model. There clearly are very complex settlement
processes happening during post-fifteenth-century Southeast Africa,
and the analysis points to effects beyond the regions and indeed beyond
the scale of Southeast Africa. Throughout Southeast Africa the pre-Mfecane/Difaqane
period was marked, to varying degrees, by concave rank-size patterning,
patterns of a relatively few large places and many small places. Post-Mfecane/Difaqane
patterns show a more complex situation---Zululand, Swaziland and the
Eastern Transvaal show double-convex patterning while Free State appears
convex. The rank-size curve for Southeast Africa should be convex
in both periods since such an analysis is, according to the settler
model, compounding many settlement systems. Instead, all of southeast
Africa moves from a concave pattern to a log-linear pattern for larger
sites and an increasingly concave pattern as sites become smaller.
These are results at odds with the settler model expectations. All
of these patterns indicate the effects of large-scale processes, even
in the pre-Mfecane/Difaqane period, processes certainly larger than
any of the individual regions and processes beyond the scale of Southeast
Africa. This suggests the involvement of Europeans in state formation
in Southeastern Africa, yet leaves open the issue of the nature of
that involvement.
EUROPEAN TRADE GOODS
The settler model emphasizes trade in exotics and the
disruption of local political processes. There should be a concentration
of these items at the elite royal sites in the core areas of Zululand
and Swaziland, but there were not early sites in Zululand with European
goods.
A number of observations can be made about the distribution
of these items. Of all of the sites of both periods the Free State
and the Eastern Transvaal had the most and the most diverse kinds
with Western Transvaal, and the Cape Frontier also having some. None
were located in Zululand, even at royal sites.
These data present serious problems for the settler
model. Evidence for trade with Europeans is more prevalent in the
pre-state-formation period than after states formed. This would seem
to suggest that something other than access to European trade goods
was the goal of the Zulu State or if it was their goal they were not
successful. The distribution of pre-Mfecane/Difaqane trade goods shows
a distinct bias towards mineral production sites, suggesting that
the European goods functioned as payment for goods rather than as
prestige items in elite competitive duels.
CONCLUSIONS
The settler model with its local level integration that
gives way to state formation in Zululand, that spreads havoc throughout
the rest of Southeastern Africa, does not make a good description
of the historical geography evident in the archaeological record.
Southeastern Africa is better modeled in the pre-Mfecane/Difaqane
period as a network of interrelated social groups, some emphasizing
agropastoralism, some pastoralism, and some, from Europe, seeking
exotic items and human captives. Processes of accumulation involving
the use of cattle and prestige ranking systems came into conflict
with processes of accumulation based on capturing human labor and
engaging in long-distance mercantile trade. Their collision resulted
in the population dislocations, famines, state formations and wars
of the Mfecane/Difaqane. Until the interpretive net is cast widely
enough to incorporate the actions of Europeans at Port Natal and Delagoa
Bay, and their agents operating in the hinterlands of Free State and
Western Transvaal, as well as Zululand, the history of the period
will remain hidden.
My research and analysis not only suggest that the settler
model of the Mfecane/Difaqane is wrong, but also how archaeology can
contribute to our understanding by identifying and explaining the
contradictions between the archaeological and documentary records
caused by the context of colonialism. Such "ambiguities" in the different
lines of evidence are places where power lies - power that has resulted
in telling histories that affect social relations today. Archaeology
has an important role to play in the recovery of the past of Southern
Africa. We must begin to identify and formulate new research topics
with questions from the contrastive case, that of African captive
and cattle raiding, to direct future research strategies.
Racial commodity slavery sponsored captive and cattle
raiding which transformed African labor (without military protection)
into an available labor pool for external plantations and internal
colonies. From the beginning, however, these local and global transformations
engendered forms of African resistance and contestation which must
be reflected in the material world and cultural landscapes of Southern
Africa.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Paper presented for the symposium: Archaeology, Bioanthropology
& African Identity in the Diaspora: Theoretical & Methodological
Advances, at the 4th World Archaeological Congress in Cape Town, South
Africa. January 10-14, 1999. Please do not cite without the author's
permission.
Warren Perry is Associate Professor of Anthropology
at CCSU. He is also the Associate Directory for Archeology for the
African Burial Ground Project. He has conducted research in historical
archeology in Southern African and the United States.
Return to Table of Contents
Democratization
in South Africa
By J. Gani Yoroms, Center for Democratic Studies
Abuja, Nigeria
The release of Nelson Mandela and the relaxation of
apartheid laws made the South African democratization process change
its course from internal war to peaceful negotiation. The adversarial
relationship turned to a negotiated compromise on issues relating
to politics, economy and national security. The ANC and the Apartheid
government of F.W de Klerk initially dominated the negotiation process
with some accord reached between Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. This informal
negotiation was transformed to a formal multiparty agreement attended
by 50 political parties, business class and public interest groups
under the banner of a National Peace Accord. The progress experienced
from the National Peace Accord was frustrated by the escalating political
violence in black townships between the ANC and the Buthelezi- led
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
The emergence of the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa (CODESA) was intended to provide a platform for the political
interest groups to negotiate a political settlement. The first meeting
of CODESA held on the 20 December 1991 was attended by delegates from
18 organizations without the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and IFP.
Some IFP members attended but not on any official capacity.
However, the meeting significantly represented all shades of opinion.
A declaration of intent was signed by the participants who agreed
to commit themselves to (i) an undivided South Africa, (ii) peaceful
constitutional change, (iii) a multi-party democracy with universal
suffrage and the separation of powers, and (iv) a bill of rights.
There were some major areas of disagreement over the interpretation
of CODESA I. The ANC saw CODESA as a vehicle for organizing a swift
transition from minority rule to a representative majority rule; and
F. W. de Klerk's National Party envisaged CODESA as instituting a
transition program that would guarantee acceptable modalities for
power sharing. Because of this, CODESA II was faced with "enduring
lack of trust between the government and the ANC", as there existed
"deep differences over federalism and power sharing" (Schneidman 1994:4).
Therefore, CODESA II settled for a committee system to deal with the
problems in the negotiation process. Thus five committees were established
to handle the reincorporation of the Bantustan Homelands into the
mainstream South African system; creation of free political climate;
transitional government and constitutional principles; and the composition
of the constitutional-making body. However, the failure to reach a
consensus in CODESA II led to the September 7, 1992 ANC peace protest
which recorded 28 deaths and 200 wounded in Ciskei homeland. In the
aftermath, President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela met. There, the National
Party conceded to the transitional government. Power would be shared
between the ANC and the National Party (NP). The ANC and the NP Record
of Understanding was opposed by an alliance of Inkhatha Freedom Party
(IFP), the White Conservative Party and the homeland governments of
Ciskei and Bophuthaswana under the platform of Concerned South African
Groups (COSAG) (Schneidman; 1994).These hitches in the democratization
process in South Africa resulted from the problematics of attaining
majority representation in a multi-ethnic context.
Though the autonomy and protection of the minorities
was democratic, a division of South Africa into sub-sovereign units
based on ethnic homogeneity would not equally establish the basis
for democratic reconciliation within South Africa. Therefore, a constitutional
democracy was advocated as the only acceptable approach in the deeply
divided society.
The elements of a constitutional democracy include:
(a) Executive power-sharing among the political parties representing
various ethnic and political interests, (b) A high decree of internal
autonomy, (c) Proportional representation and proportional allocation
of position in both political - bureaucratic system, and (d) A minority
veto on the most vital issues (Lijphart, 1985:6). The idea of constitutional
democracy had been floating since the 1970s when the search for viable
alternatives began. It is in the light of the above that the Record
of Understanding between Mandela and F. W. de Klerk was expanded to
incorporate all other political parties. The political parties accepted
a government of national unity as a yardstick for national reconciliation
where power was shared in a multi-party cabinet and in the parliament
for the period of 5 years beginning from 1994.
Each party was to be represented in parliament according
to the percentage of votes won and in the Executive Council only if
it won at least a 5% vote in the election. This was a prelude to CODESA
III which later became a multi-party Negotiation Forum to accommodate
various interests (like the Conservative Party, IFP, PAC). However,
threats from the IFP and the Afrikaner Volk Front (VF) led by General
Viljoen, a retired member of the South African Defence Force, pressed
for a confederal South Africa. The opposition groups under Freedom
Alliance opposed the April 27, 1994 dateline for the democratic election
(Schneidman, 1994:5).
Meanwhile Nelson Mandela demonstrated his craftiness
by meeting (in both open and in secret) with the opposition in order
to convince them to accept a multi-party democratic system. He was
also able to allay the fears of the IFP and VF, despite the deep-seated
differences. A major step was taken with the establishment of the
Transitional Executive Council (TEC) as a means for creating a climate
for a free political participation and free and fair elections. Thus
21 political parties endorsed TEC on September 7, 1993 with only the
IFP in protest. TEC was set up purposely to enable the political interests
to direct the transition programme by consensus. Despite the initial
problems faced from the Homeland areas of Kwazulu and Bophuthatswana,
the TEC succeeded in organizing the first multi-party election in
South Africa on 27-28 April, 1994. The election to the National Assembly
was by proportional representation with equal division between national
and provincial parties. In an election that was conducted by an Independent
Electoral Commission, made up of five international members, the ANC
won over 65% of the votes cast in the election and Nelson Mandela
was sworn in as the first Black President of the Government of National
Unity, with Thambo Mbeki and F.W de Klerk serving as 1st and 2nd Vice
Presidents respectively. Unlike the expectation for regional autonomy
the transitional constitution provided a wide range of power for the
central government but would delegate power to the regions. The minority
veto power was limited to the local level. The minority whites were
entitled to 30% seats in the local council election followed by 30%
Section by tax and rent payers. The remaining percentage in the local
election was to be on a non-racial basis.
Thus was the tortuous road to South African democracy
and the elections of 1994.
Return to Table of Contents
Southern African
Jubilee Debt Summit: Gauteng Declaration
On the eve of the new millennium, we are witnessing
the rapid growth of Jubilee 2000 structures and debt coalitions.
Most people in sub-Saharan Africa live in pervasive
poverty, although Southern Africa is not intrinsically poor. Southern
Africa is shackled by debt owed to the same forces which initiated,
enforced, condoned and sustained slavery and colonialism. Today this
debt is both a manifestation and an instrument of the unjust international
economic order in which the North dominates the South and the elite
in our countries are willing accomplices and beneficiaries.
Indebted nations are pressured to agree to crippling
conditionalities to get loans to repay the debt in a deepening spiral
of indebtedness. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have
caused increasing levels of unemployment, reduced government services,
higher prices of food and other basic commodities and intensified
poverty.
We commit ourselves to self-determination in working
for debt cancellation within a broader concept of Jubilee, including
assertion of our sovereignty from Northern domination and transformation
towards an alternative global economic system.
For more information contact Jubilee 2000 South Africa
at aid-@iafrica.com or Jubilee 2000 Afrika at afrik-@jubilee2000uk.org.
Return to Table of Contents
APARTHEID CAUSED DEBT
The Role of Swiss and German Finance
By Mascha Madoerin and Gottfried Wellmer with a
contribution by Martina Egli
Summary of the Research Document (excerpts)
This 100 page report was commissioned by the German
and Swiss Campaign Coalitions linked to the newly launched international
Campaign for Debt Cancellation and Reparations in Southern Africa,
and is published in English by Jubilee 2000 South Africa. The paper
is meant as one of several contributions that have been published
in the course of the last 18 months on the issue of South Africa's
foreign debts and the costs which the Apartheid regime caused the
neighboring states in Southern Africa.
The research interest of the paper focuses on two fields:
Firstly, the authors intended to
deal once more with the question of how the issue of foreign financing
of the Apartheid regime affected the political development in South
Africa in the 80s. Two issues are in the forefront: The legitimacy
of foreign debt. The question of the long-term effects of Apartheid-caused
debt on the young democracy and its economic sustainability. The controversial
question of the risks to South Africa's capital market arising from
the campaign for debt cancellation is also briefly discussed.
Secondly, the authors examine the role played by
German and Swiss financiers within the framework of foreign financing
of the Apartheid regime during the politically critical years.
A separate part of the paper deals with the issue
of reparations and demands compensatory payments from those who profited
from Apartheid.
After 1973 it became obvious that the colonial
wars in South Africa's neighbouring countries (Angola, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe and Namibia), which represented an actual cordon sanitaire
for the Apartheid regime, could not be won by the colonial powers.
The independence of Mozambique and Angola was imminent.
Large-scale workers strikes and the Soweto uprising
of 1976 reflected the beginning of a new phase in South Africa's political
history.
In this situation, the Apartheid regime decided
to embark on its "Total Strategy," which contained comprehensive military,
economic and home components serving the single objective of safeguarding
the regime. In the implementation of this programme, the government,
the administration and public corporations played a decisive role.
The incredible waste of resources - seen from today's perspective
- put at the disposal of the regime thanks to soaring gold prices
and thanks to increasing foreign financing until the mid 80s, served
basically to put into practice the survival strategy which left behind
devastating results.
Already at the beginning of the 80s, mainly US
companies began to sell their businesses in South Africa. Towards
the end of 1982, after the major western countries had once more opted
to grant credits to South Africa, the IMF was forbidden to grant loans
to South Africa if the institution failed to prove that these resources
were not used to perpetuate Apartheid. This proof could not be delivered.
On the other hand, foreign banks, the most eager among them major
banks from Germany and Switzerland, organised long term loans worth
several billions of dollars for the Apartheid state. More comprehensive
financial sanctions were only imposed in 1985. Their effect was, however,
significantly reduced by several debt rescheduling operations and
by the striking loyalty of German and Swiss bankers.
As is convincingly shown in Part I and in the attached
chronology, the decisive issue of the period from 1985 to 1990 was
the intensification of Apartheid South Africa's war against its neighbouring
countries and against the South African population. The transitional
period from 1990 to 1993 was also characterised by a severe policy
of internal destabilisation and by the escalation of violence. Only
well into 1993 was the Apartheid regime prepared to comply with one
of the central conditions for the lifting of sanctions: the holding
of democratic elections according to the principle one-person-one-vote.
The authors are convinced that sanctions and in
particular the financial crisis of the Apartheid regime in relation
to foreign creditors, played an essential role in getting the regime
to the negotiation table. Towards the end of 1989, South Africa was
faced with a serious financial crisis in foreign relations. On the
other hand, the Apartheid regime used foreign credits as an opportunity
to postpone negotiations and to intensify its repression and war.
Should the young democratic state now be burdened with the repayment
of Apartheid-caused debts at the expense of urgent social expenditure?
The many organisations that have joined the campaign clearly say NO.
Those who stuck to the regime by providing foreign
finance are to be considered accomplices. The paper therefore suggests
that either 1989 or 1993 be taken as the cut-off year for the demands
for debt cancellation and that profit transfers from 1985 to 1993
be considered as a reference for reparation demands. . .
The Most Important Financiers of the Apartheid State
Looking at long term debts, 90% are owed to four creditor
countries of the Apartheid regimes: the United States, Germany, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. Up to 1992, the US mainly held assets with
public corporations and compared to Switzerland and Germany much less
assets with public authorities. . .
Furthermore, the research confirms that German companies
and banks were contributing significantly with direct and non direct
investments to maintain the Apartheid regime in power and to prolong
the suffering of the oppressed people. According to estimates made
by the author, the gains made with their odious businesses amounted
to 8.4 billion DM for the period 1971-93 (not considering trade).
This is dirty money, for which compensation should be paid. Well-informed
experts on the South African economy and administration have again
and again asserted that during the critical phase of the late 1980s,
the German and Swiss banks remained utterly loyal to the Apartheid
regime - with high risk increases on the interest paid, though!
This material is being reposted for wider distribution
by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC). APIC's primary objective
is to widen the policy debate in the United States around African
issues and the U.S. role in Africa, by concentrating on providing
accessible policy-relevant information and analysis usable by a wide
range of groups and individuals.
Return to Table of Contents
Africa
Online
By Haines Brown, CCSU History Department, emeritus
In Pretoria on March 23rd INTELSAT
sponsored a three-day pan-African summit, "Internet and New Technologies."
Jointly sponsored by Telkom South Africa, the summit focused on the
use of satellites to improve communications access across Africa.
The summit draws communications operators, equipment
manufacturers and Internet service providers from over 20 African
countries to learn about the Internet backbone and multicasting services
via satellite, TCP/IP enhancements for satellite transmission, interactive
multimedia services, and Integrated VSAT/Wireless Local Loop solutions
for rural telecommunications.
Over 45 African countries already use INTELSAT.
"Africa has experienced extensive growth in Internet services over
the last year," according to Flavien Bachabi, INTELSAT Group Director
for Africa."
In addition to Internet, Telkom South Africa and
operators in over 50 African nations use INTELSAT's satellite communications
products for international and domestic services including public
switched telephony, private business/ VSAT networks, video contribution
and distribution. Over forty African communications entities hold
over US$ 115 million shares in INTELSAT.
INTELSAT owns and operates a global communications
satellite system providing voice/data, Internet and video services
to over 200 countries and territories via satellite. For more information,
visit the INTELSAT Web site at www.intelsat.int.
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