Vol. XVIII, Issue 4 (Fall 2011): Libya, Nigeria, Brazil's Berimbrown |
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BOARD: Gloria Emeagwali Walton Brown-Foster Haines Brown ISSN 1526-7822 REGIONAL EDITORS: Olayemi Akinwumi
TECHNICAL ADVISOR: Jennifer Nicoletti For more information
on AfricaUpdate |
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Table of contents
By early September, 2011, the
rebels and self-styled revolutionaries of Libya gained the upper
hand militarily, in Benghazi and several Libyan regions, with
massive military help from NATO, under the guise of “R2P”
humanitarianism. As early as August 2011,
BBC World News once
respected for its impartiality and reasoned journalism,
jubilantly declared victory on behalf of NATO. The failure of
the Western based rebels to gain regions such as Sirte and Bani
Walid, by mid September 2011, however, implied that the euphoria
was premature.
The hard reality is that the
battle for Libya continues, and there are yet several possible
outcomes, namely, the Afghan model of intra-regional fighting,
intermittent suicide bombs and American troops on the ground,
and, the Somali model of permanent warfare- in collision with
U.S drones and more moderate Islamic interest groups. When
diamond-rich Katanga attempted to secede from the newly
independent Congo in the 1960s, it ultimately failed.
Nigeria's Biafra was not
able to breakaway and declare independence, despite the brutal
civil war of 1970 -3. Conversely, oil - rich Benghazi has chosen
to be part of the new Libya and not secede completely, but it is
difficult to say how long the entire region can stay unified
under its direction, given the nature of the intervention,
lingering suspicions of Western self interest, and the
ideological disparity within the rebel group, some of whom,
alas, may be al-Qaida sympathizers. The best case scenario for
Libya would be regional reconciliation and reconstruction, done
on the basis of democracy, respect for human rights, and free
and fair elections. Time will tell if that is possible.
*During his forty two year
tenure, the erratic ruler of Libya, Moammar Gaddafi, supported
numerous activist groups around the world including the
anti-apartheid African
National Congress and the
Irish Republican Army.
He also supported the
notorious Charles Taylor and his rebel group, RUF, and as
pointed out by Museveni, Idi Amin, Gaddafi's plan to introduce
in Africa a common gold-based currency, the dinar, did not
endear him to Western power brokers, despite his willingness to
collaborate in U.S backed torture programs such as
Rendition. Gaddafi's
attempt to replace the Sanusi dynasty, that he overthrew in
1969, with his own, weakened his support domestically. In the
final analysis, it is
most unlikely that Moammar Gaddafi will recover the Libyan seat
of power, even though his
friends around the world are probably
no smaller in number than
his enemies, given his largesse and spasmodic signs of courage
and rebellion in the first three decades of his rule.
We include in this issue of
Africa Update an analysis of the Libyan situation by Yoweri Museveni,
who wrote this piece in the early days of the conflict.
President Museveni of
Uganda is by no means a role model for democracy. He has been
accused of electoral malpractice and human rights abuses, by his
critics. His commentary on Libya, however, remains informative,
lucid and illuminating. It sheds light on the academic and
cultural background of Museveni and
his peers, and the life and times of Muammar Gaddafi. The balance sheet, listing the negative and positive activities of Mr.
Gaddafi, is helpful for those seeking
a dispassionate account of the Gaddafi saga.
Dr.
Sule Bello of the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello
University, Zaria, Nigeria delivered a lecture to the National
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPPS), in February
2011, on the issue of good governance. We have included that
address in this issue of
Africa Update.
The
issue concludes with a
brief interview with Mestre
Negoativo of Berimbrown,
the internationally acclaimed, Brazilian, Congo Pop Band, that
has been deeply inspired by African culture.
Dr. Gloria Emeagwali
Let Libyans
Solve Their Own Problems By the time Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, I was a Third Year university student at Dar es Salaam. We welcomed him because he was in the tradition of Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt who had a nationalist and pan- Arabist position. Soon, however, problems cropped up with Gaddafi as far as Uganda and Black Africa are concerned: 1. Idi Amin came to power with the support of Britain and Israel because they thought he was uneducated enough to be used by them. Amin, however, turned against his sponsors when they refused to sell him guns to fight Tanzania. Unfortunately, Gaddafi, without getting enough information about Uganda, jumped in to support Amin presumably because Amin was a ‘Muslim' and Uganda was a ‘Muslim country' where Muslims were being “oppressed”' by Christians. Amin executed a lot of people and Gaddafi was identified with these mistakes. In 1972 and 1979, Gaddafi sent Libyan troops to defend Amin when we attacked him. 2. The second big mistake was Gaddafi's position vis-à-vis the African Union. Since 1999, he has been pushing for a United States of Africa. We tried to politely point out to Gaddafi that this was difficult in the short and medium term. We should, instead, aim at the Economic Community of Africa and, where possible, also aim at regional federations. Gaddafi would not relent. He would not respect the rules of the AU. He would resurrect something that has been covered by previous meetings. He would ‘overrule' a decision taken by all other African Heads of State. Some of us were forced to come out and oppose his wrong position and, working with others, we repeatedly defeated his illogical position. 3.
The third mistake has been the tendency by Gaddafi to interfere
in the internal affairs of many African countries using the
little money Libya has compared to those countries. One blatant
example was his involvement with cultural leaders of Black
Africa — kings, chiefs, etc. Since the political leaders of
Africa had refused to back his project of an African government,
Gaddafi, incredibly, thought that he could by-pass them and work
with these kings to implement his wishes. 4. The fourth big mistake was by most of the Arab leaders, including Gaddafi, to some extent. This was in connection with the long suffering people of Southern Sudan. Many of the Arab leaders either supported or ignored the suffering of the Black people in that country. This unfairness always created tension and friction between us and the Arabs, including Gaddafi to some extent. However, I must salute him and former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak for travelling to Khartoum just before the Referendum in Sudan and advising President Omar el-Bashir to respect the results of that exercise. 5. Sometimes, Gaddafi and other Middle Eastern radicals do not distance themselves sufficiently from terrorism even when they are fighting for a just cause. Terrorism is the use of indiscriminate violence — not distinguishing between military and non-military targets. The Middle Eastern radicals, quite different from the revolutionaries of Black Africa, seem to say that any means is acceptable as long as you are fighting the enemy. That is why they hijack planes, use assassinations, and plant bombs in bars. Why bomb bars? People who go to bars are normally merry-makers, not politically minded people. We were together with the
Arabs in the anti-colonial struggle. The Black African
liberation movements, however, developed differently from the
Arab ones. Where we used arms, we fought soldiers or sabotaged
infrastructure, but never targeted non-combatants. These
indiscriminate methods tend to isolate the struggles of the
Middle East and the Arab world. It would be good if the radicals
in these areas could streamline their work methods in this area
of using violence indiscriminately. These five points above are
some of the negatives associated with Gaddafi. The positions
have been unfortunate and unnecessary. Nevertheless, Gaddafi has
also had many positive points, objectively speaking. These have
been in favour of Africa, Libya and the Third World. I will deal
with them point by point:
1. Gaddafi has been having
an independent foreign policy and, of course, also independent
internal policies. I am not able to understand the position of
Western countries, which appear to resent independent-minded
leaders and seem to prefer puppets. Puppets are not good for any
country. Most of the countries that have transitioned from Third
World to First World status since 1945 have had
independent-minded leaders: South Korea (Park Chung-hee),
Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew), China People's Republic (Mao Zedong,
Chou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Marshal Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Jiang
Zemin, Hu Jing Tao, etc), Malaysia (Dr Mahthir Mohamad), Brazil
(Lula Da Silva), Iran (the Ayatollahs).
In Africa, we have benefited from a number of independent-minded
leaders: Col. Nasser of Egypt, Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania, and
Samora Machel of Mozambique. That is how Southern Africa was
liberated. That is how we got rid of Amin. The stopping of
genocide in Rwanda and the overthrow of Mobutu were as a result
of efforts of independent-minded African leaders. Gaddafi,
whatever his faults, is a true nationalist. I prefer
nationalists to puppets of foreign interests. Where have the
puppets caused the transformation of countries? I need some
assistance with information on this from those who are familiar
with puppetry. Therefore, the independent-minded Gaddafi had
some positive contribution to Libya, I believe, as well as
Africa and the Third World. I will take one little example. At
the time we were fighting the criminal dictatorships in Uganda,
we had a problem arising from a complication caused by our
failure to capture enough guns at Kabamba on the 6th of
February, 1981. Gaddafi gave us a small consignment of 96
rifles, 100 anti-tank mines, etc., that was very useful. He did
not consult Washington or Moscow before he did this. This was
good for Libya, for Africa and for the Middle East. 2. Before Gaddafi came to power in 1969, a barrel of oil was 40 American cents. He launched a campaign to withhold Arab oil unless the West paid more for it. I think the price went up to US$20 per barrel. When the Arab-Israel war of 1973 broke out, the barrel of oil went up to US$40.I am, therefore, surprised to hear that many oil producers in the world, including the Gulf countries, do not appreciate the historical role played by Gaddafi on this issue. The huge wealth many of these oil producers are enjoying was, at least in part, due to Gaddafi's efforts. The Western countries have continued to develop in spite of paying more for oil. It, therefore, means that the pre-Gaddafi oil situation was characterised by super exploitation by Western countries.
3. I have never taken time
to investigate socio-economic conditions within Libya. When I
was last there, I could see good roads even from the air. From
the TV pictures, you can even see the rebels zooming up and down
in pick-up vehicles on very good roads accompanied by Western
journalists. 4. Gaddafi is one of the few secular leaders in the Arab world. He does not believe in Islamic fundamentalism, which is why women have been able to go to school, to join the Army, etc. This is a positive point on Gaddafi's side. Coming to the present crisis, therefore, we need to point out some issues: 1. The first is to distinguish between demonstrations and insurrections. Peaceful demonstrations should not be fired on with live bullets. Of course, even peaceful demonstrations should co-ordinate with the police to ensure that they do not interfere with the rights of her citizens. When rioters are, however, attacking Police stations and Army barracks with the aim of taking power, then, they are no longer demonstrators; they are insurrectionists. They will have to be treated as such. A responsible government would have to use reasonable force to neutralise them. Of course, the ideal responsible government should also be an elected one by the people at periodic intervals. If there is a doubt about the legitimacy of a government and the people decide to launch an insurrection, that should be the decision of the internal forces. It should not be for external forces to arrogate themselves that role, for often, they do not have enough knowledge to decide rightly.Excessive external involvement always brings terrible distortions. Why should external forces involve themselves? That is a vote of no confidence in the people themselves.A legitimate internal insurrection, if that is the strategy chosen by the leaders of that effort, can succeed. The Shah of Iran was defeated by an internal insurrection; the Russian Revolution in 1917 was an internal insurrection; the Revolution in Zanzibar was an internal insurrection; the changes in Ukraine, Georgia, etc., all were internal insurrections. It should be for the leaders of the resistance in that country to decide their strategy, not for foreigners to do so. I am totally allergic to foreign, political and military involvement in sovereign countries, especially the African countries.If foreign intervention is good, then, African countries should be the most prosperous countries in the world because we have had the greatest dosages of that: slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, etc. All those foreign imposed phenomena have, however, been disastrous. It is only recently that
Africa is beginning to come up partly because of rejecting
external meddling. This, and the acquiescence by Africans into
that meddling, has been responsible for the stagnation in
Africa. The wrong priorities in many African countries are, in
many cases, imposed by external groups. Failure to prioritize
infrastructure, for instance, especially energy, is, in part,
due to some of these pressures. Instead, consumption is
promoted. I have witnessed this wrong definition of priorities
in Uganda. External interests linked, for instance, with
internal bogus groups to oppose energy projects for false
reasons. How will an economy develop without energy? Quislings
and their external backers do not care about this. If you promote foreign backed insurrections in small countries like Libya, what will you do with the big ones like China, which has got a different system from the West? Are you going to impose a no-fly-zone over China in case of some internal insurrections as happened in Tiananmen Square or in Tibet? The Western countries always use double standards. In Libya, they are very eager to impose a no-fly-zone. In Bahrain and other areas where there are pro-Western regimes, they turn a blind eye to the very same conditions or even worse conditions. We have been appealing to the UN to impose a no-fly-zone over Somalia so as to impede the free movement of terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda who killed Americans on 9/11, killed Ugandans last July and have caused so much damage to the Somalis, without success. Why? Are there no human beings in Somalia similar to the ones in Benghazi? Or is it because Somalia does not have oil which is not fully controlled by western companies on account of Gaddafi's nationalist posture? The West is always very prompt in commenting on every problem in the Third World — Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, etc. Yet, some of these countries were the ones impeding growth in those countries. There was a military coup d'état that slowly became a revolution in backward Egypt in 1952. The new leader, Nasser, had ambition to cause transformation in Egypt. He wanted to build a dam not only to generate electricity but also to help with the ancient irrigation system of Egypt. The West denied him money because they did not believe that Egyptians needed electricity. Nasser decided to raise that money by nationalising the Suez Canal. Israel, France and Britain attacked him. Another negative point is going to arise out of the habit of the Western countries overusing their superiority in technology to impose war on less developed societies without impeachable logic. This will be the igniting of an arms race in the world. The actions of the Western countries in Iraq and now Libya are emphasising that might is “right.” I am quite sure that many countries that are able will scale up their military research and in a few decades, we may have a more armed world. All this notwithstanding, Mr. Gaddafi should be ready to sit down with the opposition, through the mediation of the AU, with the opposition cluster of groups which now includes individuals well known to us Ambassador Abdalla, Dr Zubeda, etc. I know Gaddafi has his system of elected committees that end up in a National People's Conference. There is now, apparently, a significant number of Libyans that think that there is a problem in terms of governance. Since there has not been internationally observed elections in Libya, not even by the AU, we cannot know what is correct and what is wrong. Therefore, dialogue is the correct way forward. The AU mission could not get to Libya because the Western countries started bombing Libya the day before they were supposed to arrive. However, the mission will continue. My opinion is that, in addition, to what the AU mission is doing, it may be important to call an extraordinary Summit of the AU in Addis Ababa to discuss this grave situation. Regarding the Libyan opposition, I would feel embarrassed to be backed by Western war planes because quislings of foreign interests have never helped Africa. We have had a copious supply of them in the last 50 years — Mobutu, Houphet-Boigny, Kamuzu Banda, etc. Recently, there has been some improvement in the arrogant attitudes of some of these Western countries. Certainly, with Black Africa and, particularly, Uganda, the relations are good following their fair stand on the Black people of Southern Sudan. With the democratisation of South Africa and the freedom of the Black people in Southern Sudan, the difference between the patriots of Uganda and the Western Governments had disappeared. Unfortunately, these rash actions on Libya are beginning to raise new problems. They should be resolved quickly. Therefore, if the Libyan opposition groups are patriots, they should fight their war by themselves and conduct their affairs by themselves.
Perspectives on the Challenge of Good
Governance in Nigeria
since Independence
Introduction
This is a topic which is widely discussed at several levels in
Nigeria as well as outside the country. It is discussed from
national to regional and international levels by both
governmental and non-governmental organizations. In particular
it is continuously addressed by executive organs, legislative
assemblies, higher institutions of learning and specialized
research institutions as well as relevant public and private
resource centres, from both within and outside the country. In
this regard it is a subject which enjoys tremendous input from
foreign sources such as Economic Community for West African
States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU) and the United Nations
Organization (UNO) especially the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the United States of America
(USA) and the European Union (EU) in addition to many others.
Despite such diverse and massive inputs, in both human and
material resources, over a long period of time the almost
universal verdict on the question, and status, of good
governance in Nigeria is that it is conspicuous only in the
manner it has been absent from the scene.
Indeed most analysts conclude that poor governance in the
country, particularly since the mid 70's, has increasingly only
resulted in various development crises associated with
dismal performances at the levels of creative and
productive economic activities, as well as disregard for the
rule of law resulting in corruption, mismanagement, poverty,
insecurity and economic backwardness. How do we account for this
discrepancy between the massive human and material investment
towards good governance, on the one hand, and its poor outcome
on the other? How do we explain the tendency for most national
policies and programmes to end in failure despite the apparent
goodwill, and the generous support, towards their implementation
from foreign sources as well. How can we put a stop to the
tendency for massive investments made in the formulation of
constitutions, visions, laws, policies, plans, goals and
programmes, at both the national and international levels,
ending in unwarranted failures? What are the key challenges of
“good” governance by whatever criteria governance is adjudged as
either “good” or “bad”? How is accountability to be ensured at
both the national and international levels?
Clearly there is a big gap, nay a tendency towards contrary
development, between expectations and inputs, on the one hand,
as well as performance and output on the other. This is further
emphasized by the obvious discrepancy between the
vast resources
available to the country, on the one hand, and its condition of
massive and increasing poverty on the other. So when we talk of failure we are
not only looking at it in relation to the abundant resources
available to the nation, in absolute terms, but also
in terms of the specific resources
increasingly
committed to governance in general, and the formulation as well
as implementation of national development plans and programmes
in particular.
Two basic assumptions underlie the attempt to explain post
independence development in Nigeria, and Africa, made in this
paper. These two interrelated assumptions refer to the quest for
development, symbolized in the nationalist struggle for
independence, in a manner that makes it possible to address both
internal and external factors relevant to contemporary African
conditions. The
first assumption is that the scope, levels and quality of
independent, as well as popular, national participation in
politics greatly define all manner of Nigeria's national
achievements or the lack of such. This is particularly so
because it is independent and popular participation that informs
both freedom of political expression as well as qualitative
participation of the national intelligentsia, and various other
resource centres, in national development. The second assumption
is that the extent to which African nations are able to unite
and manage their external relations towards common regional
independence, integration and development also greatly informs
the level, and degree, of both national and continental
stability as well as their common prosperity. Failure in this
regard also greatly reflects the extent to which inimical
foreign interests, and meddlesomeness, greatly subvert Africa's
common interests leading to instability, as well as
socio-political and economic malfunctions.
No matter how we choose to define good governance its essential
character, in Africa, is that it is nationalist politics geared
to national liberation and nation-building in the context of
regional integration, based on the principles and ideals of Pan
African development.
It is in fact in this context that the outstanding performance
of African nationalists towards the achievement of independence,
democracy, republicanism and local processes of popular decision
making in their respective countries, as well as the creation of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at the Regional level in
1963, needs to be seen. This period constituted an expression
not only of positive political development but also portrays a
gallery of competent, nationalist and visionary African leaders.
The so-called failed
states and leaders that we observe today in Africa are defined
by their recency, venality and corruption. They exhibit an
inherent incapability towards leading their countries in
sovereign development resulting in the type of incompetence, and
foreign subservience that saps the national will and subverts
self-reliance, unity, respect for the rule of law and creativity
so vital to any genuine process of development.
Two important conceptual issues need to be touched upon in the
light of their importance to developments in Nigeria since
independence. The first is the question of corruption in Nigeria
in terms of its sources, scope and consequences. The second is
the characterization of
Nigeria as ‘post-colonial' i.e. in terms that tend to
obscure its possible connections, or lack of same, to either the
colonial past or to new forms of imperial relations in the
present.
Corruption is so colossal that in many cases, in Nigeria, it has
become open plunder of national resources and public revenues as
well as widespread extortion of the general population. It has
undermined and contributed to the failure of most national
programmes and projects. It has resulted in the most irrational
development whereby massive capital is repatriated abroad, in
the search for safe havens for the proceeds of corruption by
corrupt officials, rather than invested at home. It has thus
completely undermined the nations efforts towards investing or
re-investing national resources, let alone attracting foreign
capital, for constructive and comprehensive national economic
development.
Due mainly to the above observations there is the need to
appreciate the fact that corruption cannot be fully explained,
or contained, only on the basis of a moral or legal approach.
This is because it is venality, or inaccountability, of the
political class that defines Africa's corrupt and failed
leadership. External dependency also facilitates the undue
influence of foreign interests in terms of controlling, and
compromising, local leadership. We have to look therefore at
both the political and economic conditions which make possible
the generation of a leadership that is above the law, as well as
inclined mainly to the act of national spoliation rather than
nation-building.
In order to fully appreciate these observations we need to draw
attention to the nature and degree of influence exerted over
modern African states by former colonial, or recent world,
powers as well as the extent to which modern African economies
have remained essentially colonial, in terms of their general
structures and extroversion (Amin,1974, Kodjo,1989).
Indeed in his assessment of the causes of today's Africa
problems Kodjo, a one-time Secretary General of the OAU,
summarised them as “continued extroversion, lack of economic
policies based on independence, and apathy as regards the
creation of a community” (1989, P.53).
We need to also bring into view the extent to which a
substantial body of the national laws of African countries, as
well as international laws that affect Africa, greatly derive
not only from the colonial past but also the era of the slave
trade (Esiemokhai, 1986; Umozurike, 1979 P.7).
Umozurike draws attention to how the self-cetredness of
European states, their expropriation of the land and properties
of peoples they termed “primitive”, as well as the abuse of
their rights and persons constituted the basis of international
law. He noted that “since Africans were denied international
personality, their future was decided by bilateral treaties
entered into by European states” (1979, p.21-24). Indeed the
author, in his summary of the basis, content and objectives of
international law concluded that:
“Although the Europeans
purported to raise their methods into the realms of
international law, the immoral, inhuman and unjust basis of such
a law is hardly disputable” (1979, p. 26)
Similarly we need to bring into focus how new forms of economic
relations with the West, the World Bank and The IMF, such as
foreign indebtedness as well as monetary and fiscal relations,
lead to the fleecing of African countries as well as the control
of their internal policies in addition to the imposition of
various conditionalities on them. (The Report Of The South
Commission, 1993; Mihevc,1994)
Finally it is important to also underline the fact that the USA
and its (NATO) allies, have at various times, applied different
strategies to contain, undermine, subvert and control various
African States (Mamdani, 2004; Onoja, 1996; Smith, 1974).
Africa's development since independence tends to indicate that
local accountability is more greatly expressed where ruling
regimes derive their powers from local support rather than
remain under some form of foreign control. The latter tends to
promote greater in accountability and corruption.
In short the extent to
which politics and governance in Africa is defined by venality
and corruption is a function of the degree to which popular
freedom, public and national interests as well as popular
sovereignty have been denied, in favour of foreign control,
usually with enough military support to defeat the independent
assertion of any form of local resistance. Of all the problems confronting the student of Africa's contemporary history the presumption that the possible role of colonialism or the continuing influence of imperial powers, in Africa's present day affairs, is either considered to be nil or even outright rejected, constitute a major conceptual challenge. In this regard it is usually argued that since at one point in their history, usually 1960, African states were granted formal independence the factor of colonialism must not be introduced into any discussion about Africa's ‘post-colonial' development. (Mazrun, 1984 P.xi, Ashcroft, etal, 1995; Meredith, 2005; Akinyemi, 1974; Palmberg, 1999) This view does not only presuppose that the influences of the colonial past, in both form and content, could be ignored but is indeed designed to ensure that they are not even investigated. Similarly the possibility of the continuation of old colonial relations and activities in new forms, or neo-colonialism as many experts contend, is simply denied rather than refuted on the basis of the available evidence. (Kodjo, 1989; Smith, 1974) Indeed the post-colonial period cannot be studied in any meaningful sense outside its general relationship with the colonial past which produced and shaped it. The ‘post-colonial' period cannot be assessed, and evaluated, except in relation to how much or how little it has changed from the colonial past. This is what makes it essential to study not only the colonial period, but also the pre-colonial period as well, for any proper evaluation of the so-called ‘post-colonial' period. Beyond this the insistence that colonialism is simply past and gone amounts to no more than an attempt at ideological censorship against the investigation of its new, and probably more critical, role in the contemporary affairs of African states.
Identification and Contextualization of the Essential Dimensions
of Good Governance.
It is important to put in context the very idea of “good
governance” and the various dimensions, or parameters, defining
its assumed character in every given situation.
Politics and governance have always been historically, as well
as ideologically, defined by a number of factors from the
earliest times to date.
Two important issues need to be born in mind. The first is that
good governance could come from sources other than formal
“democratic”, or multiparty, rule in so far as such governance
were nationalistic, patriotic and committed to the overall
interest, and development, of the nations concerned. Indeed in
many cases it was both popular and “authoritarian” regimes that
were able to initially establish and nurture the progress of
their countries, as well as design and promote the “democratic”
regimes that eventually succeeded them.
Secondly even in terms of “democratic” choices it is obvious
that it is the national will, expressed through popular and
independent initiatives, that determine both the “nature” of
politics and the “goodness” of governance institutionalized, as
well as what is considered to be the highest priority in terms
of the national interest-which might not necessarily be
multipartyism for its own sake. What therefore makes functional
democracies exceptional is the degree of freedom, participation
and control they afford the individual citizen, on the one hand,
as well as the extent to which they are able to facilitate
political choices between competing interests and ideologies.
Democracy, therefore, is not a political ideology per se
but rather a set of legal, institutional, structural and
cultural procedures that guarantee and protect individual
citizenship rights as well as provide an environment that
promotes peaceful, free and fair contest between different
political interests and ideologies. Any claim therefore that any
particular political option constitutes or represents democracy
per se must therefore
be seen as not entirely correct. Support for democracy does not
mean lack of association to any particular political interest,
choice or ideology.
In the case of Nigeria for example, the nationalist period and
the 1st Republic (1940s-1966), constituted
significant, constructive and progressive development in terms
of the origin and development of democracy, the subsequent
achievement of independence in 1960 as well as attempts at the
promotion of federalism and the declaration of Nigeria as a
sovereign Republic in 1963. In addition the nationalist leaders
participated in the founding of the Organization for African
Unity (OAU) also in the same year. (Nwozugha, 1999, Akindele,
1988)
By extension the Second Republic (1979-1983) was also to a large
extent characterized by the influential role of Nigeria's
foundation nationalist leaders like Shagari, Awolowo, Waziri
Ibrahim, Nnamdi Azikwe, Aminu Kano and many others in the newly
formed political parties such as National Party of Nigeria (NPN)
Unity Party Of Nigeria (UPN), Great Nigeria Peoples Party
(GNPP), Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) and Peoples Redemption Party
(PRP) respectively. As such they reflected not only some measure
of independence in their policy orientations but also
significant abilities in terms of local policy formulation with
respect to national economic diversification and socio-economic
development in such areas as agriculture, industry and
infra-structural facilities at both the national and state
levels. (Nwozugha, 1999;
Ojiako, 1981)
Although the military regimes in Nigeria's history generally
undermined democratic governance, constitutionalism and
federalism it is to be noted that most of them exhibited strong
inclinations towards promoting national unity and national
independence in a manner that helped to keep the country united,
as well as constituting new and significant initiatives in a few
cases. For example in the aftermath of the
Nigerian Civil War General Yakubu Gowon's policies
signified more of an achievement rather than any kind of failure
both in terms of their strategic objectives of Going On With One
Nigeria, as well as in terms of the level of transparency
manifested by its leaders. The regimes policies of promoting
national unity in the form of the 3Rs-Reconciliation,
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation under the slogan “No Victor,
No Vanquished”, was seen as a particularly important
achievement. It is to be noted that Gowon prosecuted the
Nigerian Civil War, in addition to the creation and development
of the 12 states of the Federation, as well as the
reconstruction of Lagos, within the resources of the nation. (Nwozugha,
1999 P. 81ff). He refused to incur any foreign debt. At that
time he was widely ‘misrepresented' as having stated that with
the new incoming oil revenues Nigeria's problem was not one of
cash but rather that of how to spend it!.
Similar observations could be made with respect to the Murtala
Ramat Mohammeds tenure (1975-1979). Murtala's short reign was
characterized by patriotic dynamism at both the domestic and the
international levels that won him the admiration of most
Nigerians. In particular Murtala's policies of containing
corruption and the creation of a new Federal Capital in the
country, as well as his onerous support for the Liberation of
Africa in international diplomacy, despite the opposition of the
USA, stood him out as a patriotic and steadfast leader.
Similarly Obasanjo oversaw the faithful implementation of some
of the programmes of the regime which culminated in the return
to civil rule in 1979.
The Buhari/Idiagbon short tenure (1983-1984) exhibited a
committed and purposeful opposition to corruption, and
‘indiscipline' that greatly promised to cleanse the country of
the type of executive lawlessness that had been its undoing.
However the highhanded and extrajudicial methods adopted by the
regime evinced a great deal of popular opposition to it. It is
worthwhile, however, to note that Buhari's current political
popularity is largely associated with what his present admirers
perceive as his steadfastness, incorruptibility and singular
commitment to the rule of law as exhibited during his short
tenure as the country's military ruler.
In the same manner the tenure of General Sani Abacha
(1993-1998), despite various accusations of corruption and human
rights abuse in addition to self-perpetuation in office, also
inclined towards certain national economic policies designed to
ensure sovereign national development. These are particularly
illustrated in terms of his initiation of Vision 2010, the
rehabilitation of the national economy through infrastructural
provisions, such as the Petroleum Tax Fund (PTF), among other
things. His efforts to also sanitize the national financial
sector and the national banking system also stood out as a
significant foresight. Of particular significance was his
singular effort towards the absolute liquidation of Nigeria's
foreign indebtedness in order to free the country from the yoke
of foreign debts. (Aluko, 2007; Nwozugha, 1999, P.464ff)
Some of the various lessons learnt in terms of Nigeria's
political and economic problems, as well as their adjudged
solutions, were summarily expressed in Nigeria's National
Constitution Of 1999. The Constitution emphasized on the need
for national control of “the commanding heights of the economy”
as well as the responsibilities of the state towards the
citizenry in Ch. II on the Fundamental Objectives and Directive
Principles of State Policy. Indeed, setting aside some
limitations here and there, the Constitution would be found to
have addressed a number of the actual problems, and needs, of
the country in such a manner that faithful adherence to it would
have greatly helped to overcome the key problems of the country.
It is major deviations from the Constitution that have tended to
throw the country into significant problems. Such major
deviations could be seen in the form of increased dependency on
foreign sources for policy inputs at the expense of the
Constitution or in terms of the implications of foreign
financial indebtedness, as well as other types of strategic
external influences, in the manner reflected during the three
years of military rule under Olusegun Obasanjo (1976 – 1979)
after the assassination of Murtala Mohammed; the eight year rule
of Ibrahim Babangida (1984 – 1993) and above all else, over the
last ten years of the 4th Republic (1999-2010).
It is to be noted that it was Olusegun Obasanjo who, in 1976,
began the process of getting Nigeria indebted to the World Bank
which has resulted in a number of disastrous consequences,
associated with the country's foreign indebtedness, that are yet
to be resolved. (Fasipe, 1990 P.6) Furthermore during
Babangida's time (1985-1993) the Structural Adjustment Policy
(SAP) was introduced by the IMF and the World Bank. Since then
the country is still to find its way out of the doldrums it was
thrown into as a result of that policy.
The current crises of the loss of any sense of a national
purpose or direction, extraordinarily high level of corruption
and the tendency to socio-economic and political meltdown,
generally referred to as evidence of a “failed state”, are more
characteristic of the 4th Republic since its
inception in 1999 than of any other period in the political
history of the nation. The point being made is that while some
of the previous regimes, and leaders, could be referred to as
qualified successes, in relation to the achievement of Nigeria's
national objectives, the Fourth Republic, despite its being a
civilian and “democratic” administration, can hardly qualify as
a success in relation to any of the country's expressed national
objectives in general, or respect for its constitution in
particular. Indeed it is precisely this fact that makes the
‘failed state' argument in Nigeria almost exclusively limited to
the scope of failure, and scale of corruption, which defines the
4th Republic.
Unlike most other countries, and democratic republics, that
uphold the principles of nation-building enshrined in their
constitutions under Nigeria's 4th Republic, in
particular, there is not only a disregard for the Constitution
but a tendency to its total abuse. This is what makes it
difficult if not impossible to identify, in the present scheme
of things, in Nigeria, any consistent policy-line or national
strategic objective, dedicated to nation-building, whose outcome
we should anticipate and whose absence constitutes a fatal
danger to the development of the country. To demonstrate the
truthfulness of this observation we need to appraise four
important policy factors whose role in national development is
indispensable.
The key problem, in the first instance, that currently bedevils
development efforts in the country begins at the level of their
conceptualization, articulation and organization.
There seems to be no
overall coordinative framework towards the articulation,
objectification, strategisation and evaluation of any given
development agenda. There is hardly any approach which fully
integrates nation-building strategies to the task of economic or
socio-political development in general. The earlier efforts of
the nationalists towards nation-building seem to have been
abandoned without being replaced by any definite, tangible and
verifiable alternative. Indeed the National Constitution,
National Development Policies and National Development Plans
have not been the sources or the guidelines for the programs
implemented under the 4th Republic over the last 10
years. This has been one of the most consistent accusations by
the National Assembly against the regimes since 1999. It is the
absence of commitment to any of these essential national
provisions, which ought to provide the framework for its
development, that make it difficult to discuss or indeed review
present development efforts in Nigeria in any meaningful
context, except as a catalogue of some on-going national
failures, endless local lamentations and the usually duplicitous
denunciations of the local leadership by their foreign
“partners”.
The second consideration is the
fact that there is no given national vision informing
development activities in the country.
Since the nationalist, and Civil War periods, no national
mission, strategic objective or
Vision has been
formulated and consistently pursued. Abacha's Vision 2010 was
thrown out by the incoming Obasanjo regime in 1999, while vision
2020 promised the nation by the latter and initiated by the
Yar'adua regime, is yet to see the light of day. There is thus
no accountability on the part of the relevant governments in
respect of the national
policies and development plans which they should have
implemented, but which were simply discarded and never
implemented despite the massive expenditure supposedly committed
to them. Foreign imposed policies, like the recent so-called
privatization programme and other related foreign economic
agenda, for which the government is hardly accountable to
anybody, simply predominate. Development is not possible outside
any visionary, independent and national framework, or without
any base in constitutionalism and the rule of law. This failure
is greatly responsible for the nation's inability to make the
Nigerian state accountable as well as the custodian, and regulator,
of the nations development visions, instruments and processes in
the manner that it should be.
In the third place these problems reflect an incapacity to learn
from history as well as the corresponding failure to prescribe
for the nation options and strategies for greater future
historical achievements. In many ways the
failure of nation-building activities in Nigeria is also a
reflection of the extent to which its present rulers have failed
to appreciate the unique lessons of its own history, and what
needs to be learnt from its various experiences in order to
construct a better future for it. Knowledge of Nigeria's
capabilities and assets, as well as its achievements and
failures should provide guidance in formulating national
policies, as well as sorting out national priorities. In the
same way the identity and character of Nigeria's citizens
should, in general, be moulded on the basis of a basic knowledge
of their own history geared towards an appreciation of their
common achievements, problems and prospects. Nigerian, or indeed
African, history is conspicuous only in its absence from the
curricula, at virtually all levels of educational instruction in
the country. The history of all forms of societies, and in
particular modern nation-states, indicate that it is not
possible to create and promote a sense of common identity, or
cultivate an informed and patriotic citizenry, without promoting
some basic and common knowledge of their histories as an
essential part of their identity, and the socialization process,
for all members of the community. Nigeria cannot be an exception
to this rule and it certainly does not stand to gain anything by
promoting collective loss of memory, and a general state of
national amnesia, as a principal vocation.
While the above
observations indicate, in general, a tendency towards failing to
define and implement national objectives in the due manner and
direction, they need to be pursued
the fourth problem has to do with the wastages resulting from these
observed shortcomings. An important component to governing
well is the ability to identify and utilize the necessary
resources, both human and material, relevant to the undertaking.
Failure in this regard is responsible for a great deal of
wastages in the management of Nigeria's national affairs. In
Nigeria we can, among many others, identify four significant
areas representing most critical human resource input whose
relevance to the political process is indispensable. Once more,
however, we find that these important national sources of
potential political participation representing independent,
evidence-based and professional capabilities in national policy
formulation, and implementation, are hardly ever properly
utilized and managed. They tend to, generally, be neglected
whereas their services are needed towards formulating,
implementing and reviewing the kind of policies guiding the
overall development of the country.
In the first place the general participation of the indigenous
population in politics, even where it is recognized and
acclaimed, is seldom taken into account in deciding the destiny
of the nation. This is evident in the sense that hardly do
indigenous contributions, resources, techniques, economic
activities and achievements or problems feature as priorities in
the country's national agenda. (Adedeji, 1981; Akinwumi, 2007;
Oniboneje, 1976). As a result various contributions which could
lead to more resourceful use of indigenous endowments and
capabilities are not reflected at the levels of policy
formulation. Earlier policies, like Nigeria's
indigenization exercise of the early 70's, have not been
followed up by others designed to enhance local indigenous
skills, economic activities and national unity in line with many
related suggestions and recommendations on the issues.
Further to the above, most of Nigeria's public institutions of
higher learning such as the universities, polytechnics and
colleges of education, whose research out-put could greatly
facilitate well investigated and considered solutions to many of
the country's problems, tend to exist mainly for the award of
certificates rather than the generation of important, innovative
and relevant ideas in decision-making at several levels. A
similar level of neglect applies to established and specialized
research institutions in the field of policy formulation,
foreign affairs, industry, agriculture, technology, science,
arts, health, human development, employment etc. Further
observations can also be made in terms of the neglect of policy
output emanating from sub regional and regional organizations
such as ECOWAS and AU. Some of these include the ECOWAS treaties
on a common market, currency, etc., which should have been
achieved by now, or the implementation of the Lagos Plan of
Action which should have greatly changed the fortunes of the
continent by now (Kodjo, 1989.) Most of these tend to be
neglected in favour of policy inputs from foreign sources which
are, in turn, hardly ever implemented towards any definite and
enduring local benefits.
Similarly the prevailing national institutions in the form of
schools, national organizations, political parties and
professional associations etc. which should function as
leadership cultivation centres, and promoters of the national
interest, tend to specialize principally in the promotion of
divisive intrigues because their leaders usually use them mainly
as conduit pipes for self-enrichment. Thus instead of serving as
sources of relevant policies and leadership they only tend to
generate ill-governance and local conflicts. Thus political
leaders who transgress the law usually decide, in their own
favour, either not to allow for its enforcement or simply
promote its selective applications. Such ‘leaders' fear no
consequences because there is neither internal democracy in the
country's various organizations and communities nor functional,
and productive, separation of powers between the Executive, the
Legislature and the Judiciary at various levels of both the
local and national administration. On the contrary the
executives, in control of local and national revenues, tend to
either buy out or blackmail everybody else.
There is finally the critical role that the citizenry should
play in the contexts of social movements, popular and national
organizations as well as trade unions and professional
associations in the process of nation-building. Such a role is
hardly appreciated, organized and pursued. Despite the fact that
such organizations are necessary to the articulation, and
achievement, of key national objectives through popular
participation. Such movements greatly contributed to the
achievement of independence and all forms of our major, and
positive, national expressions. All of them could contribute
more given the right conditions and environment.
It is clear from the above considerations that in order to
ensure governance that expresses the popular wishes of its
population there is a need to be able to facilitate, generate
and utilize both popular and specialized forms of participation,
towards the effective formulation and implementation of national
policies, as well as the enforcement of its most basic laws.
(III)
Defining Good Governance
We have so far used the term “good” in relation to governance
only in its most ordinary meanings of serving popular and public
interests or in the disposition of governance towards the
achievement of key nationalist objectives in the form of
independence, unity, self-reliance and socio-economic growth in
general.
The whole question of political “instability” in Africa, in the
aftermath of the formal granting of independence to most African
states, cannot be properly understood except in the context of
the various attempts made by the former European imperial
powers, under the leadership of the United States, in the
context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to
retain and maintain control over Africa in new ways, under
changed circumstances. As a result of this a new pattern of
control, which assumed more of an indirect form as opposed to
the direct colonial occupation of old, developed. Similarly the
new form of control was based on foreign multilateralism in the
form of a united alliance between the US and its NATO Allies. In
addition the divide-and-rule policies of imperial control was
maintained and, where need be, invented anew in order to ensure
Africa's incapacity to resist. Finally the task of retaining old
colonial mono-cultural economic structures, as well as imposing
new forms of economic control, were achieved through the
activities of the foreign states concerned, some multinational
corporations as well as international agencies at the level of
UNO such as IMF, World Bank, WTO etc.
It was in the form of the Cold War in Africa that the assault on
newly independent African countries identified above was
organized and carried out. The objective of the assault was to
reverse the gains of independence, and forestall local control
over national resources or the evolution of independent
processes of policy formulation that could lead to the
diversification of the economy, resulting in the unraveling of
foreign dependency. The Cold War in Africa did not seek to
promote any form of free political expression but rather the
negation of all forms of political expression that constituted
any threat to continued imperial hegemony on the African
continent. Ideological propaganda, as well as political,
diplomatic and military intervention by the NATO powers became
all too common in Africa. In this respect the Cold War was waged
at several levels, all to the disadvantage of African
independence, unity, self-reliance and development. In short to
the detriment of all that Pan-Africanism and African nationalism
stood and fought for. In many cases independent African regimes
were toppled, while many patriotic African leaders were
assassinated. In an assessment of the impact of the Cold War on
Africa the writers noted that:
“Across sub-Saharan Africa did the Cold War have perhaps the
most enduring negative impact on the developing world? Cold War
rivalries encountered newly-independent countries still
struggling to find their feet. Both Communists and the 'Free
World' found their champions in either the governments or
'freedom movements' in each particular country. Arms, money and
other forms of support flowed, and the picture was (and still
is) complicated further by the resource-rich nature of many of
the countries involved. The results were often catastrophic -
Angola, for example, suffered one of the longest conflicts in
modern history. Unlike in certain parts of East and South East
Asia, there were very few Cold War 'success stories' in
sub-Saharan Africa, as superpower interference had a negative
influence almost everywhere”.
At the ideological level a whole new baggage, and vocabulary, of
“development” was promoted by western powers through various
channels, both formal and informal, as well as direct and
indirect (Sachs, 1993; http://en.wikepidea.org/wild/Goodgovernance).
One of these is “good governance” which espouses ‘human rights',
‘transparency', and ‘democracy' more or less as abstract
principles that could be pursued and imposed on selected
nations, by a group of self-appointed powerful states, outside
the context of either a just and democratic international system
or, rather, through the legitimate agency of popular
participation, sovereignty and constitutional accountability at
the levels of the nations concerned. (Ake, 1996; Ladan, 2004;
Mohammad 2010; Coomassie, 1998) The idea of ‘good governance',
in this context, derives from the assumption that it should
constitute the political flank to the economic development
policies from the “developed world”.
In common, however, such policies on both economic development and good
governance have only tended to fail.
Infact the major problem of this perspective of good governance,
or of so-called pressure towards “human rights” and “democracy”,
is its limited scope and focus, on the one hand, and the fact
that it denies the pursuit of similar objectives at the level of
the United Nations where the influence of the imperial powers is
predominant. For example the USA and its allies have greatly
opposed various attempts at the democratization of the United
Nations system, the creation of a new world economic order and
that of a new world information order along with many other
“humanitarian” and “democratic” issues, making their claims on
‘good governance' in general less credible. (Ake, 1992;
Mohammed, A.S. 2006; Wisner, 1988)
More importantly “good governance” advocacy, as conducted by
foreign powers in Africa, greatly aim to undermine national
sovereignty, and processes of independent nation-building in
African states, in order to facilitate foreign intervention in
their internal affairs. This is why the term, “good governance”,
tends to beg the question rather than answer to the critical
issues that ought to define it. It tends to be totally silent on
such vital issues as national sovereignty, nation-building,
national unity, national development plans, citizenship and
regional integration. As a result they have promoted policies
which undermine local nationalist achievements in favour of
foreign economic and political interests. They have relentlessly
campaigned against the “state”, where this refers only to newly
independent African states, in favour of powerful foreign
imperial states and multinational corporations. Not only have
African economies remained mono-cultural and non-industrialized
but all forms of local investment and
indigenous private
capital have been undermined in favour of foreign public, as
well as private, interests. Despite the poverty-generating
effects of dependent African economies foreign policy
prescriptions on Africa always tend to maximize resource
extraction from the continent rather than allow for the
diversification of the local economies and the creation of more
employment opportunities in ways that could lead to the
promotion of relevant social welfare programmes, as well as the
facilitation of local control over natural disasters and social
conflicts, in a manner that will benefit its pauperized peoples.
Finally the ideology of good governance, as propounded by
foreign powers does not only serve as a pretext for selective
intervention in the affairs of other nations it also, in certain
situations, facilitates the funding and use of interventionist
NGO'S, CSOs and human rights groups to undermine regimes that
attempt to assert their independence.
Thus three problems tend to become associated with the issue of
human rights. In the first place there is the worrying question
of the widespread abuse of human rights by a variety of states.
This requires an equal, open and transparent mediation by
legitimate institutions of the United Nations. In the second
place there are certain states such as the USA, Members of EU
and Israel, which appear to be beyond international sanctions on
human rights or any other issue. Finally human rights is, many
fear, becoming increasingly reduced to a
mere pretext for the pursuit of the foreign policies of
the powerful nations of the world to the detriment of the very
principle of human rights itself, as well as the interests of
those nations that have become the victims of such
interventions. (Coomassie, 1998; Ladan, 2004).
Clearly the scope of good governance in Africa ought to
transcend the limited agenda of interventionism which picks, and
chooses, which “cases” of “human rights” and “democratization”
to pursue, in the interest of certain foreign powers.
To define the term good governance in conceptual terms,
embracing the status of contemporary Africa and Nigeria in the
global political set-up, we need to appreciate major
developments since 1960 and, in particular, the impact of the
Cold War on politics and development in both Africa and Nigeria.
(IV) Key Problems of Governance In Nigeria
The thesis of failed states and failed leadership have, in
general, tended to identify problems of Nigeria and Africa as
resulting only from lack of good and capable leadership. It is
usually suggested that it is the incompetence, mismanagement and
corrupt practices of African leaders that has led Africa to the
state that it is in today. (Zartman, 1995). Indeed this
perspective has almost been elevated to the status of popular
wisdom whereby all forms of problems in the country are simply
relegated to the view point of “lack of good leadership”.
While there is some truth in this position it is both
one-sided and inadequate in many senses.
In the first place this perspective has neither identified, nor
explained, the associated problems and conditions which greatly
contribute to the very occurrence of failed leadership in
itself. For example what role do inherited colonial economic and
political structures, or the prevailing scope and character of
foreign influences and direct intervention in Nigeria's internal
affairs, play in the general equation of failed leadership in
the country? To what extent is failed leadership a deviation
from sovereign national development policies, and a reflection
of political surrogacy to foreign interests? Similarly to what
extent can we relate local failures, in terms of leadership, to
the extent to which the implementation of independent national
policies is forsaken in favour of policies imposed from abroad
by foreign powers, either directly or indirectly?.
Furthermore the perspective represents a broad and false
generalization to the extent that important instances and cases
of good leadership in Africa are not only covered up but also
misrepresented. Cases of good leadership in Africa are many and
most abundantly represented in the type of leadership that
constituted the PanAfricanist movement over the last two
centuries as well as the nationalist leadership responsible for
the liberation of African states from colonial domination
leading to the achievement of independence on the continent in
the 50s, 60s and 70s. At the national level some of such leaders
include Nnamdi Azikwe, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello,
Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Mal. Aminu Kano among many others.
Some of such leaders, at the continental level, include people
like Patrice Lumumba, Gamel Abdel Nasser, Sekou Toure, Amilcar
Cabral, Kwame Nkurumah, Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Samora
Machel and many others whose achievements towards the liberation
of Africa have not only been monumental but a number of whom
were indeed either overthrown, or assassinated, by foreign
interests that are inimical to Africa's independent development.
Similarly the failed leadership thesis has neither identified
empirically, nor explained theoretically, the exact nature,
scope and character of the failed leaders it is referring to
beyond generalizing them as African. It thus assumes that the
leadership of Africa, as distinct from its rulership, is all
African without an external component. To what extent, for
example, can we divorce the failure of
all major foreign
policies imposed on Africa from the involvement of the foreign
powers that have, in many ways, operated as the
defacto leaders, or
the self-styled “partners”, of the failed African rulers under
reference?
Finally, this perspective thus fails to see that there is a
definite connection between failed states and Africa's political
rulership that are beholden to foreign, in the main Western,
interests as exemplified in the case of Mobutu Sese Seko of
Zaire, Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi,
Kofi Busia of Ghana, Husni Mubarrak of Egypt, Bokassa of the
Central African Republic and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, among
many others. One cannot blame one of the “partners” and at the
same time also exonerate both the other “partners” as well as
the relevant system of “partnership” in question!.
The key problems undermining good governance in Africa stem from
three major sources. The first is the extent to which foreign
interference by the USA and its allies, under the pretext of the
Cold War, greatly undermined and reversed the nationalist
struggle for independence, democracy and self reliance on the
continent. This, in turn,
assured the retention of old colonial economic structures
as well as the extraction of new forms of economic concessions,
and political control, through a diverse range of policies,
directives, conditionalities, treaties and military bases
promoted by foreign powers.
Secondly the installment of puppet rulers in itself, where this
was feasible, greatly undermined both
national and
popular sovereignty
and, therefore, local control over processes of governance.
This is a very significant feature of Africa's
contemporary history that deserves a great deal more attention
from researchers. Nothing seems to define the political
character of contemporary Africa like the struggle for control
between foreign imperial powers and local nationalist, moderate
or revolutionary, forces. The first major manifestation of this
was the crisis in the Congo where the duly elected leader,
Patrice Lumumba, was abducted and assassinated while a puppet
military ruler was installed. These crises defined not only the
nature of the political crises in Congo itself but also
the pattern of indirect
political control that tended to emerge all over Africa
subsequently.
Finally, both national and regional development in Africa cannot
be divorced from the ability to implement duly considered plans,
at both the national and regional levels, within the bounds of
existing constitutions and agreements. Failure to operate within
such bounds explains why issues like citizenship identity,
national unity and economic integration at all levels have not
been treated rationally, systematically and on constitutional
bases but are rather unusually undermined through various acts
of political incitement and provocation, as well as the return
to colonially induced ideology of ethnocentrism and
primordialism in both politics and civil affairs. (Nabudere,
1977; Mamdani, 2002; Bello, 2010).
If there is any need to verify the truthfulness of this
observation a survey of the relative successes of the Pan-Africanists,
nationalists and pioneer African governments in the achievements
of Pan-African unity, independence and democratization, in
addition to the initiation of many independent development
policies between 1950 to 1975 is enough to bear ample testimony.
(Kodjo, 1989; Ali, 1988). Today's African rulers whose failures
are being generalized as an
overall African phenomenon
consist, essentially, of surrogate functionaries
supported and promoted by the West in its continuous
struggle to keep the continent, its peoples and natural
resources under its control.
The quest for sovereignty, justice and development in
Africa, under the general label of good governance, must not be
turned into an opportunity by foreign powers to intervene in
African affairs leading to the subversion of both national and
popularly sovereignty, which alone constitute the major bases
for the independent, and democratic, development of Africa's
nation- states. Good governance cannot be but self-governance,
in all senses of the term.
V. Quest for Good Governance and the Challenge of Popular
Sovereignty
Indeed good governance, properly defined, cannot be reduced to
the pursuit of so – called democratization and human rights on
the basis of intervention in the affairs of others and generally
weaker, but particularly weakest, nations. The first major
problem of this perspective of interventionism, in the name of
good governance, is that it does not apply to all other nations
of the world but only to a few of the developing countries and
most of the states in Africa.
The European and American nation states do not brook
foreign intervention in their own affairs and so do not apply,
or allow others to apply, such policies to undermine or
compromise their sovereignty.
Secondly both national independence and democracy would mean
nothing and amount to nothing if they do not translate into
popular sovereignty where the citizens, on the basis of their
national laws, can freely formulate the policies
that rule them as well as make their chosen
representatives accountable to them through due and
constitutional processes. Where, as is presently the case, the
policies that rule Africa emanate from powerful foreign
interests while their rulers, even where they were seemingly
elected, tend to kowtow only to local and foreign overlords, it
needs to be noted that such a system of indirect control is a
misrepresentation of democracy.
Furthermore it is also curious that legions of foreign
sponsored organizations are claiming to promote democracy in the
weaker countries of the world while their very sponsors are
doing everything in their power to frustrate the democratization
of the UNO and other international organizations.
Finally not only is popular sovereignty the only true face of
democracy it is also the surest guarantor of national
independence and public interests, as well the greatest
anti-dote to corruption. Unfettered empowerment of the
public, through universal franchise, makes it possible for the
public to use their representatives and the law, to achieve the
protection of public interests.
Good governance, comprehended beyond the rhetorics of Cold War
propaganda, must espouse libertarian principles and articulate
popular rights in a manner that is not only applicable to each
and every nation but is also respected by all nations in each
and every case. This is
why popular sovereignty and not external dictations or
interferences ought to provide, like in most other parts of the
world, the basis for the development of good governance in
Africa. On the
basis of this we can proceed to identify some of the key
challenges that need to be taken into account in the formulation
and execution of a good governance agenda. In so doing however
it is important to keep some issues in perspective.
Good governance needs to be based on the identification and
application of those essential principles of governance that
makes it possible to overcome bad or ill-governance in favour of
unity, peace, prosperity and the enjoyment of basic citizenship
rights. Ill-governance is here understood to mean a form of
governance that is conducted without any concern for, indeed
despite, its harmful effects of oppression, exploitation,
repression and pauperization on the majority of the population.
Those key political features of today, on the basis of which
many characterize
Nigeria's present day political system indicate, in themselves,
the various dimensions of both bad and ill-governance in the
form of corruption, tribalism, nepotism, kleptocracy and, above
all, a contingency plan for the rulers to flee their countries
when things finally get out of hand.
A number of studies tend to characterize Nigeria's present day
political system, in substantive and descriptive terms, as
either neo-colonial or prebendal-beyond the simple clichés of
‘post colonial', ‘nascent democracy' or ‘civil rule'. A good
number of scholars identify it as a spoil system defined by
client/patron relationship as a system founded on god-fatherism.
(Amin, 1974; Joseph, 1991; Essence, 2004). Such relations
of god-fatherism are expressed in local political activities, as
well as in the latter's connection to the arena of international
politics. In essence
god-fatherism, wherever it exists, tends to undermine the
required qualities necessary for good leadership in terms of
honesty of purpose, independence of character, patriotism and
respect for the rule of law. It tends to undermine the capacity
for the cultivation of good and independent leaders, with
commitment to public interests and national goals, expressed
through respect for the constitution and the rule of law. This
is why many analysts of the African condition see venality, or
disrespect for the laws, as the major form in which corruption
asserts and manifests itself. It is also for the same reason
that we need to see those countries which provide safe havens to
looted funds, and serve as refuge for corrupt officials from
other countries, as accomplices in the practice of
ill-governance. This is also why the system corrodes democracy,
and the rule of law, by denying free, popular and lawful choices
in favour of surrogates at every level of the political
officialdom, whether governmental or non-governmental, elective
or appointive. (Essence, 2004; TELL No.5 Feb. 7th
2011; ‘Tyranny of the godfathers'; Usman, 2008 P.14ff)
The principles we use to formulate or adjudge good governance
must not only be capable of overcoming conditions of external
dependency, and god-fatherism, but must also not be based on any
double standard in the sense that they ought to be able to apply
equally to all nations. At the same time they need to respect
the rights of non-interference in the affairs of other nations.
Finally the objective of good governance in Nigeria must be able
to embrace and address the need for national socio-economic
viability through its effective and functional integration into
the African regional economic community, as the only viable
framework for its general capacitation, diversification,
expansion and competitive development. It is also imperative to
appreciate that only such a regional platform will be able to
promote not only the required economies of scale necessary for
independent and sustainable economic development, it is indeed
also the only basis on which Africa's political and diplomatic
unity could be harnessed and deployed for the pursuit of its
vital interests at the global levels. It is through such a
capacity-building process that Africa could be able to protect
the interests of its various constituencies at every level from
both foreign and local predation. It is also at this level that
Africa could be able to exert its weight towards the reform of
global institutions into a more democratic, and just,
international order as an essential condition critical to its
own liberation and development.
To achieve the above objectives African states need to organize,
conduct and promote governance on the basis of principles
capable of leading to the achievement of people-centred
objectives in the form of sovereignty, unity, democracy,
creativity and resource control, as well as overall security and
performance capabilities.
Only in this way can we be able to approach the question
of governance in an expanded, as well as integrated, enough
perspective that should do justice to the peculiar problems that
governance itself should address in the context of developing
countries, in general, and African states in particular. We thus
need to focus on:
Sovereignty:
As the capacity to assure that national independence, and the
freedom of the population to determine the destiny of their
nation, is ensured in line with the laws of the land. A close
observation of Africa's development since independence reveal
the contradictory fact that for the most part its major policies
have either been imposed, or unduly influenced, from outside
rather than by the needs of its own peoples. (Wisner, 1988).
Unity:
Unity is fundamental to the attainment of all social and
national goals irrespective of their nature or scope. Where it
fails such ventures will more often than not also fail. Unity is
however not the same with uniformity and certainly not averse to
diversity. Indeed unity in diversity is more of the reality in
all ages and has certainly become the key principle in the
management of modern political, cultural and business
establishments. Unity implies the
ability to identify
common goals or interests and work towards their basic and
persistent pursuit, at both the socio-political and economic
levels. That is why the most important instrument signifying the
unity of any nation is its constitution as well as the
corresponding activities of the state towards its continuous
realization, development and protection. Unity is not in any way
a unidirectional quest for socio-cultural, religious or
ethnocentric uniformity. The laws of social development deny
such possibilities on the basis of differentiation in all
cultures, societies and polities leading to their general
transformation. Such is further denied by the need for
individuals, as free citizens, to exercise their independent
rights of choice, and affiliation, in relation to such matters
as personal opinions, creed, affiliations and association. Most
African leaders, and scholars, have remained captive to colonial
ethnocentric ideologies and lost sight of the fact that the
developed nations of the world do but strive only for individual
citizenship on the basis of equality, and in the context of
plural or multicultural societies. Perhaps the major source of
Africa's incapacity is always demonstrated when it fails to
unite in order to face the challenges facing it. Where it was
able to unite which are, unfortunately, few and far between it
had been able to register tremendous successes and progress.
Democracy:
Democracy is designed to
ensure the rights of all nationals as free citizens rather than
their continued existence as colonial or other subjects. It
assures their participation in the selection and control of
their leaders through popular elections, as well as
constitutional checks and balances, on the exercise of power.
Popular sovereignty, or people's power, constitutes the basis
for independent decision making in the polity, as well as the
mechanism that assures control and accountability in the use of
power. Where the practice of democracy is neither based on nor
serve, such ends it will be a misnomer to call it so. The denial
of popular sovereignty in Africa is a fundamental source of its
woes.
Creativity:
In order for any modern nation to assert its
independence, promote its development and greatly benefit from
its human resources it has to be able to harness, tap and
properly deploy the creative and productive powers of its
population. These should be in the form of a variety of
solutions to its socio-cultural, economic and political
problems. More often than not the prevalence of old colonial
structures, and new forms of external influences, tend to
preclude such possibilities in Africa.
Resource Control:
Related to the above issues is the question of resource
control. This is particularly relevant for the use of resources
to solve basic national and regional programmes. This problem
has manifested itself in Nigeria in a manner which runs counter
to the positive manner earlier Pan-Africanists and African
nationalists had envisioned the utilization of Africa's natural
resources (minerals, water, fauna and flora). Unfortunately not
only are Africa's resources essentially controlled by foreigners
but its failed leaders have also led their nations down the path
of corruption and ethnocentrism which only promote misuse of
revenues, as well as divisiveness and conflicts, in their
various polities. There are today in many African states armed
mobs deployed by various ill-motivated sponsors to contest and,
if possible, confiscate territories which are rich in mineral
resources for the benefit of certain criminal gangsters
campaigning under one retrogressive banner or another. The
nations of Africa must strive towards the general,
comprehensive, planned and coordinated use of their resources in
order to build productive, and industrialized, economies that
can provide jobs, and lead to greater progress through wealth
creation, reproduction and conservation for both present and
future, generations.
Security:
The concern with the issues of security in Africa is
today expressed at many levels of individual, public, national,
sub-regional and indeed regional interests. Virtually all
aspects of security concerns pervade individuals as well as
public agencies and institutions in Africa. They range from
individual political rights or security from hunger to general
public concerns over foreign interventions, sabotage and
aggression at all levels – national, sub regional and regional.
They could be in the form of testing nuclear bombs, dumping
toxic waste, economic sanction, instigation of coups and
conflicts or outright invasion.
As many contributors have expressed, one major factor requiring
attention with respect to security in all nations of Africa is
the need to review, and transform, it from the inherited
colonial functions of the suppression of the local population to
the new need for upholding and protecting the rights of Africa's
independent citizens as well as their wellbeing and dignity.
Secondly the national security outfits of African nation states
need to be reoriented to the task of facilitating the
integration of African countries, safeguarding the free movement
of peoples in the region and the protection of its integrated
economic community rather than the continued maintenance of each
African state as an isolated monocultural economy operated
mainly for the benefits of foreign economies. Thirdly a security
network which is designed to serve the interests of the African
peoples ought to have as its basic frame of reference the
relevant constitutional provisions of African states as well as
the various instruments, at the regional and sub-regional
levels, they have adopted. It needs to be empowered, and
autonomous, enough to undertake its professional
responsibilities without undue interference from the executive
arms of government. Finally African states need to exert their
diplomatic weight, as well as invoke international law, in order
to secure themselves from subversion by foreign interests.
Performance capabilities:
Performance is here seen as the operational capabilities
of the essential structures for the execution and delivery of
services. An
examination of the LGAs in Nigeria; their structures,
capabilities, relations with traditional authorities and state
governments reveals that a lot contributes to their present
dysfunctional state. The same with the operations of the states
and the Federal government. They hardly qualify for the term
“federal” and they don't seem committed to the execution of the
essential policies of government in terms of the economic and
political goals enunciated in the Constitution. A similar
pattern is illustrated in the relation between the central
authorities and the service institutions, or parastatals,
established to support and complement their functions.
Finally an examination of the foreign component of the functions
of the state reveals a tendency towards undermining previous
achievements in terms of Nigeria's leadership role in Africa, as
well as the AU's general conduct at various levels of
international relations. For example not only is the recent
formation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) an
abnormality it is also counter-productive. It is both on account
of the fact that not only are the so-called “partners” (USA and
European states) brought into the OAU not members of the African
Region but their very presence also greatly compromises, and
undermines, the capabilities of the region.
The problems of political stability, continuity and efficiency,
which has attracted the attention of many scholars, cannot be
discussed outside the realm of the functions of such to the
achievement of nationalist objectives of independence, democracy
and self-determined development. Stability cannot be both the
permanence and durability of colonial, and neocolonial,
institutions as well as those of independent, national and
Pan-African institutions at the same time. One must give way to
the other and where this has not yet successfully happened only
crises of instability is bound to recur.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Good governance could refer to the ability of those in power to
promote and protect popular, public and national interests. In
this regard governance need to be designed, and conducted, with
reference to the essential need for popular sovereignty, unity,
democracy, creativity and resource control in the interest of
self-determination as well as overall national security and
capabilities, for the effective achievement of national goals,
as well as their effective protection.
In the light of the popular demand for political reforms in
Nigeria two important issues need to be continually pointed out
in line with the recommendations of the Political Reform
Committee. In the first place there is need to insist on the
complete independence of the so-called Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) as well as professional autonomy for
all security and law enforcement agencies, in order to shield
them from undue political influence, as well as ensure that they
can execute their duties without let or hindrance, in the
interest of the nation and in line with its constitutional
provisions.
Similarly in the light of our observations on the deviations
from the provisions of the Constitution there is need for
continuous pressure towards structural reforms, at both the
economic and administrative levels, aimed at ensuring that not
only is the Nigerian economy diversified and made more
productive but that all relevant laws designed to contain
corruption are duly implemented at all levels. In this regard
the campaign of Nigeria's Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) to
the effect that all leading members of each administration ought
to be seen to account for their tenure, in line with the laws of
the land, need to be fully supported and effected.
Enhancing the scope of popular and patriotic participation in
governance is vital to the achievement of Nigeria's national
objectives, as well as those of the African region. The present
rather lukewarm approach to the activities of national
associations, and institutions, need to be greatly improved
upon. Higher institutions of learning, specialized research
centres and other types of resource establishments as well as
political party administrative structures, and the research
capabilities of legislative assemblies at all levels, need to be
facilitated to assume a more purposive, visible, capable and
pro-active function in policy formulation and oversight
functions. This will greatly enhance the country's capacity to
become focused as well as engage competent hands in the
articulation of its national goals towards finding solutions to
its national problems.
The Government needs to greatly improve its performance at the
level of mobilizing, sensitizing and using community, religious,
youth and women organizations as well as their leaders, towards
the promotion of peace, unity and development. Conversely the
state also needs to ensure constitutional enforcement of the law
where the activities of organizations, or individuals, subvert
or threaten these national objectives.
In addition it is important to recognize and actively promote
the positive as well as ethical activities of popular and
professional national bodies
such as unions in the form of Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC),
National Union Of Journalists (NUJ), Academic Staff Union of
Universities (ASUU) etc; along with professional associations
like Historical Society Of Nigeria (HSN), Nigeria Political
Science Association (NPSA), Institute of Chartered Accountants
of Nigeria (ICAN), Association of National Accountants of
Nigeria (ANAN), Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Nigeria Medical
Association (NMA), Chartered Institute of Bankers (CIB), Nigeria
Institute of Architects (NIA), Nigerian Institute of Building
(NIB), Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) etc as well as
voluntary organizations that are active on environment, health,
culture, leadership, welfare and development issues generally.
The proper identification, organization and synergisation of
such bodies will greatly enhance the nations capabilities in
good governance at least at two critical levels. In the first
place the specific contributions of each of such bodies to
national programmes, and activities, constitute important and
critical dimensions to the overall processes of governance in
the polity, as well as the character of the essential variables
informing its development practice. In the second place such
organizations could, through their exertion of professional
ethics and advocacy functions, play a great role in ensuring
respect for the rule of law with beneficial effects on the
containment of corruption in the land.
In order to achieve this
each professional association,
in particular, and other
associations in general, should work to ensure that their
members respect the ethics of the organizations and are so held
to account in their practices. In particular accountants,
lawyers, auditors, architects and many other consultants as well
as teachers, administrators, managers, and engineers in both the
public and private sectors, in addition to many other social and
security functionaries, will contribute a lot towards sanitizing
the nation if they work towards enforcing their professional
code of ethics on their respective members.
This presently
constitutes a very important Missing Link in our attempts to
fight corruption.
Finally we need to always remember the most basic truism that
governance cannot but fail, where justice does not prevail. All
our efforts will come to nothing if we are not able to enthrone
the delivery of justice as the most cardinal principle of all
forms of our national endeavour.
We need not only ensure the separation of powers, as well as the
independence of the judiciary, but also the latter's expansion,
and empowerment, in such a manner that will make it possible for
it to handle the enormous tasks of the delivery of justice which
so many, so eagerly, expect from it and which has not only been
in short supply but also deliberately denied in many cases.
Finally the extent to which we are able to separate positive
political undertakings from criminal activities (fraud, rigging,
embezzlement, bribery, theft, hate-mongering, kidnapping, rape,
incitement to violence, public unrest, murder, arson etc) will
greatly determine the progress we make towards the enthronement
of justice as the cardinal principle in our national affairs.
This, and only this, will help us to separate politics from
criminal activities, – the two of which have been deliberately
conjoined, and confused, in the interest of those in power.
In the final analysis, governance cannot but ail; indeed it must
but fail, where justice does not prevail.
Central Connecticut State University in conjunction with Trinity College, Eastern Connecticut State University, and Yale's Center for Latin American Studies, co-hosted a series of musical performances by the internationally acclaimed Brazilian Congo Pop Band, Berimbrow. Professor Mary Ann Mahony, Chair of the Latin American Studies Committee, facilitated this brief interview of Mestre Negoativo (MN) of Berimbrown, that took place on Thursday April 28, 2011 in the Torp Theater, CCSU. Interview conducted by Gloria Emeagwali
GE: What does
Berimbrown stand for?
GE:
What region of Brazil does the band come from?
GE: What is your
musical style?
GE: How did the
band get together and with what objective?
GE: What kinds of
instruments do you play?
Good Night
Good Night to those who are headed home
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