Vol. XXI, Issue 1 (Winter 2014): Cameroon and Nigeria |
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BOARD: Gloria Emeagwali Walton Brown-Foster Haines Brown ISSN 1526-7822 REGIONAL EDITORS: Olayemi Akinwumi
TECHNICAL ADVISOR: Jennifer Nicoletti
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Table of Contents
In this issue of Africa Update we reflect on the
negotiations for independences in Cameroon in the 1960s. The author,
Ngam Confidence Chia of the Department of History, Diplomacy and
International Affairs, introduces
us to the configuration of political groups and societies in the Bamenda
region and argues that the negotiators Ahidjo and
Founcha tried as best as
possible to secure the interests of their various constitutencies. A
federal constitution was finally agreed to by both parties at the July
1961 Foumban conference with some degree of satisfaction from delegates
from both French and British Cameroon. In this issue, we have also a
careful scholarly analysis and evaluation of the Fourth Republic in
Nigeria, 1999 to 2007. Dr.
Adeolu Durotoye, the author, concludes that there was much to be desired
during this critical era of Nigeria's democracy.
In fact the polls were
manipulated and election results compromised in various ways. He argues
that elements of the old, discredited, autocratic regime resurfaced.
Even so there were areas of
positive growth, he points out. We thank the contributors to this issue of Africa
Update for their illuminating and scholarly contributions. Professor Gloria Emeagwali The Realities of Bamenda, Cameroon, 1960s
Ngam Confidence Chia The history of Cameroon since October 1st 1961 is a story of two territories that were far different in political upbringing, social orientation and worldview. They bonded and have paced together through a combined force of negotiation and sacrifice. In this setup, they have over the years deployed alternating means of asserting their identities and forms of cohabitation. In their various encounters and competing trends, they are seen to have deployed alternating strategies to negotiate better treatment or favors from the central government. Critically observed, the North West Region of Cameroon, known and held popularly as Bamenda, has put up a fascinating way of responding to the series of changes that have affected the Cameroon political landscape within this time frame. By tracing the history and contribution of the North West Region taken here simply as Bamenda, this article maps out the different methods, tools and procedures adopted and used by the people of the North West Region to assert themselves in Cameroon history in 1960. It argues that a high spirit of political sensitivity and self-confidence combined to define the Bamenda peoples' political mind-set and prompt responses to the sometimes rough, evolving and unpredictable political topography of Cameroon. This work situates the Bamenda people's history in their wider Anglophone Cameroon context including their ever increasing search for compatibility.
The history of reunification of the two Cameroons and the metamorphosis
they underwent is incomplete without a special focus on the concerted
actions of the people of Bamenda or the North West provinces. Indeed by
mere stroke of fate, divine providence and genuine political
calculation, Bamenda, and by extension the North West Province, became
pace setter in most political events that have marked the history of
reunification for the past five years. This article. besides presenting
the somewhat double role played by the Bamenda people both in building
and restricting efforts at unity, equally goes further afield to argue
that the colorful response so far put up by these people were just
tactful strategies for full attention, greater recognition and an ever
growing willingness for their territory to be treated as an equal
partner in the evolving political landscape of Cameroon. Bamenda in Perspective The area known as Bamenda taken by this paper to mean the capital town of the North West Province and the conglomerates of ethnic entities that reside throughout this region, has undergone and may continue to undergo changing appellations.1 The people comprise of a mixture of people that can be roughly categorized into five different groups. They are for the most part people with claims of Northern origin as far as the Ndobo area around the Bakim River. This corresponds mainly to the Nso, Kom, Bafut, Nkambe, Bum, Babanki, Bambui and a number of groups in the Ndop plain. The second are the Chambas notably the Balis who equally claim a northern origin but are believed to have built a spirit of bravery which occasioned them to fight and conquer a number of established groups of people as they negotiated their ways to their present sites in the Bamenda-Western Plateau. The most prominent ones in the North West Province are the Bali Nyongha and Bali- Kumbat .The third is the Ngemba ethnic group that claimed to have migrated from a basin around Nigeria or just from around the present day Widikum area. In the present North West administrative jurisdiction are mainly the people of Wing, Mankon, Meta, Pinyin and Santa. The fourth which has closer connectivity with the third are those who have been named differently by early ethnographers as the people of the Aghem federation. They claimed to have migrated from Nigeria and settled in different locations around the North West Province. This group is essentially called the people of Aghem and Esimbi, found in the present Menchum division. The fifth is a significant number of the Hausa and the Fulani people who for purposes of long and short distance trade and abundant pasture to feed their cattle, found themselves settled in areas like Nso, Babanki, Kom, Nkambe, Bamenda, Santa and Awing. The North West Province happened to have been one of the last regions to be affected by the tentacles of German colonization; cosmetic system of administration and forms of government which the whole machinery of colonization sought to implant almost everywhere without due respect for functional local realities.2 This system of administration had complete neglect of the realities of traditional states. In this process, the colonialist fought hard to ensure application of their administrative principles. This was the root cause of the resistance encountered both by the Germans and the British colonial systems in Cameroon from 1884 to 1961.Though diametrically different in structure, tone and affection in the domain of foreign policies, the British and the Germans desired as much as possible to rule Cameroon with the use of local resources and man power.3 Obsessed with this goal, the Germans and the British fought hard to raise their colonial doctrine to the heights of religious dogma and grappled in vain to convince the people of Bamenda to accept its effective application, on the ground, without question. The resultant effect was that two systems of administration that shared different profiles, agents and law enforcement mechanisms were bound to co-exist. In any case, the traditional system and the colonial system were forced by this new intercourse to negotiate alternative networks to support their original structures. An outgrowth of this was what Nyamnjoh termed “mutual self-denial”.4 These changes occasioned special changes and forms of negotiations among the above discussed ethnic entities of the North West Province .In the main, the five different groups practiced a form of centralized traditional administration where power, authority, command or leadership was vested in the hands of a single individual who went by different appellations like Fons.5 Surrounding them were a battery of regulatory societies who catered for the daily business of their states. In such setup there was a form of representative democracy since there was a council both at the palace and regional level with a membership freely chosen by trusted elders. The centralized structure failed to create “center- periphery considerations” or “a depreciation complex” where power and the feeling of belonging depreciated as one moved away from the nucleus of authority or central command. There was therefore no reason for the negotiation of any form of network of recognition, consideration or compensation by individuals or groups to exert belonging. It is however argued that the failure to question royalty was linked to the absurd belief.6 Common to the age of absolutism, that, royalty operated within the spirit and full direction of divine providence. This blind submission to the whims and caprices of royalty and its accessories helped to keep some stability among the different groups, though inter-ethnic wars were still largely common..
These were the structures, convictions and loyalties that were uprooted
by colonialism and modernization. In Bamenda or the entire North West
Province of Cameroon the first colonial concept that significantly
helped to destroy blind obedience to royalty and created a spirit of
awareness on the mind-set of the Bamenda people was Christianity. The
teachings of Christianity succeeded in the main in destroying the basic
tenets of tradition. Christianity did not only concentrate on teaching
about Christ and the advantages of leading an upright, honest and
accountable lifestyle but also took further steps to point out those
aspect of African tradition that were considered counterproductive. By
so doing, the concept of royalty and the personalities that incarnated
it gradually shifted away from the position of central command to the
restricted end of traditional elegance which in time also became a
subject of scorn. The British colonial authorities after their
assessment reports carved out the Bamenda area into 23 different Native
Authority areas under different Fons. Most of them were instructed to
rule purely with their traditional competence. This further helped to
sustain the campaign carried out by the missionaries against traditional
administration.
Along with the egalitarian teachings of the Church were forms of
awareness created by the Christian Schools and colonial instruction
centers. At this level the missionaries and the colonial office were
seen to be involved in almost the same kind of business. They were out
to train clerks, liaison officers, messengers and interpreters who could
ease their work on the field and also provide understandable records
whenever an opportunity presented itself. A noticeable outcome of the
broad based education program en vogue, was the emergence of an elite
class who were pointedly few in number but enormous in their
determination and influence. Besides being politically aware, most of
them though still relatively traditional in outlook and mentality were
no longer fully prepared to be led by traditional leaders. A cross
section of them understood that in the ensuing dispensation, leadership
was supposed to rotate only on the shoulders of people with fine brains
like themselves. In this mode of thinking, they came to see the Fon as
individuals with second class leadership skills occupying offices backed
by tradition.
The constant negotiation for full recognition after independence had its
foundation in this background. The constant negotiation for full
recognition also grew from the special circumstances surrounding the
political platform adopted at independence. To this could equally be
added the fact that, the breed of political leaders that negotiated
independence was blessed with a rare openness which warranted awareness
at every level.7
They were the likes of people like John Ngu Foncha,
Augustine Ngom Jua and JK Kangsen all majoring from the Catholic
Schools, S T Muna, Rev Ando
Seh and Sam Boja from a protestant background and Sama Ndi a product of
the NA school in Kom. They
were all the members of the Southern Cameroon House of Assembly that
collapsed as a result of the Eastern regional crises.8
To this list should also be included some of the architects of
this Bamenda spirit like Benard Nsokika Fonlon who though not a deputy
like others in the Eastern Regional House, equally awakened minds to
some of the absurdities of unification. The Network
All politicians in Anglophone Cameroon insisted that their territory be
given Independence first and foremost. As an independent state they
could negotiate the nature of a possible union.9 Their
positions taken in the various meetings leading to the reunification
amounted to nothing - because the plebiscite questions had nothing to do
with that possibility. Indeed, British or the UNs' blatant refusal to
permit the third option as one of the questions to be chosen by the
people in the Cameroons, tilted the balance and pattern of loyalties to
a new direction. To the people in the Northwest, the Wum, Nkambe and
Bamenda divisions, and by extension all of the Cameroons, the absence of
the third options, placed them out of their comfort zone “which in any
case, only gave them the unimagined opportunity to dine and wine with
devils they did not know ……. even for the time being.”10 With
regards to the negotiation,
J.N.Foncha who was and still is accused
of failing to push through the third option, had to peg his political
aspirations on Ahidjo who was
definitely aware that the Independence of French Cameroun was only a
matter of time.
Though the plebiscite questions and the ultimate results chartered new
horizons of bewilderment to many people like A.N.Jua and S.T Muna in the
North West Province, it somehow fell within the reasoning of most
political shades in Southern Cameroons at the time.11
E.M.L Endeley and his CPNC
and P.M.
Kalle and the KPP parties prayed to see the British Cameroon flower and
blossom either within the evolving Nigerian political configuration
after 1961 or as an independent territory. Other political parties
wanted at best, reunification, though the timing, form and content
differed intrinsically. In this circumstance Foncha found a much- ready
audience to imbibe his reunification idea.12
Haunted essentially by the failure to secure the third option
before from the UN as a result of British manipulation, Foncha had
more pro - unificationist feelings
from French Cameroun than Endeley and his group had from Nigeria.
N. N. Mbile was frank enough to give a vivid picture of this
feeling towards reunification when he asserted among other things that:
While Nigerians naturally wished that Southern
Cameroons should remain within the Federation they were not over
enthusiastic about the idea. In contrast, the almost fanatic support
enjoyed by the unificationists from the Cameroun Republic was poorly
matched towards us, the pro-Nigerian advocates.13
Foncha and other political heavy weights began meeting in Buea in May
1961 to determine the shape of the re-unified nation. They soon grew to
discover that there was a mighty future for them. Haunted by a burning
desire to negotiate new ways in the evolving political topography of
British Cameroons, political
leaders decided to bury their past in order to build the future of their
country as a team. These feelings were substantiated in the 1961
conference in New York which had the prime aim of negotiating the best
platform that the union was to take.
14 A joint statement issued at the end of that meeting sufficiently reiterated among other things that a workable future for Southern Cameroons could only be built if both sides buried their grievances. All of them took steps to:
(a) Declare a truce in the political War, calling on every of our
members to reframe from any provocative acts and utterances. Compromise and sacrifice were required from both ends in the political landscape of the soon- to- be- created West Cameroon because it once more attempted, even for the time being, to bring together strange political bed fellows who grappled amidst difficulties to create lasting political negotiations. Though Ngoh, Mbile and Aka16 argue that Foncha's vacillating attitude tremendously weakened the negotiations for a loose federation, the decision by all political leaders in this territory to work together was an indispensable bold step in the right direction.
The Negotiation
Truly independent and neutral with an open door policy and [much
More Like]a beautiful bride committed to no one and courted by all
nations, eager to share potentials of the Country[ and in that capacity
staging] as the envy of Africa because of its unparalleled historical
precedents including the many unique possibilities [alongside the]
unlimited opportunities for social progress that the future promised[or
that were largely looming in the blues].17 To him, Ahidjo and French Cameroun despite their political upbringing and by extension philosophical orientation were still essentially brothers that had been accidentally put asunder by the sledge hammer of colonial intrigue. The Bamenda conference in the mind of Foncha was to work out this kind of unique political configuration which if tenaciously applied, could set the standards to many yet to be independent African states of that era. Southern Cameroonians of all walks of life had the opportunity to match their words with action, in the Mankon meeting. In attendance was Foncha himself and ST Muna for the KNDP; N.N.Mbile in his capacity as Endeleys' deputy; and P.N.Motomby Woleta as General Secretary of the CPNC.18 The One Kameroun Party (OK) was represented by Ndeh Ntumazah and Albert Mukong while the chiefs were represented by Galiga III of Bali and Oben of Mamfe. Though approaches and expectations differed, these people were out to negotiate and defend a comfortable network for themselves and the succeeding generations. They were definitely not aware of impending intrigues from their French counterparts but of the complexities of building everything from scratch. In this spirit, Foncha never minced his words in his key note address to the delegation in attendance:
The constitution that which we are about to recommend is being drawn
from scratch.it is [intended] to bring two different cultures together
into a workable form. As something just beginning, it is not
contemplated that it will be perfect at once. It has to grow steadily
and may I remind all delegations that constitutional conferences can
only be successful when all concerned argue their points with conviction
which stems from sincerity of purpose. This is where cooperation is
needed.19
This notwithstanding, Willard fervently argues that Foncha's proposal at
the Bamenda all party conferences were weak-willed and in that capacity,
failed to prepare the southern Cameroonian for the task that awaited
them in the union.20 As per the reasoning of Foncha diagnosed
in his address above, there was definitely a need for full collaboration
so that the delegations could implant strong pillars to stand the weight
of la Republique in the soon to be effected Federal union. This address
equally indicated that his early negotiations with Ahidjo amounted to
nothing worth genuine consideration in such a high profile meeting. In a
way, his speech sounded like a surprise to most members in that meeting
who were so eager to know the content and nature of the discussions that
had been so far undertaken by Foncha and Ahidjo. This eagerness made
Ndeh Ntumazah representative of One Kamerun to address the delegates
emphasizing that:
We have been informed now and again of constitutional talks that have
been going on between the Government of Southern Cameroons and the
United Kingdom's Government on one hand and the Government of the
Kamerun Republic on the other. We think it is not only importantly but
absolutely necessary that we be given a full and complete [sic] report
of these consultations...21
Pointedly, the delegates at this conference were burdened by the
overriding zeal of negotiating a comfortable network within which their
intrinsic identities will not be swallowed up in the Federation. In this
spirit, there were some disagreements in the structure of the union but
all of them aspired for a loose federation with a ceremonial president.
In this kind of political framework, they hoped not to sacrifice their
culture and philosophical orientation which differed largely with that
of their French counterparts.
In all of this, the delegates debated and settled on some key issues
which they viewed to be capable of putting in place their much dreamt
about “loose Federation” The proposal to be taken to the Foumban
constitutional talks as agreed by the delegations at the Bamenda all
party Conference were (a) that the seat of the Federal capital was to be
transferred or moved from Yaounde back to Douala,22 (b) that
the French Legal System in all its ramifications should be applied only
in French Cameroun while the British Legal System(Common Law)be applied
in British Southern Cameroons,(c) that the President as head of the
federal state should have nominal powers with more powers vested on the
Federal states,(d)that a bicameral legislature be created with the
maintenance of a House of Chiefs and the customary Courts in Southern
Cameroons,(e)that state citizenship and federal citizenship were to be
treated separately AND among other things (f) that a quota of
ministerial portfolios at the federal level was to be reserved for each
state.23
The Foumban Arrangements
Ahidjo and Foncha continued meeting after the Bamenda all party
conference. The Foumban Conference of July 17th-21st 1961 was attended
by people of all walks of life in both French and British Cameroon.24
Though both delegations
were preoccupied with the frank exchange of views to draw up an
acceptable constitution for the Federal Republic, they had contrasting
views on the nature of the federation. As indicated earlier, Ahidjo
wanted as much as possible to put in place a strongly centralized
structure, which by the logic of his argument, was capable of nurturing
and safeguarding national unity. Foncha and the Southern Cameroon
delegations on their part wanted a loose Federation with a kind of
ceremonial president as head. Though personal interest seemed to be at
the center of each argument put up in favor of the nature of the
federation, the two camps were definitely battling to instill the kind
of political structure they mastered best.25
At best, there was a growing need for the two delegations to
understand the proposals of each state within the context of its history
for anything of substance to be effected at Foumban. This understanding
could not come without a significant deal of tolerance which warranted
readjustments on both sides. It was for these reasons that most of the
points advanced by the Southern Cameroon delegations at the Bamenda All
Party Conference were never bought on wholesale basis by Ahidjo and his
delegation. This also goes a long way to explain why the Southern
Cameroon delegation found it sufficiently difficult to swallow “hook
line and sinker” the centralized federal scheme proposed by Ahidjo and
his delegation at Foumban. The difficulties encountered by both delegations and states enabled them to accept the federal structure proposed by Ahidjo easily. In rethinking Cameroon unification, accusation has been levied on Foncha for “concealing the draft constitution” proposed to him by Ahidjo before the Bamenda all party conference and failing to prepare the southern Cameroon delegations and the people therein for the Federal experiment.26 It suffices, however, to note that the federal constitution that was finally accepted and allowed to be fully developed at Foumban was an experiment that upheld some of the pertinent stakes that could guarantee an effective network of power and opportunities for West Cameroon. Even if Ahidjo hated unification to the core as it is argued and only accepted it reluctantly, he however had the skills of leadership and persuasiveness to convince the Southern Cameroon delegation to accept far less than what they aspired to get. The final resolutions of Foumban were arrived at through negotiations. West Cameroon identity and cultural values were still protected in the new constitution.
Introduction This article is a study in democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The third wave of democratization that swept through Africa from the early 1990s brought hope that democracy is after all not an aberration to the continent of Africa. Many heaved a sigh of relief when Nigeria, expected to lead other African countries by example by virtue of its size and resources, returned to a democratic regime in 1999, after it had wasted such an opportunity 6 years earlier when the military junta of General Ibrahim Babangida annulled an election adjudged by both local and international observers as the freest and fairest in the history of Nigeria in 1993.
Since 1999, how far has Nigeria gone in its democratic journey? This is
the task this paper has set for itself. The article will explore
different paradigms of democratic consolidation in its discourse of
Nigeria's 4th Republic. The performance of the different institutions of
democracy in Nigeria's 4th democratic enterprise will be assessed. To be
sure, we will weave our thesis around whether Nigeria's 4th attempt at
democracy has been a success or not.
The article is organized in four sections. Section one will look at the
state of the debate on democratic consolidation in Africa towards
forging a timely assessment of the trends of democratization in Africa.
Section two will dwell on the different practices that were considered
antithetical to democratic consolidation between 1999 and 2007, while
also looking at the different institutions of democracy in Nigeria's 4th
republic. Section three beamed a searchlight on the menace of political
violence and political assassinations during the period under review.
Section four discussed 2007 general elections in Nigeria.
The State of the Art in Democratic Consolidation in Africa
Different writers have written on the state of democracy in Africa.
A school of thought had given a
sordid picture of the democratization project in Africa. Said
Adejumobi's work on Elections in Africa is very instructive here.
(Adejumobi: 2000). “Election rigging and brigandage, violence and
election annulment are common practices. The trend is towards a reversal
to the old order of despotic political rulership under the guise of
civil governance. Elections in their current form in most African states
appear to be a fading shadow of democracy, endangering the fragile
democratic project itself.” (p.59). He lamented that although elections
constitute the most important element in the conception and practice of
democracy, elections and the electoral process have become the major
victims in the dangerous descend of African “democratic regimes' towards
‘democratic retreat”. He elucidates the functions of elections in a
democracy as including a symbol of popular sovereignty and the
expression of the “social pact” between the state and the people, the
defining basis of political authority, legitimacy and citizens'
obligations, the kernel of political accountability and a means of
ensuring reciprocity and exchange between governors and the governed,
and a basis for leadership recruitment and socialization. (p.60). Using
the examples of Zambia and the Gambia, among others, Adejumobi stated
“In most African countries, recent developments suggest that elections
are only an expedient political exercise of ruling regimes, partly
because of their economic implications in terms of external aid flows
and economic assistance, and partly because of their public relations
advantage in propping up the political profile of the regime in the
international arena. Even where those regimes came into power through
popular elections as in Zambia, they have since relapsed into autocratic
rule, conducting “fabricated” elections. Thus the dominant practice is
that most rulers organize an electoral “coup d'état” which ensures their
“selection” in the name of a popular electoral process. The tactics
employed include stifling opposition parties and reducing them to
docility, covertly corrupting the electoral process or embarking on
outright election rigging” (p.66). The scenario described above
approximates to what has been tagged elsewhere “liberal Machiavellian
election” (Huntington, S. and C.R. Moore, C.R:1970)
Richard Joseph indeed pronounced in his work that lack of elections in a
democracy will lead to a state of “political decay”. “Renewal in
democratic systems usually occurs via elections. Any political system
which does not undergo such will ultimately atrophy and suffer decay”.
(Joseph, R: 1990). Patrick Chabal: 1998, (pp.289-303) reviewed the state
of democracy in Zambia and Kenya under Chiluba and Moi respectively.
Although a review of the number of African countries that have embraced
democratization since the 1990s may show that democracy is being
consolidated in Africa, Chabal observed “there are also indications that
the process of democratization, such as it is, is fraying at the edges.
In the first place, there is the persistent claim that multi-party
elections are controlled and distorted, when not actually rigged, by
incumbent regimes. Secondly, there is the nagging doubt that
democratically elected regimes have every intention of subverting the
momentum for political liberalization by ruling much as the previous
one-party regimes did. Thirdly, there are very obvious limits to the
actual democratic nature of functioning multi-party systems, chief of
which seems to be that such systems have no place for political
opposition. Finally, and most ominously, there is the unavoidable fact
that where multi-party elections have failed to bring about genuine
improvements, Africans have begun to lose faith in “democracy' (P.290).
Another school of thought argued that only a “home-grown” democracy will
survive in Africa. Guy Martin:1993, in his contribution to this debate
noted “…economic and political change in Africa will succeed only if it
is a home-grown, indigenous process, initiated by the African people
themselves, taking into account their own historical, social and
cultural values and traditions.” (p.7). According to him, real democracy
goes beyond dormal trappings of democratic political systems. “Any
effort to superimpose a specific narrow formula of democracy could lead
to mere formal compliance, such as allowing multipartism without “real
democracy”. In this context, “real democracy” means substantive (as
opposed to formal) democracy. Real democracy goes beyond the formal
trappings of democratic political systems (such as multipartism and
elections) to include such elements as accountability and genuine
popular participation in the nation's political and economic
decision-making process. If democracy is to be sustained over time, firm
foundations for democratic institutions must be created in accordance
with local circumstances, and a democratic culture firmly grounded in
African values and traditions must be built”. (p.7)Claude Ake felt the
same way. (Claude Ake: 1993). Ake was right to say that the present
nature of democracy in Africa has not transferred power to the people
but rather “there is an increased awareness among Africans that the
monopoly of power enjoyed by failed leadership has to be broken in order
that power can be transferred to the people…That is why demonstrations
for democratization persist in spite of repression” (p.240). He also
dwells on the nature of the African ruling elite; “in the case of many
African leaders of the (democracy) movement, democracy is largely a
strategy for power, not a vehicle for popular empowerment” (p.240). A third school of thought argues that African democracies have been bedeviled by lack of strong political institutions necessary to solidify democratic practices.
In his work on “Democratic Transitions in
Africa since the 1990s, published in Africa Update, Vol. XIII, Issue 3
(Summer 2006):, this author reviewed the state of democratic
consolidation in Africa and concluded, “To be sure, about 40 of the 48
sub-Saharan African countries had undergone significant political
reforms in the early 1990s, with some concluding the first competitive
elections in a generation. However, few political institutions were
strengthened by regime transition. In most cases, the State's ability to
respond to citizen's needs, by ensuring law and order throughout the
nation, and by providing basic services to low-income populations is
still seriously deficient in many countries. Judicial and legislative
institutions remained weak, while past practices of clientelism, rent
seeking, and fraud remained well and alive. Although one-party and
military rule have become defunct, ruling parties have continued to
embark on a monopolistic style of rule while opposition parties, the
press, labor unions, and other pressure groups have not proved strong
enough to enforce the accountability, and transparency needed for
democratic governance”. Obasanjo's Undemocratic Practices and the Institutions of Democracy Enormous harm was done to politics and democracy in Nigeria's 4th Republic. “Many people in the opposition believe that the President has bequeathed, even foisted, on the polity and political process a culture of impunity that is at once undemocratic and disdainful of the Constitution and the rule of law. Apart from his alleged disregard for the law, which is said to make him disobey rulings of courts, the President is also accused of introducing into the electoral process, in his party and invariably in the country's political system a strange tradition of hand-picking of candidates by a cabal of political elite. Critics point to the way he single-handedly imposed the presidential candidacy of Umaru Musa Yar' Adua on the party and the manner he went about ensuring his victory at the polls, using state institutions to muscle opposition and enhance his anointed person's chances”. It is believed that Obasanjo has aided the perpetration of the most fraudulent election process in Nigeria, which in itself is an act of corruption but Obasanjo seems unperturbed by this criticism insisting that “democracy is not a destination. It is a journey and there's no country in the world that would say it has reached the end of the journey of democracy.” (Tell Magazine) Nigeria's 4th Republic witnessed a measure of undemocratic and sometimes dictatorial practices on the part of the executive arm of government symbolized by President Olusegun Obasanjo. On more than one occasion, the President had to battle impeachment moves by the two houses of the National Assembly for engaging in “unconstitutional and impeachable” practices. In 2002, members of the House of Representatives release what they called Obasanjo's impeachable offences. The House requires one-third of the total 360 members to kick-start the process of impeachment, which amounts to 120 members; while a two-third (240 members) is required to effect the impeachment on the floor of the House. Obasanjo was accused of running the country like his Ota farm.
Unilateral Declaration of the Office of the Vice-President Vacant
President Olusegun Obasanjo's decision to unilaterally declare Vice
President Atiku Abubakar's seat vacant for moving to another Political
Party was clearly unconstitutional. The 1999 constitution clearly stated
that the VP seizes to hold his office on account of death, ill-health
capable of undermining his office, resignation or impeachment. Obasanjo
used the PDP national executive committee meeting on the eve of December
25 2006 to declare the office of Vice President Atiku Abubakar vacant
and withdrew all the privileges attached to Atiku as Vice President. He
did not stop there, he ordered a sack of all the VP's security, protocol
and domestic staff; and also sealed up his office and residence. The justification was that the VP, having joined another political party, lacked a platform that could allow him to continue to occupy that office, and the office was now deemed vacant. According to Obasanjo's party, this satisfies the provision in Section 146 (3) (C) to the effect that the Vice President's seat can become vacant ‘for any other reason'.”
According to section 143. (1) of the Nigerian constitution, the
President or Vice-President may be removed from office in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(2) Whenever a notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less
than one-third of the members of the National Assembly:
(a) is presented to the President of the Senate;
Sections 144, 145 and 146 make further provisions in that misconduct;
permanent incapacitation; death; resignation or impeachment represent
the only other bases upon which either post holder can be removed. The
president, by declaring the position of his VP vacant appeared to have
assumed the position of the legislature, and the judiciary. The Supreme
Court has since ruled that the president does not have the
constitutional right to remove his deputy.
Unilateral Withdrawal of Public Funds
The President was accused of withdrawing 2.1billion naira from the
excess crude oil funds in March, 2006. Following speculations that the
presidency had been fiddling with the fund, President Obasanjo quickly
opened up that he had made the withdrawal to supplement the cost of the
extension of the national census. Curiously, Obasanjo did not bother to
inform the National Assembly. In a letter to the House of
Representatives, Obasanjo claimed $17, 290,067; (about 2.1 billion
naira) was withdrawn after he had convened an emergency meeting of the
“stakeholders”. He mentioned only some state governors and the Revenue
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission as the stakeholders who
apparently induced him to make the withdrawal. The constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria expressly forbids such. Section 80(3) of the
1999 constitution states that no monies shall be withdrawn from any
public fund of the federation, unless the issue of those money has been
authorized by an Act of the National Assembly. So, the President in this
case disregarded the constitution. He claimed to have held a meeting
with some governors he did not mention even when the 1999 constitution
did not permit him to withdraw such monies with the governors' approval.
Non-Implementation of the Budget
Obasanjo become infamous for breaching the constitution with reckless
abandon, since the advent of his government in 1999, the president did
not fully implement any of the annual budgets approved by the National
Assembly. Instead, selective implementation of the Appropriation Act was
the rule rather than the exception.
Unilateral Granting of Loans to Foreign Countries
In 2004,Obasanjo unilaterally granted Ghana and the Republic of Sao Tome
and Principe unauthorized loans. Only when uproar broke out across the
country over the presidential largesse did he dash to the National
Assembly to legitimize unconstitutional indulgence. In the heat of the
frenzy to pay off the debt owed the Paris Club of Creditors, the Senate
passed a motion forbidding Obasanjo from dabbling into the federation
account. In a letter to the Senate dated September 9, 2005, Obasanjo had
requested for approval to withdraw $2.4billion from the account as the
government's counterpart fund for the Power Sector Development Scheme
(PSDS). He also requested for $12.4 billion to settle the balance of the
debt owed the Paris Club. In its resolution on the letter, the Senate
told the president that PSDS fund would be obtained only after it had
been appropriated by relevant authority as required by law. It, however,
approved the $12.4 billion to settle the balance of the debt owed the
Paris Club. The president was alleged later to have withdrawn the $12.4
billion from the federation account instead of the Consolidated Revenue
Fund Account which the senate specified in addition to the withdrawal of
the$2.4 billion PSDS fund without waiting for the approval of the
relevant authorities as required by law. The House of Representatives
Committee on Public Finance and Appropriation disclosed that
investigations conducted clearly showed that impeachable offences have
been willfully committed by the same man who had sworn to uphold the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The panel's chairman,
Hon. Farouk Lawal, bluntly stated that the president's action was,
indeed, padded with irregularities. According to him “the series of
constitutional violations by the president is legion, flagrant
disobedience of court order, unauthorized use of the military such as
Odi and Zaki Biam,the withholding of the local governments of Lagos
State funds against the ruling of the Supreme Court just to mention but
a very few. Constitutional democracy as it is operated in Nigeria is
predicated on the rule of law, but in a situation where those that swore
on oath to uphold the constitution, are wantonly violating the
constitution, then such characters on the political landscape should be
tactically eased out of the system, so that the country can have a
sustainable democratic culture, thereby deepening the roots of democracy
in the country”.
In 2002, Ghali Umar NaAbba, the then speaker of the House of
Representatives, and his colleagues made frantic efforts to stop what
they perceived to be an emerging dictatorship that had no regard for the
rule of law. Some of the allegations of impeachable offences against the
President and the relevant sections of the constitution he breached
included (a) disregard of the Supreme Court ruling with respect to the
release of local government funds to Lagos State. This is contrary to
Sections 235 and 162 (5) of the Constitution. (b) Extra Budgetary
spending is against section 80 (1) & (4) (c) Falsification of 2005
budget ( in any form) is against the provision of section 80 (2,3 & 4).
(d)Non-implementation of budgets and disregard for rule of law against
sections 1 (2) and 80 (e)Abuse of power section 15 (5)Violation or
misuse of section 305 (e)Loans to Sao-Tome & Principe, section 80
(f)Accomplice in the Anambra State saga based on the admission contained
in the Presidential letter to the former Chairman of the People
Democratic Party (PDP), Chief Audu Ogbeh. (g)Obstruction by not
providing the National Assembly with his ministry's book as the Minister
of Petroleum Affairs, sections 88 and 89. (h) Promoting an economic
policy that negates the provisions of section 15 of the Constitution
(i)Promoting a university education policy that negates sections 18 (1c)
and 4(3) (j)A privatization policy that violates sections 162 (c&d) and
15 (5) (k)Violation of section 15(5) by employing two of his children
and making his son a de facto oil minister (l)Making El-Rufai the
Chairman of the Federal Capital Territory” (see Vanguard Newspaper:
Impeachable offences: How far can the Reps go this time?, May 15, 2005).
The Third Term Agenda
Third Term Agenda is a term which was used to describe alleged,
controversial attempts by supporters of Nigerian President Olusẹgun
Ọbasanjọ to change the constitution to allow for a third term in office.
The 1999 constitution had provided a maximum of two terms of office for
the President. This led to a political media uproar in Nigeria, which
resulted in a bill which recommended for the amendment of the
constitution to be defeated in Nigeria's Senate. President Olusegun
Obasanjo's allies wanted him to amend the constitution in order to run
for a third term in 2007. The argument was that the President needed
more time to implement his economic reforms. Though the president
himself maintained that he would respect the constitution of the
country, he was no doubt behind the efforts to amend the constitution
allegedly to prolong the tenure of the President and the State
governors. The Vice President openly opposed the third term agenda. He
had told the BBC that “We have seen how tinkering with the constitution
to allow for tenure elongation in some African countries led to
sit-tight dictatorships”. Despite Obasanjo's attempts to distance
himself publicly from the effort, it was widely seen in Nigeria as
emanating from his office. In another breath in an April 2006 interview
with The Washington Post, Obasanjo said that he had not decided whether
to run again but that a third term would allow him to complete
initiatives he started in his previous seven years in office. "The
reforms that we are putting in place have to be anchored, anchored in
legislation, anchored in institutions," he said. Opposition lawmakers
alleged that millions of dollars in bribes were offered to those who
agreed to support a third term. To cheers from opponents, the president
of the Senate, Ken Nnamani, ruled that a voice vote had defeated the
measure introduced by Obasanjo's allies and that "the Senate has said
clearly and eloquently that we should discontinue other proceedings on
this amendment." The proposed amendment needed two-thirds of the vote to
pass in Nigeria's federal and regional Parliaments. The rejection of the
constitutional amendment that would have got a third term for the
president was the major achievement of the legislative arm in the 4th
Republic.
It is generally believed that the Nigerian judiciary has fared well in
the 4th Republic going by many landmark political cases it has handled.
The judiciary upturned 3 impeachment cases that were carried out
unconstitutionally in some of the States. In the few months leading to
the April elections, the performance of the judiciary inspired a lot of
public confidence. The judiciary won public's confidence because it was
the only body or institution that stood up to Obasanjo's bidding over
the issue of whether Vice-President Atiku Abubakar should be allowed to
contest the presidential poll or not. The Supreme Court, in an 11th hour
ruling just days before the April 21 ballot, cleared Abubakar to run
after he had been disqualified by the electoral commission INEC on
grounds he was indicted for corruption by the anti-graft body EFCC. The
speed and courage with which cases were disposed of prior to the 2007
elections was an indication of what is possible if the judiciary is
truly determined to perform its important role in deepening democracy.
More decisions had been delivered against the government than at any
time in the history of the Nigeria. The Supreme Court helped to
illuminate the dark areas of the constitution.
Judiciary watchers contended that the dismissal of some state high court
judges who aided and abetted the subversion of the constitution in the
impeachment of governors in Ekiti, Plateau and Anambra states had
salutary effect on the bench.
Even the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which by law
was supposed to be neutral abandoned its assignment as an arbiter and
became openly partisan pretending at the same time that it was neutral.
The Supreme Court justices appropriately upbraided both INEC and the
police during the declaration of the office of the vice president's
saga. This posture of independence of the judiciary is unsurpassed in
the annals of Nigeria's political history.
The Media and the Civil Society
The Nigerian media was up and doing in its function as the 4th estate of
the realm. For instance, between 1999 and 2007, the media reported more
than 70 incidents of election-related violence leading to more than 70
deaths. The media was very dispassionate with its reporting of the 3rd
term moves by the president and his apologists. The fact that some
electronic media covered the third term debate live cautioned the
senators who knew their constituents were watching. Nigeria has a very
vibrant civil society. This is partly due to the many years of military
dictatorship that has thrown up myriads of civil society organizations
originally established to oppose military dictatorship. The civil
society is expected to check corruption and abuse of power (whistle
blowing), stimulate and lead debates on national issues, engender free
flow of information. The media is a barometer for testing the effect and
efficacy of government's reforms, collaborate in diagnosis and feedback,
perform monitoring functions on the government, and its programs, and
forge strategic alliance with the legislature to ensure constituency
feedback information sharing.
The Political Parties
The Political parties, especially the big three-PDP, AC, and ANPP
resorted to selection of party candidates thereby barring popular
candidates who may not be in the good books of the political godfathers
and party leaders from contesting most of the elections.
Besides, the PDP has been accused of killing democracy in the country by
deliberately subverting opposition parties through blackmail and
planting of moles in their ranks.
The political parties are anything but democratic in their activities
especially in the selection of candidates.
The Military
At the time of his swearing-in in 1999, many Nigerians were cynical
about the chances of the government lasting long.
The fear of the military staging a comeback hung thick in the air. The
president himself must have sensed it, because his very first action in
office was the unexpected but tactical retirement of all military chiefs
and their immediate replacement. That action was followed by the
retirement of all military officers who had held political appointments
in the preceding military regime. The steps were widely applauded and
they sent a clear message to the barracks and officers' messes that the
military must henceforth subject itself to control by civil government.
Obasanjo's military reforms brought about a cordial civil-military
relations especially at the top of the echelon. Immediately Obasanjo was
sworn in, he engaged the services of the MPRI. MPRI is a US based
consulting outfit made up of retired military and intelligence officers
is a training, simulation and government services company of highly
skilled and experienced military, law enforcement, diplomatic and
private sector leaders with uncompromising professionalism who apply
integrity, innovative ideas and integrated solutions to defense and
national security challenges. With more than 3,000 employees worldwide,
MPRI serves the national security needs of the US government, selected
foreign governments, international organizations and the private sector
with programs of the highest standards and methodologies of proven
effectiveness. MPRI had been engaged in training the Nigerian military
in the art of civil-military relations to ensure that the Nigerian
military is subservient to the civilian authority. The MPRI engagement
has not gone down well with most top officers of the Nigerian military
who felt MPRI had other hidden agenda and this indeed led to the removal
of Obasanjo's first Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu who refused
to cooperate with the officials of MPRI arguing that doing so will pose
a threat to national security.
Political Violence and Political Assassination in the 4th Republic
Between 1999 and 2007, Nigeria witnessed the highest rate of politically
motivated killings and violence compared to any of the three previous
republics. With the incessant wave of politically motivated killings,
political assassination was introduced as an instrument of politics in
Nigeria. Although some of the killings were been discountenanced as
ordinary murders, the timing of killings left no doubt that political
assassinations were far too common occurrence during the period and
actions by the government and police to stem the problem proved
insufficient and ineffective. Just before the April 2007 general
elections, Nigeria's police chief, Sunday Ehindero lamented the spate of
political violence in the run-up to the elections. “Now coming down to
the security situation in the country in relation to the 2007 elections,
I have to inform you that we have arms in large quantities in our
society; proliferation of arms and ammunitions in our society…There is a
big threat of proliferation of arms and ammunitions in this country.
Some politicians do carry arms during rallies…It is a truism that
election plays an important role in our democracy; in fact, without
election, there cannot be democracy. However, elections since the 1960s
have had their own problems of violence and acrimony. As we approach the
2007 elections, there appears to be a spate of political violence.
Politics is about competition for power and of all the criteria of
development, be it social, economic or cultural; it is the political
criterion that takes the lead particularly in our own system. This is
because the stakes are high. That is why all methods are used to achieve
political power, including violence. There ought to be a fundamental
moral base in politics and the Machiavellian principle of the ends
justify the means may not be acceptable. (Nigeria's Inspector General of
Police (IG) Sunday Ehindero speaking to the Senate in the run-up to the
2007 elections).
The 4th Republic has witnessed a circus of unresolved Political
Assassinations in Nigeria.
The 2007 elections
The April 14 and 21 State and Federal elections in Nigeria were marred
by different kinds of malpractices bordering mainly, but not absolutely,
on the manipulation of the electoral process by the ruling party, the
PDP. Supported by the INEC (The Independent Electoral Commission), and
the police, and in some places the military, and a retinue of thugs, the
ruling party explored intimidation, ballot box snatching and stuffing,
physical assault, and “votes allocation” to outwit its opponents and the
wishes of the people. The elections petitions tribunals annulled most of
the elections and new elections were ordered in many states across the
country. The judiciary had proved as the bastion of democratic
consolidation once again.
A few days after the elections, Nigeria's senate president, Ken Nnamani
painted a bleak picture of general elections in Nigeria, leaving his
audience that included former United States (U.S.) Secretary of State,
Miss Madeline Albright, awe-struck. Albright led a delegation of the
Washington D.C.-based global organisation, the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), to monitor the presidential and National Assembly
elections. According to Nnamani "Last Saturday's elections….were
fundamentally flawed and foreign intervention is needed for the country
to get it right in future…The problem we have had in Nigeria is that
every succeeding election is worse than the previous one. In other
words, the election of 1999 was better than that of 2003 and if care is
not taken, (that of 2003) will be better than that of 2007." He also
told his visitors that the proliferation of political parties was an
albatross on the country's democracy, suggesting that the number be
reduced to two in future. "The party in power enjoys monopoly because it
has the resources, it has the size, it dictates the pace and you can't
blame it. And with the proliferation, there is no way any of the parties
will be strong enough to match the ruling party. … For as long as we
practice impunity and the big party must win every place, it must muscle
its way. If it can't do it by mobile Police, it does it with soldiers.
As long as that is the case, we are deceiving ourselves. Our democracy
is not growing”. Conclusion
No doubt, a critical look at Nigeria's 4th Republic starting from 1999
to 2007 would reveal an admixture of both the positive and the negative.
A regime analysis of Nigeria since independence will reveal that no
government has been as focused as the Obasanjo's regime of the 4th
Republic. One could say the development project which Claude Ake said
never commenced because the political preconditions were generally
nonexistent in Africa took off in 1999. This may be due in part to
Obasanjo's experience having ruled as a military head of state between
1976 and 1979, and an assemblage of a team of technocrats who were not
necessarily politicians. The president, especially during his second
term of office, gathered a team of good economists under a new finance
minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, previously a World Bank economist and
vice-president. The team drew up an ambitious clutch of reforms focusing
on job cuts in the public sector, investment in agriculture and
infrastructure, and a new drive to speed up halting privatizations.
Obasanjo also did well in the area of diplomacy winning respect for
Nigeria in the committee of nations. His anti-corruption drive was also
commendable. Although sometimes used as political instruments, the
culture of probity has been strengthened by the intervention of agencies
of scrutiny and investigation like the ICPC and EFCC.
It was clear however that democracy in Nigeria could not be described as
“real democracy” during the period under study in view of the different
kinds of anti-democratic practices by the political class. Election
rigging and brigandage, violence and election annulment were common
practices. The trend is towards a reversal to the old order of despotic
political rulership under the guise of civil governance. One cannot but
agree that elections in Nigeria in the period under study were a fading
shadow of democracy, endangering the fragile democratic project itself.
The use of state power and security privilege to harass and intimidate
the challenger's machinery was widespread. Harassment of the opposition
was the most intransigent legacy that has survived from the locust years
of military autocracy, and those who are deeply concerned about the
survival of democracy might be tempted to believe that this legacy could
abort the survival of democratic values in the nation.
The role of the legislature and the judiciary during the period showed
that all hope is not yet lost in the match towards democratic
consolidation in Nigeria. Unlike most African countries, Nigerian
democracy had been strengthened by strong political institutions
necessary to solidify democratic practices. Democratic contest is alive
even though battered.
**The author presented an extended version of this paper at Dartmouth
College, Massachusetts, USA when on an exchange scholarly visit from the
University of Ibadan. He was at Ibadan as Lecturer in the Department of
Political Science. He was also a Visiting
Professor, Department of
Political Science, University of Toronto at Mississauga. | ||||
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