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Editorial
by Dr. Gloria Emeagwali
In this issue of Africa Update, Professor Okafor of Eastern Michigan
University explores an area with tremendous implications for
Nigerian electoral politics, revenue allocation and even regional
stability. The Professor suggests that Nigeria should consider
making use of the expertise of the United Nations in future
censuses.
Also included in this issue is an analysis of the booming video
film industry and visual literature by Dr. Ademiju-Bepo of the
Nigerian Film Institute, Jos. He makes comparative references to
the era dominated by Nigeria’s literary giant, Femi Osofisan, and
what he refers to as the’ post-Osofisan’ era.
In April 2007, Nigeria held its Presidential elections. A former
chemistry professor turned politician, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua,
emerged victorious, pledging to turn Nigeria’s economy around and
serve the country as a whole rather than regional interests. He
vowed also to ensure that future elections of Nigeria would be free
and fair. We have included in this issue an interview produced
exclusively for Africa Update on the April 2007 election. We
interview Ms Therese Nweke, a veteran journalist and commentator who
has been a keen observer of Nigerian politics and society for the
last thirty years.
Nigerian electoral politics and the recent elections would be the
theme of the Fall issue of Africa Update.
We thank the three contributors to this issue for agreeing to
provide us with their penetrating analyses of Nigerian politics and
society.
Dr. Gloria Emeagwali
Chief Editor, Africa Update
Return to Table of
Contents
Nigeria’s Census Jinx: Is there a way out?
By Professor Victor Oguejiofor Okafor1
Eastern Michigan University
Ypsilanti, Michigan 48197
Email
Address:
victor.okafor@emich.edu
Students of Nigerian politics could not have been surprised by the
swirling controversy over the recently-released provisional results of
the national headcount, which the federal government of Nigeria
conducted in 2006. Nigeria’s National Population Commission (NPC)
announced that the 2006 census produced a national population of
140,003,542. According to the commission, this result indicates a growth
of about 20 million from the 1991 census figure of 120 million. This
represents a growth rate of 3.2 per cent and a female to male ratio of
105 males to 100 females (71,709,000 males and 68,293,683 females). The
provisional results, like previous Nigerian censuses, show the north to
be more populous than the south. A breakdown of the new national
population of 140 million shows the three geopolitical zones of the
North as having a combined population of 75,025,166 (53.7%), while the
combined population of southern states is 64,978,376 (46.3%) (Omonijo).
Despite notable objections that have been raised from several sectors of
the south, as are discussed later in this article, Nigeria’s Council of
State2 advised President Olusegun Obasanjo to accept the results of the
2006 census. The next step required by section 213 of the operative 1999
national constitution of Nigeria is the laying of the census report by
the president before each chamber of Nigeria’s bicameral federal
legislature (and it would appear that this step has been taken) and
subsequently publishing it in the Official Gazette of the federal
government. Going by section 213 (3) of that constitution, it appears
that the disputed census results have already scaled the most critical
huddle, namely its acceptance by the Council of State. This does not
bode well for the segments of the nation that have objected to the
census outcome. It is particularly important to recall that on the same
day that the census result was announced, Jare Ajayi published a claim
that instead of 140 million, the census exercise had generated a
population of about 200 million but had to be amended by the national
population commission. Here is the rest of his account. “Compatriots, I
happen to know (unofficially) that the initial census figure after the
exercise was about 200 million. The Nigerian Population Commission (NPC)
had to frantically go back to the field to verify most of the claims
made. It was in the process that a whopping 50 million figure got
dropped. The point I'm trying to make is that so many things in Nigeria
appear or occur unnaturally. Things that are simply and honestly done
elsewhere are twisted in Nigeria - especially at the official level. May
the Almighty save us. But we need remember that Heaven helps those who
help themselves.”
Needless to say, throughout Nigeria’s history, no national head count
has ever won nation-wide acceptance, specifically because all recorded
national head counts have shown the northern, predominantly Moslem part
of Nigeria to be more populous than the predominantly Christian south.
As is happening now, southern politicians have always claimed that the
north is not as populous as successive national head counts have
demonstrated. Reacting to the provisional results of the 2006 census, a
pan-Yoruba socio-political organization, Afenifere described the results
“…as an attempt to use ‘well-managed and manipulated demography to
justify the inequities that have made calls for restructuring so
strident’" (Ogunmade). By “inequities,” Afenifere refers to the
following statistics of Nigeria’s political power configuration. “These
figures are well understood when other statistics are considered. The
North has 54.1 per cent of the states in Nigeria and 54.1 per cent of
local governments. In the National Assembly, the North has 53 per cent
of the House of Representatives seats, as well as 53.2 per cent of the
seats in the Senate. The North also draws 55.3 per cent of the Federal
Allocation to local governments” (Ogunmade).
Its Igbo counterpart, Ohanaeze questioned the results but betrayed a
somewhat subdued reaction as shown by this excerpt from a national news
report regarding statements made by its president. “… Dr Dozie Ikedife,
while faulting the result, said the group would make a full statement
after studying the breakdown in detail” (Omonijo). The news report
further quotes Ikedife as saying that "We have to study the figures
before I can give you a categorical answer. But my preliminary
observation suggests that there is a shift and that shift cannot be
justified by what is on ground. But my full comment will come after we
have reviewed the details so that demographers and population experts
will be able to guide us, so that what we say will be scientific and
factual. From the figures, the South-East population is the least in
Nigeria, and this makes you wonder if this is real. But as I said, a
full explanation will come when we have had a detailed study" (Omonijo)
While the north contains a larger share (600,000 square kilometers) of
Nigeria’s land mass of 923,768 square kilometers,3 than the south
(323,768 square kilometers), southern politicians have consistently
insinuated that the south is more densely populated than the north. As
Nigeria’s Vanguard brilliantly recalls in a recent editorial, “Each new
census has benefited from the fouled environment of the one preceding
it. The first head count in 1866 - 141 years ago - was controversial.
The subsequent ones in 1871, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1953, 1962,
1963, 1973, 1991 were all doused in controversy over which part of the
country was more populous” (Colours of Census). As Vanguard’s editorial
recalls, Nigeria’s census disputes pre-date its national independence
from British colonial rule, which occurred in 1960. For instance, the
census of 1950-3 produced an outcome that led southern politicians to
accuse the British colonial authorities of manipulating the results “…
in order to give the North (which the colonial establishment perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a dependable ally) a political edge in Nigerian
politics” (Okafor 99).
Another recent commentary on the 2006 census reminds one of the fact
that the new census controversy has given fresh currency to Nigeria’s
north vs. south bi-polar politics despite the breaking up of the
multi-ethnic federal republic into 36 states. As the commentator puts
it, “In a federation prone to ethnic and religious unrest, which has a
powerful northern elite yet derives its wealth from its southern states,
the issue of whether Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north is more
populous than the Christian south is always thorny. The latest census
has proved no exception” (Vesperini). The preceding passage hits the
nail in the head by drawing attention to the main reason for the
successive politicization of the results of Nigeria’s national
headcounts. Not unlike most countries, Nigeria uses population as its
major criterion for the sharing of nationally-derived revenue among the
constituent 36 states and more than seven hundred local governments.
Nigeria’s mineral and other natural resources are publicly owned and so
are managed by the central government. Revenue that accrues from such
resources, including petroleum (Nigeria is a major producer of crude
oil, which is the mainstay of its national economy) are shared among the
federal, state and local governments, based on a formula that uses
population as it key yardstick. Besides revenue sharing, the census is
also the basis for determining the number of legislative seats assigned
to each state of the federation. Thus, besides serving as a basis for
planning, the census has both economic and political power
implications.
In this new controversy, the sourest point appears to be the census
results’ claim that Kano state recorded a higher population (9.4
million) than Lagos state (9.01 million). Lagos Governor, Bola Ahmed
Tinubu objects to this result, while a group that is described as the
Yoruba Council of Elders, YCE insists that the 2006 census results run
counter to known rules of demography. It also reported that both Abia
and Bayelsa State governments dismissed the census results all together.
Governor Tinubu’s reaction is rather cautious. He is reported as saying
that the census result is “… something that must be scientifically
approved or disapproved. We are looking at our data base; we are looking
at the basis scientifically. The basis of this figures, I would not
react to that now until we finish all the analysis that we are
conducting and the evaluation both demographic and our GPS and the
survey area and number of forms. I know that the NPC processing centre
accepted 4.9 million forms for households, I can tell you that. Are you
now saying each household is less than three? That is where I will just
wait for now, till later" (Omonijo).
In his reaction to the census controversy, the Chairman of Nigeria’s
National Population Commission (NPC), Sumaila Makama, is reported as
saying that “the figures from the 2006 census are a true reflection of
Nigeria's population,” and that there is “… enough basis to support the
census results which for the first time was 'scientifically' aided” (Muhammed).
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s own reaction to all the controversy is
somewhat enigmatic. Having accepted the report of the National
Population Commission, the president is reported as describing the
census result as “not too bad.” And, he advised Nigerians to “…to accept
or reject it,” adding that “I have concluded my assignment" (Muhammed).
The 2006 census was marked by controversy even before the counting
began. For instance, prior to the headcount, which was conducted in
March, 2006, the five governors of the Southeastern states, along with
Pan Igbo cultural organizations, such as Ohanaeze, had fought, in vain,
to have the federal government change its decision not to include
ethnicity and religion in the census questionnaire. The governors’
stance is based on their belief that the Igbos of Nigeria constitute a
larger proportion of the national population than what previous censuses
had reported. Although Igbos are indigenous to only five of the 36
states of the federation, they are probably one of the most widely
dispersed groups throughout the country. But one cannot help asking the
following rhetorical questions. Is it true or false that, as a reaction
to the federal government’s refusal to track ethnicity and religion
during the 2006 census, a south-eastern separatist group known as the
Movement for the Actualization of Biafra (MASSOB) engaged in attacks
against census officials and actively discouraged or prevented some
citizens of several Igbo states from making themselves available for the
headcount? Given MASSOB’s reported obstructionism, should it come as a
surprise that the South-East zone recorded the least population of
16,381,729? The other southern zones, namely the South-West and
South-South registered higher figures of 27,581,992 and 21,014,655,
respectively.
Nonetheless, one remains puzzled as to why the federal government
disallowed the tracking of ethnicity and religion, particularly in a
country where life’s opportunities tend to be affected significantly by
a person’s ethnic and religious affiliations. If government insists on
remaining blind to ethnicity and religion, then it has a duty to ensure
that those two factors are never taken into consideration in school and
other forms of admissions, political appointments and
distribution/allocation of economic resources, including employment. It
also has a duty to enshrine this ethic in the body politic and its
political culture by using the executive, judicial and legislative
powers of the federation to protect the constitutionally-stipulated
equal citizenship rights of Nigerians in all nooks and corners of the
federation. But the dilemma that faces the governing elite is the
constitutional challenge of reflecting the federal character of Nigeria
in their political appointments.
The question, therefore, remains: how can you equitably enforce the
normative federal character code if you do not have accurate information
pertaining to the ethnic composition of the nation? This sort of
question has also been raised in racially-diverse countries, such as the
United States where race is tracked in successive national censuses.
Supporters of the tracking of race in the United States contend that
policy makers cannot effectively monitor the implementation of social
equity programs and anti-discrimination policies if the national census
does not recognize and document racial identities. Ideally, Nigeria
ought to be experienced as a society where you are judged by the content
of your character and where your life chances depend principally upon
your skills and aptitudes. Like race, ethnicity should not matter. But
has Nigeria become an ethnically-blind nation? When it becomes one, then
the issue of the tracking of ethnicity will become mute.
Given the deep-seated mutual suspicion and distrust that exist between
the north and the south over Nigeria’s unresolved census jinx, there is,
in my view, a factor that some of us may have historically
underestimated or even brushed aside, namely the demographic fact of a
north that is predominantly polygamous (and Islamic) versus a
predominantly monogamous (and Christian) south although there is a
Moslem minority in the Yoruba segments of the south and a Christian
minority within the northern fold. Thus, generally-speaking, an average
northern and Moslem household consists of more wives and children than
an average southern and Christian household. While polygamy is typical
of Islam-dominated northern social life, monogamy is the typical marital
orientation in the Christian-dominated south. Therefore, should it take
the intelligence of a rocket scientist for one to understand that this
key factor alone would suggest that the northern population grows at a
faster rate than the southern population?
The apparent intergenerational southern bias/mindset that the north is
ever guilty of inflating its population (vis-�-vis an innocent south
that never engages in headcount manipulation) in order to unjustly
obtain a lion share of Nigeria’s national revenue, to the detriment of
the south, implies that Nigeria, on its own, probably cannot conduct a
national census that will ever survive the prejudices inherent in the
country’s north vs. south bipolar politics. Besides its importance for
planning and prudent economic development, an accurate census is
necessary for electoral purposes. If one side of the nation lacks
confidence in what is officially proclaimed as Nigeria’s population, is
that side likely to repose confidence in the elections and voting lists
that are derived from the same questionable national census? It is my
considered opinion that for Nigeria to settle its census jinx once and
for all, its federal government should invite the United Nations to
conduct a fresh national census in the country with a team of
international and Nigerian officials. Some people may resist this idea
out of national pride. But what national pride inheres in the fact that
for all time, Nigeria has failed to produce a credible national census?
In 2006, the United Nations assisted the Democratic Republic of Congo
with the conduct of the nation’s first multiparty elections in the
country in 46 years—a country that was, for years and years, embroiled
in inter-ethnic strife. There is nothing shameful about seeking help
when a person can no longer solve a problem by himself/herself. This is
the case with Nigeria’s proven inability to conduct and produce a
credible national headcount. It takes wisdom, not empty pride, to
recognize when one needs help. There is no doubt that the Nigerian
nation needs help at this time.
Works Cited
Ajayi, Jare. “Unofficial Nigeria: New Population Figure? Unnatural and
Unscientific.” USA Africa Dialogue 29 December 2007. (http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue).
“Colours of Census,” an editorial. Vanguard 17 January 2007.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Lagos: Federal
Government P, 1999.
Muhammed, Hamisu. “Census-Use it or Dump it, Obasanjo Tells Nigerians.”
Daily Trust 17 January 2007.
Ogunmade, Philip. “Census Results Fraudulent, Says Afenifere.” This Day
15 January 2007.
Okafor, Victor. A RoadMap for Understanding African Politics: Leadership
and Political Integration in Nigeria. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Omonijo, Bolade, et al. “Census-Kano Beats Lagos.” Vanguard 10 January
2007.
Omonijo, Bolade, et al. “Rejections Greet Census Result.” Vanguard 11
January 2007.
Vesperini, Helen. “Nigeria’s 2006 Census Results Resurrect North-South
Rivalry. Agence France Press 11 January 2007.
1 The writer, Dr. Victor Oguejiofor Okafor is a widely-published author
of several books, chapters in anthologies and journal articles. His
books include Okafor, Victor. A RoadMap for Understanding African
Politics: Leadership and Political Integration in Nigeria. New York:
Routledge, 2006, Okafor, Victor. Towards an Understanding of Africology.
2nd ed. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 2006, and Okafor, Victor, & Adeleke,
Tunde. Eds. Studies in African American Leadership: Individuals,
Movements, and Committees. New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
2 The Council of State consists of the President of Nigeria as
Chairman, the Vice-President as Deputy Chairman, all former Presidents
of the Federation and all former Heads of State, all former Chief
Justices of Nigeria, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, all the State Governors, and the Federal
Attorney General. The Council of State advises the president of Nigeria
on several national matters, including national population census
compilation and publication.
3 “World Statistics.” (http://www.mongabay.com/igapo/world_statistics_by_area.htm).
Return to Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION:
When Irele (1981:69) summed up our modern African literature as:
’
a form of response to those events and forces whose impact upon our
societies have determined their present state and course of
historical development but also as a means of entering more fully
into their meaning and implications for our (African) lives,’
in his critical x-ray of that tradition, he could as well have been
predicting, the revolution that catalyzed a few years later in the
annals of modern Nigerian dramatic literature.
Sharing Irele’s contention that our modern literature
presents itself not only as a response but also as a determining
factor of socio-political development on the continent and indeed,
its country of origin, it can be argued that the evolution of the
generation which came after the Osofisan’s aligns with the motive
power of drama, which De Graft (1976:5, 22), sees as a perennial
search, a reaching out by the whole man towards the goal of sanity
and security in a world that threatens annihilation, from all
directions. Going further, De Graft advocates an understanding of
the new forces that threaten our society, the things that hold
terror as well as joy for our people, the need to create new or more
compellingly relevant themes.
This paper is an examination and a critique of the
evolution of a new generation of Nigerian playwrights- their
orientation, thematic aesthetics and contribution to a growing
corpus of work otherwise known as visual literature and the
emergent paradigms.
Jeyifo once observed that a literary work, or the corpus of a
writer’s output, survives only to the extent that it continuously
receives critical attention. Garuba (1988:269) has equally argued
that,
Young writers in every literary tradition attempt to create
a space for themselves by fostering different orientation of
consciousness which will focus attention on their works, whether
this effort leads to rancorous posturing…the outcome is on the whole
the healthier growth of the tradition.
That singular experience invariably provides a current in the
continuous stream of collective consciousness, creating a nexus of
the old and the new order; especially while the creative
regeneration of a generation, and its subsequent evolution, last.
The point here is: it is apparent that the new writing coming out of
Nigeria, or that has come out, the work of young and budding
playwrights, owes something to the past and a good deal to the
future but expectedly, with a visible reaching for its own
individuality.
DEFINITION OF A GENERATION
The NUTAF initiative of the early 1980s which spread
like a tornado swept in a strong, new generation which emerged
towards the end of the 1980s in the University of Ibadan as well as
other University towns of Ile-Ife, Benin, Calabar, Jos, Nsukka,
Zaria, Port-Harcourt, Ilorin and Maiduguri, came with the purpose of
reviving the consciousness of theatre-loving Nigerians to their
own art, and that of bringing a re-generation of the
art. Writing of this generation, Abati (1990:18) argues that when
the basic shortcoming of these student-dramatists in their
imitativeness and fascination with the simple and the psychedelic is
tolerated, “their drama reveals a lot of promise.”
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Attempting an ideological reading of the thematic
thrust of the new drama of the ‘90s, Adesokan (1990:27,28), has
noted of Tunde Ajayi’s “Streaks of Blood”, one of the entries in the
NUTAF, that
the spiritual transformation that culminates in the
evolution of a new system can be said to be the playwright’s own
conception of what a social change should be. He seems to believe
that the enthronement of Marxist or socialist government through
violence or political processes is not the best cure. If everybody
is spiritually reformed and the irreconcilable ones equally
eliminated, what we would have would not only be a politically
stabilized country, but a morally purified one.
Invariably, this thesis which establishes the shift in
the thematic aesthetics of the generation after Osofisan et al,
who chose to turn their back on the previous Marxist-materialist
approach, is our conceptual premise. While not turning its back on
the formalist tendencies, the approach here is generally
sociological.
These playwrights have reflected, and continue to
reflect the Nigerian society and beyond from thematic perspectives
such as leadership crisis, military misadventure, national unity,
political and ethnic rivalry, state oppression of the masses,
poverty, human rights violation and injustice, the scourge of campus
secret cults, war and conflict, among other socio-economic issues
and themes, and of course, the ravages of HIV/AIDS, cancer and other
viral diseases. They do this with the newness and purposiveness that
contemporaneity dictates. Their thematic and creative tendency
continues to deal with Nigeria’s prevailing political and economic
anguish, chronicling and mirroring our times, and offering outlets
from our fast enclosing cells.
Indeed, the 1990s came with the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, a contending world power, the collapse of orthodox
communist structures in Eastern Europe, the retreat of
Marxist-socialist creeds, on the one hand, and the triumph of
America and a new right offensive, a new capitalist challenge and
order, on the other. Cautiously, Udenta (1993: vii) notes that
The world became witness to… a new racial-ideological
onslaught. Internationalism gave way to nationalism and the class
struggle to a new era of practical economic and political
co-operation on the shadow of a new world order.
The themes of the recent playwrights, rather than
being shaped and sharpened by the ideology of predecessors such as
Osofisan, have been ordered more by the search for a spiritual
solution to our socio-political problems. To these playwrights,
ideologies have failed to awaken the desired consciousness in the
people to confront their realities. On the religious level, the rise
of Pentecostalism, “now a most interesting development in
contemporary Christianity worldwide” (Nihinlola, 1998:5) and
fundamentalist Islam also coincided with the rejection of socialism
in favor of survivalism as the ideological platform of
expression for the generation. Today, with the return of drama to
the church as in the medieval period, there are Christian groups
(and Moslem sects) using drama as a vehicle of mobilizing their
worshippers, both on stage and on screen. To this, Adelugba
(2003:29) attests when he enthuses
…I must say that the drama performances, the live theatre
that now take place in churches is no kind of output to laugh or
scoff at. Some of the works coming out of the church dramatic groups
have in recent years been quite impressive. Indeed if you are going
to talk of the group at Ile-Ife that has not only succeeded in stage
dramas, but also has had their works adapted for television and
video…..
.
This development however cuts across the two major
faiths mentioned above as an Islamic group based in Ibadan, The
Caring and Sharing Brotherhood in Islam also employs drama in the
same light.
VISUAL LITERATURE AND THE EMERGENT PARADIGMS
The emergence of this new set of talents at the turn
of the ‘90s was an instrument in the struggle for
self-determination. As we have noted elsewhere (Ademiju-Bepo,
1999:46), these “new” plays also sought to re-write the history of
dramatic enterprise in the country in an attempt to wrest the reins
of dramatic mode from the ‘older’ generation, whose influence is
however still sparingly discernible in the plays of the ‘90s.
As far as their themes are concerned, it was a new
vision for drama in the country, a vision which has now assumed a
pre-eminent place in the critical tradition of recent drama, with
the rise of the home video, therefore giving the world a whole new
visual literature as a medium of entertainment, the challenging,
rival tendency of survivalism and economic pressures
notwithstanding. Oyesoro (1999) has argued for the declining
popularity of the live theatre at the turn of the 1990s:
…inasmuch as the new breed generation playwrights want to
make their impact felt on the dramatic terrain, they have been
handicapped by the diversion of the home video phenomenon which has
lured many of them because of the instant financial gain it offers.
Rather than wait for the live stage or the publishers to get their
plays to the public, many of these playwrights simply choose to sell
off their scripts to home video producers.
VIDEO TECHNOLOGY AND THE DIALECTICS OF TRANSITION
The video movie aided by technology has today become a
major Nigerian dramatic form of the nineties. Taking up Haynes’s
contention (2000:xv), one can say that the motion picture industry
has found its feet, sustained by the increasingly diverse and
powerful cultural energies currently flowing into it and the
tremendous growth and mutation it has experienced, in its first
decade and a half of its emergence. We want to posit that the
survival of this paradigm has been buoyed by the post-Osofisan
playwrights who gravitated to and became spellbound to same in their
search for contemporary relevance and dramatic prominence.
Interestingly, empirical evidence shows that the choice has neither
been ill-inspired nor motivated as these playwrights of the ‘new
order’ now practice in the realm of visual literature as opposed to
dramatic literature. The dialectics of their transition from the
stage to the screen was invariably inspired by their ideological
orientation and disposition, viz survivalism.
The dramatic spirit of the “new age”, which became the
emergent paradigms of expression in the genre, appeared to have been
galvanized by Soyinka (1979:98), who once asserted that
… The two (the
stage and the screen) are interrelated and mutually complement each
other so often, both in practice and theory, that new comers to the
cinema, which include all of us, tend very often to transpose the
form of theatre directly into film, with of course, very stagey,
static film.
In the same vein, the television, cinema and the new
forms of entertainment and communication, in Bamidele’s contention,
which we share, have become a sort of
visual literature, since these can now be
viewed as gatekeepers through which a literary work passes to the
audience (2000:40). The philosophy behind the creation of the
several series in the TV play left some topics or thematic
pre-occupation to be clich�-ridden, noting that such pioneering
screen efforts, as we have noted above, gave the video makers the
impetus to experiment with new form, topic (themes) and technical
innovation with the daring, new video technology (2000:48), now gone
digital. Bamidele goes ahead to aptly capture that “transition” when
he asserts that
The television
play has shifted the attention of many playwrights away from the
stage. There are those who have been associated with live theatre
for most of their lives and there are also performers who have grown
up as artists before the eyes of popular theatre audience who no
longer write and perform for the live theatre. Reasons for this
shift may be traced to some socio-economic factors
(2000:50).
A theme, according to Farker, implies the linearity or
extension of a work in a way that other subject matter do not. He
further asserts that:
Theme may refer to those repeated parts of a subject which
control aspects of a work which is perceived as formal as well as
conceptual. Theme is therefore, a more concrete and formalistic term
with structural implications
(1991:247-249).
We should not forget that the same events, images, and
symbols of their social realities, which now set the pace for their
thematic thrust, had roots in the theatrical experimentations
offered by the NUTAF initiative. Haynes (2000:4) has stressed that
“the videos may not give us what we thought we wanted, but…They
offer the strongest, most accessible expression of contemporary
Nigerian popular culture.” According to him, they are
a prime instance of the interpretation of the global and the local
through the international commerce in cultural forms.
Thus, their recourse to visual literature in the home
video syndrome, therefore, is both an assurance of better means of
livelihood and continuing relevance, visibility and viability as the
dynamics of tradition and change affects them, spurring them on to
take full advantage of the creative symbiosis of literature
and motion picture.
These interpreters of our social reality have
responded in both economic and cultural perspectives by evolving a
popular art form to interpret and reflect contemporary tendencies.
For instance, Femi Kayode, an isolated exemplar of the generation in
discourse, wrote the screenplays for White Handkerchief and
Thunderbolt (2000) for Mainframe Productions, one of the fast
growing video production outfits, owned by Tunde Kelani.
EXEMPLARS OF THE NEW PARADIGM: THEMATIC TRENDS AND CREATIVE VISION
The trends of video films in the twenty-first century,
according to Adesanya, are unpredictable, because, literacy,
artistry, history, contemporaneity and the future would have to come
into cognizance in the dramatic perspective, beside the new
realities which the hopeful filmmaker has to embrace. He says,
while dramatic release is the principal market for the film
producer, the videographer was able to consider theatrical release
and the video market
(Adesanya, 2000:42).
The
theme of any film on the other hand, is its intellectual content,
its subject. Since a motion picture is a method of communication
between the filmmaker and the audience, it has a language and
vocabulary of its own. The filmmaker (or scriptwriter) usually has
something to say, and it is this content that is the theme of any
film. However, contemporary film has become fragmented and often
seems to lack cohesion and a recognizable form or structure, that it
is easy to assume that theme is either absent or unnecessary.
Tracing the thematic trends in recent Nigerian home video films,
Akpovi-Esade (2003:66) in an incisive article notes that against the
backdrop of Kenneth Nnebue’s 1992 daring road marker, Living in
Bondage, which opened the floodgate of ritualistic themes, movie
producers began to duplicate storylines. According to him, before
the trend met a natural death,
The National Film
and Video Censors Board, NFVCB had to step in when some Nigerians
were murdered in a mob action in Accra, Ghana in the late 90s.
Offence: Nigerians were accused of being responsible for the death
of a little girl that had her head severed after she was murdered,
presumably for ritual purposes. The conclusion reached by the angry
Ghananians was that Nigerians being ritualists as portrayed in our
home videos must have been responsible for the death!
That trend was supplanted by themes drawing from violence, heroism
(e.g. football), American Hollywood style, tradition, religion
(Pentecostalism), comedy, and love in that order of quick
succession, as thematic pre-occupations of the producers who now
double as the scriptwriters/directors.
The less than two decades of the home video phenomenon in Nigeria
invariably produced filmmakers who stand as gatekeepers of the
enervating symbiosis between literature and visual
technology. From among these, we have selected two exemplars, our
choices, of course particularly influenced by their NUTAF
antecedents. The visual literature of Charles Novia, and Pedro
Agbonifo-Obaseki among other NUTAF proponents, has come to represent
the voice of the new generation. The strength of their thematic and
aesthetic idiom and dramatic form is played out in the commitment to
the survival of the art of visual literature which they pioneered in
the country as a representation of emergent paradigms.
AESTHETIC CRITERIA AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
i) Novia
Charles Novia’s foray into the art and business of video films came
as a response to the urge to utilize the wider scope offered by the
television and video technology over the stage, rather than a fluke.
The last time he produced a play for the stage was in 1996, some ten
years ago, with the gracious sponsorship of the Goethe Institut, the
German Cultural Centre in Nigeria. Since his discovery of the
television as the ‘new medium’, he joined the Nigerian Television
Authority, NTA, Lagos, as a scriptwriter and worked behind the scene
for four years. Novia however contends that the stage and television
are different ball games. But with the advent of the home video, he
enthuses:
I wouldn’t know
what the stage will be like in five years. But it would continue to
be the training ground, even though there is no enabling environment
for the arts in the country. We are in a quandary: torn between a
bohemian life of the artist – are you a committed or commercial
artist?
(Novia, 2003).
Choosing the romantic, human interest, and family angle as his
thematic canvas, Novia has carved a niche for himself as a love
creator/writer. In his words: “I see the family as a component part
of the society. In view of so much strife in the society, I choose
not to follow the bandwagon, hence, my love stories. With love, we
can overcome a lot of stress. I run away from banal themes, and once
you are consistent, you become known and accepted and appreciated,
if you are good. The viewers would scold you if you are otherwise.
It’s been tough, but very rewarding.”
His works to date, some of which have embraced other thematic
concerns as well,
include Deep Secrets (2000), Easy To Kill (2000),
Spiritual Husband (2000), Lovers Day (2001), For
Your Love (2001), The Assassin (2001), Afro
(2001), Judas (2002), The Pastor and The Harlot
(2002), Love of My Life (2002), Love For Sale (2002),
When Love Dies (2002), Real Love (2003), I Will Die
For You (2003), You Broke My Heart 1&2 (2003), Adam
and Eve (2003), Husband & Wife (2003), Missing Angel
(2004),
among others. These he has produced under the inspiration of Charles
Novia Think, from the stable of November Productions based in Lagos.
VISUAL AESTHETICS AND DRAMATIC FORM
Novia’s When Love Dies is a story about the consequences of war
involving Mary, a young pretty Liberian refugee who finds herself in
Nigeria after fleeing the scourge in her native land. Rescued from a
refugee camp by a pastor, she becomes a house help in Colonel Bala’s
household. In the course of adjusting to a new life, Bala seduces
her, forcing his wife to send her packing. The Colonel seeks her out
and proposes for her to become his mistress, with a house and
servants to the bargain. She succumbs to the pressure after he
rescues her from jail and moves to her new home.
Although transformed and well-catered for, the heavy hand of
loneliness, lovelessness and depression soon descends on her. One
evening at the club in Bala’s company, she meets and falls in love
with a young, homeless musician, Daniel, even as she has to steal
backstage to see him. She later asks him to move into a Boys
Quarters in her house. This turn of events sets both of them on the
path of destruction as soon as the Colonel finds out about their
affair through Shade, Bala’s girlfriend, whom he introduces to Mary
as his niece, and sends to stay in the same Boys Quarters. Unknown
to Mary, Shade used to know Daniel and plots to get even with him
for jilting her. Daniel is detained and beaten up on Bala’s orders.
Undaunted, he says to him:
DANIEL: What more can you do to me than to torture
me and have me killed? (When Love Dies. Scene 14)
Infuriated, the Colonel gets back home and beats up Mary, who ends
up in the hospital and is later diagnosed of suffering from cancer
of the liver. But she tells Bala:
MARY: Daniel is the first man I ever loved. You’ve been
so kind to me… But…
Daniel is released to go and vacate his room, after being forced to
write off his love for Mary. He meets his mother waiting for him as
the Colonel shows up in a bid to monitor his packing and comes
face-to-face with “a young barracks girl twenty-five years ago.” She
recounts how Bala, fresh from the Defence Academy then, denied and
refused the pregnancy that became Daniel. The die is cast: Father
and son fighting over the same girl!
DANIEL: You call yourselves soldiers who protect innocent
citizens…But once you allow power to get into your head…
Too late, Daniel rushes to see Mary in the hospital where she has
already made up her mind on her next line of action, but all the
same sympathizes with him:
MARY: I’m
sorry that I’ve put
you through so much,
so much on my behalf…
Out of hospital, they both go out to the beach and hands him a
letter in which she has left him the sum of four million Naira to
finance his album and also for her former refugee camp. As Daniel
reads the letter, she wanders off on the sand. By the time he looks
up, she has vanished. And he begins to search for her.
Individual responsibility, marital infidelity, senselessness of war,
revenge, power, betrayal and sacrifice, apart from love, are some of
the themes treated in this film. Bala’s refusal of the pregnancy is
a failing in his individual responsibility to the girl in question
and the society in which he later grows to become powerful as to
inadvertently terrorize the same fruit of that union over a woman he
keeps as mistress – to be used and dumped. His transparent
unfaithfulness to his wife raises a moral question about his sense
of duty. Mary’s bequest in the last scene, rescues Daniel’s talent
in spite of Shade’s betrayal and revenge.
Critically, I do not think it is plausible for Mary to have
sacrificed her life simply because of her diagnosis of cancer, when
she does not even get to learn that the Colonel is Daniel’s
biological father. It renders that dramatic twist a contrived
sub-plot in order to elicit the audience’s empathy for Mary. After
her battle and suffering, finding real love in Daniel could have
provided the needed elixir to see her through the pains. However,
Novia succeeds in weaving all these thematic concerns into a good
and well-crafted piece consistent with his style and forte�.
ii) Agbonifo-Obaseki
With four published and twelve yet-to-be-published plays, two
anthology of poems, a non-fiction novel, numerous home video movies,
teledramas and documentary to his credit, Pedro Osa Agbonifo-Obaseki
(otherwise known as Don Pedro) may yet be described as the ‘rising
icon of the post-Osofisan generation’ of Nigerian playwrights.
The man who won the Director-of-the-Year Award in 1999 for his epic
video film, IGODO, has also either written or produced
Obaseki, Azagidi, “Nights of Erinmwin”, Idia,
“Sunset in the Lagoon”, “Soldiers O’Fortune”, “Rendezvous At Hell’s
Gate”, “Goodbye My Redeemer”, “Ikpoleki”, “Ritual of Rebirth”(dance-drama),
“Hallowed Screams” (for the stage); and Evil Thing(1998), Eziza
(2000), Days of Rage, Four’s Kompany, Images, Akwa: Tales of the
African Woman, Tara (2000), The Brave Soldier (2001), Spell Binders,
Grip of Fate, and Shades (for the screen) as part of his own
contribution to the body of writing from the post-Osofisan
generation.
Since film basically weaves thematic hoists and narrative devices
with new elements, it relates socially with familiar or topical
subjects with a sense of contemporaneity. His art takes his Bini
culture of the Edo people up for the world to see and appreciate.
The result is an interesting blend of old and new elements to tell
stories that have dramatic relevance for his generation.
VISUAL AESTHETICS AND DRAMATIC FORM
In The Redeemer (2000), Agbonifo-Obaseki weaves the revelation of
the Anti-Christ and such themes as prostitution, materialism,
unemployment, greed and the inordinate quest for miracles rather
than salvation by a majority of today’s church goers to tell a very
enervating story of contemporary reality. Three
Fingerlings-turned-men rape a pretty harlot, Maryann, while easing
herself in the course of plying her trade one evening, after a
quarrel with Zico, her regular ‘boyfriend’. About a year later, she
is delivered of a baby boy on her way to the hospital.
A blind beggar at the scene immediately regains his sight as soon as
the baby is raised up for the crowd before the ambulance arrives to
whisk mother and baby away. As soon as the stretcher bearing both of
them is wheeled into the ward, dead and sick babies variously
experience revival and resurrection, unknown to them that:
V/O: This day…a child is
born
A son is given! And the
government shall be
upon his shoulder. And
he will be called wonderful…
Of the increase of his government…there will be no end. He
shall strike the earth with the rod
of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips, he shall slay
the wicked. He shall set up a banner for all the nations.
Out
of the mouth of babes and nursing infants, you have
ordained strength. And a little child shall lead them.
(The Redeemer.p.8).
Before Maryann is discharged, a visibly elated Zico, a
graduate-turned ‘common mechanic’ secures her hand in marriage
witnessed by those present in the ward. The baby is christened Jessy,
a psychedelic version of Jesus, amidst his mother’s protest:
ZICO: Okay! We’ll call him…Jesus! He will be unique. Nobody calls
anybody that kind of a name. So? He will be…
MARYANN: That’s blasphemous! We cannot call our
son…my son ‘Jesus’. He is not a messiah! …(p.11)
As a child, Jessy performs a series of minor miracles unacknowledged
by the parents, until he helps Zico with winning numbers in a pools
betting, and one day, heals a deaf man during a deliverance session
in their church:
JESSY: I can heal that man, Papa.
ZICO: Hmmm? What man?
JESSY: The deaf and dumb. I can heal him.
ZICO: Heal him? How?
JESSY: I’ll just say the word(p.31)
Zico brings this to the notice of Pastor James:
ZICO: You are pastor. My boy has healing power; a
divine ability to heal the sick, and cure the afflicted. That is a
devastating combination! Here is the deal. You preach,
my boy heals and performs miracles. People
will invade our little church. The House of God grows, and…Mo’more
money!
PASTOR: How did your son come about this power?
ZICO: I don’t know and I truly do not want to know…(p.32)
Soon, Jessy becomes the attraction of his ministry, healing,
delivering and performing other miracles while his church continues
to grow and the mega-bucks increase, until the president gets to
know about it. The parents’ lifestyle and fortune change for the
better and Zico decides to quit his mechanic job but Maryann accuses
him of exploiting her son:
Unknown to many, Jessy secretly begins to groom an ‘army’ from
amongst his schoolmates for his eventual diabolical assignment in
this world. His first disciple is Agatha, the baby girl pronounced
dead before Maryann was wheeled into the ward after having Jessy and
who “woke up from the dead.”
JESSY: They think it is the End time. Not yet. You instead, are
going to be apostles of the future. All that I’ve healed in his name
shall soar with me, and you all will return as soldiers and
conquer the world for him.
JUDE: And we shall reign for one thousand years…
EMEKA: Because we are the anointed…
TUOYO: The chosen ones…
AGATHA: And we all bear the mark…
JUDE: And carry the number…
ALL: Six…Six… (p.48)
By the fullness of his time, Jessy reveals his identity and takes
over the church from Pastor James after he fails to get his own
share of the proceeds from his miracles-generated booty from him and
his father, who dies soon after while the pastor also runs mad:
JESSY: The Lord has abandoned you, Pastor James. You fell for
money and you sold your ministry and your soul to the devil long
ago.
PASTOR: What?!
JESSY: Now they will mock you. A prophet without honor among his
own relatives, and in his own home. I’ve taken over the church.
PASTOR: Stop it! You, you little devil! ...Jessy…who are you?
JESSY: I’m God’s other Son (p.42)
He brings his ‘soldiers’ into the church, changes its name and goes
about with a battalion of bodyguards and a fleet of luxury cars. For
the commissioning of the new church headquarters, the President
donates two Lexus jeeps and a Mercedes SLK 230!
Maryann rescues Pastor James and rehabilitates him in time for the
epic encounter between the forces of darkness - led by Jessy and the
Lord’s army of parents whose children Jessy has under his evil spell
behind James - which takes place on a prayer mount as the kids are
about “going on a short journey of a thousand years”:
PASTOR’S VOICE OVER: Ancient of Days. The Lily of the valley.
Father... We covenant in the blood and stand against the plans of
the evil one…We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against
principalities, against powers, against the rulers of darkness
of this world…We send forth the Holy Spirit to cover our
children…Because, oh Lord…You are God.
JESSY: And I cover you in the new covenant. You shall live a
thousand years. In no time, you shall return to rule the
affairs of men. Because you bear the mark. The number and mark of he
that sent me. The number and mark of his name.
ALL: (In unison) Six…six... six.
JESSY: …The ‘Soldiers of the new Order’! ... Stand to
defend the kingdom!
ALL: We stand to defend the kingdom! (pp.53-54)
With police help, the children are all rescued except Jessy who is
really not a human being and is taken away by the Fingerling who
impregnated Maryann, for the scripture to be fulfilled:
PASTOR: It is written. “But there were also false prophets…who will
secretly bring in destructive heresies, even doubting the
Lord who bought them, and bring on themselves swift destruction.(p.54)
From a critical reading, the film is a timely statement to the
multitude of church-goers who are merely miracle seekers today in
the heat of Pentecostal revolution gripping the nation and indeed,
most part of the world. The derailment into materialism and
prosperity preaching by many of the new day founder-pastors of these
so-called psychedelic churches has assumed an alarming proportion,
hence, Agbonifo-Obaseki’s thematic treatment of this trend to warn
believers that the end time is at hand. While condemning the
religious trend, the film also moralizes on the ignominy and stigma
that go with prostitution as we find Zico until his death
castigating Maryann because of her scarlet past. She herself is
ashamed to narrate the experience to Pastor James. Another habit it
calls attention to is pools betting, which has actually rendered so
many men who ought to be breadwinners of their respective families
useless and poor.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The relationship between the stage and the screen and the
development of the motion picture from a purely narrative
storytelling entertainment to a genuine art form capable of
communicating profound themes with subtlety and depth took place
over a span of some three decades. Despite the wide variety of film
styles and movements within the past twenty years, there is a common
trait and trend running through artistically successful films, which
is a discernible theme that is both intellectually and
philosophically arresting.
In the two films we have chosen to represent emergent paradigms,
from the repertories of Charles Novia and Pedro Agbonifo-Obaseki,
the contemporaneity with which the themes are treated is refreshing.
For instance, introducing the space ship into the Anti-Christ saga
in The Redeemer is a well-handled novelty. Despite the numerous
churches, crime rate in Nigeria has continued to confound every
right thinking citizen. The gospel of prosperity being championed by
these 21st century pastors seems not to have done anybody much good,
except to confirm the growing belief that church is now a business.
Many analysts are of the opinion that that is the only thriving
industry in Nigeria today. Yet life must surely go on, even in the
face of brazen deceit from the pulpit.
This paper argues that the generation after the Osofisan’s has taken
the visual medium of film beyond entertainment. Film is now the
culture of our society, more than any other art form, even though it
is the product of a society. They realized that when film is not
culture, it is business, a commercial proposition. When it is not
business, film is politics, history, education, or propaganda, and
much more. And this they have utilized in their and art business.
Today, the story is even different, thanks to innovations in the
digital revolution, which has thrown up more possibilities for the
video format. And Nigerian motion picture practitioners are poised
to take the ART to the next level which would equally translate to a
better and wider acceptance of the home movie industry in Africa’s
most populous nation, with a huge market potential.
WORKS CITED
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post-Colonial Novels”, Journal of African Comparative Literature.
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2. De Graft, J.C.
(1976). “Roots in African Drama and Theatre.” African Literature
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(1988). In Ogunbiyi, Y. (eds.) Perspectives on Nigerian
Literature. 1700 to the Present. Lagos: Guardian Books.
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Abati, R. 1990. “Recent Nigerian Dramatists: Context, Attitudes and
Pattern”. The Guardian, November 3, 10 and 17.
5.
Adesokan, W. (1990). “ “Streaks of Blood”: Advocating Change Through
Mysticism”. In The Masque, magazine of the Association of
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Udenta, U.O. (1993). Revolutionary Aesthetics and African
Literary Process. Enugu: Fourth Dimension.
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Nihinlola, E. (1998). A Biblical Evaluation of Pentecostalism.
Ibadan, Sceptre Prints Limited.
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Adelugba, D. (2003). “Death of Theatre”. Interview in Position
International Arts Review, Vol. 1, No. 2. Lagos: Position
Magazine.
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Ademiju-Bepo, (1999). “Recent Nigerian Dramatists: Context,
Attitudes and Trends”. Unpublished Research Project, IFRA,
University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
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Oyesoro, S. 1999. Interview with writer.
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Haynes, J. (eds.) (2000). Nigerian Video Films. American
Edition. Ohio, USA.
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Soyinka, W. (1979). In Opubor et al (Eds.). The
Development and Growth of the Film Industry in Nigeria. Lagos:
Third Press International.
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Stirling-Horden Publishers (Nig.) Ltd.
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Farker, R. (eds.) (1991) A Dictionary of African Drama.
London: New York: Routledge.
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Adesanya, A. (2000). “From Film to Video” in Haynes, J. (eds.)
Nigerian Video Films. American Edition. Ohio, USA.
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Akpovi-Esade, J. (2003). “Love, love everywhere in moviedom.”
The Guardian, October 16.
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Novia, C. 2003. Interview with writer/ When Love dies, Video
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Video (2000).
Brief Note on the Author
ADEMIJU-BEPO, Adediran has a Ph.D in Dramatic Literature & Criticism
and Film Dramaturgy (Ibadan). A graduate of Playwriting, Directing
and Media Arts from the same University, whose plays have won awards
at the Nigerian Universities Theatre Arts Festival (NUTAF), his
research interest covers Generational / Comparative Literature, Film
Genre / Popular Culture and Media Arts.
diranbepo@yahoo.com
NOTES ON NIGERIA’S APRIL 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS
An Interview with
Professor Gloria Emeagwali, Chief Editor,
Africa Update (AU) and Th�r�se Nweke (TN), Journalist and Writer-
who has worked with the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) and has
served in various advisory capacities for Nigerian parastatals
for
over three decades.
AU:
The current news coming from Nigeria is that the General
Elections of April 2007 were neither free nor fair. Given your
extensive knowledge of the Nigerian and African terrain can you
share some of your views on this?
TN:
It is indeed true that these elections were not free or fair.
Actually, they were the worst elections in Nigeria’s 47 years of
political independence. One of the main causes for this was that the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) headed by Maurice
Iwu, was poorly prepared for this task despite the huge sums of
money given it by the Presidency, which was in charge of its funding
and who had hand-picked the US-based Iwu for the job. INEC, which is
supposed to be a neutral electoral umpire, spent valuable time
fighting “the enemies” of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
and President Olusegun Obasanjo through the process of
disqualification, exclusion, disobedience of court orders and
appealing legal decisions; thus demonstrating its partisanship.
These distractions prevented the body from training its staff,
educating the electorate, getting the voters’ register in good time,
printing ballot papers with serial numbers and security features,
and concentrating on perfecting its electoral logistics.
Given the poor track-record of the PDP and the
unpopularity of President Obasanjo and most of the PDP governors,
more than half of whom are being investigated for corruption, it was
most unlikely the PDP could win these elections. In view of this,
the PDP had to employ the machinery and resources of state power to
ensure a massive electoral victory. According to Obasanjo, it was:
“a do-or-die” affair. Hence, INEC, the police, the army, party thugs
and the various paraphernalia of the state and its funds were
co-opted into the PDP strategy. The opposition was doomed to lose.
The general low voter-turn out should be interpreted as a protest
against the system, because most Nigerians did not believe their
votes would count.
A large number of local and foreign observers and
monitoring groups who attended the elections have written them off
as “a fraud” and “a charade”. They include the European Union (EU),
the National Democratic Institute (NDI) headed by a former American
Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, the Transmission Monitoring
Group (TMG) (with more than 50,000 observers), the US-based
International Republican Institute (IRI), the Institute of Human
Rights & Humanitarian Law and the Civil Liberty Organization (CLO),
one of Nigeria’s oldest and most effective human rights
organizations. Other notable critics of the elections include
Nigeria’s Senate President, Ken Nnamani and the Nigerian Nobel
Laureate of Literature, Wole Soyinka, one of the country’s most
relentless political activists.
Let me give you a sample of some of their criticisms.
Max Van den Berg, the EU’S Chief Observer, described both state and
federal elections as having “fallen short of international and
regional standards for democratic elections”. They were marred, he
said, by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency,
widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud,
particularly during the collation process, voter disenfranchisement
at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for
contestants and numerous incidence of violence. As a result, he
explained, these elections have not lived up to the hopes and
expectations of the Nigerian people and they cannot be considered
to have been credible. Van den Berg stressed: “it was the worst
elections the EU has observed”.
Albright of the NDI actually described INEC’s Maurice
Iwu as having “a delusional mentality”, when he awarded himself 80
per cent for producing “good” elections. She regarded the elections
as: “a step backwards” in the conduct of good polls in Nigeria.
The TMG’s Head, Innocent Chukwuma, listed a series of
election malpractices, which included intimidation of opposition
party members and voters, partisanship of INEC officials and
security agents (the police and the army), hoarding and non-arrival
of election materials at polling stations, such as ballot papers and
result-sheets by INEC officials, which created deliberate scarcity,
and the theft of ballot-boxes. Others, Chukwuma said, included the
inability of voting to take place in most rural areas, as well as
the states located in the South-East, South-South and North-East
axis of the country, even though INEC later produced results for
these states.
More sinister was the fact that election result-sheets
were unavailable to opposition party agents, so this would inhibit
attempts to later contest the results at election tribunals.
Observers, party agents and voters observed that many ballot papers
had no serial numbers, and in the case of the 60 million new ones
hastily printed in South Africa a few days to the presidential
elections to accommodate the addition of Atiku Abubakar, the
Vice-President, to the presidential race, these had no security
features. In addition, political party agents claimed that often
they were prevented from signing the results as required by the
Electoral Act, as these were forcibly taken away by the security
forces, at times with the collusion of INEC officials. Those
officials, who refused to sign that an election had taken place in a
state where none had occurred, were denied their allowances and had
to later abandon their duty posts in fear of their lives.
Groups, such as the CLO, noted the low voter turn-out, while others
listed problems such as INEC’s attempts to muffle the press,
killings, burning of houses and vehicles, as well as violent
demonstrations, which they claimed could have been avoided if the
collation and announcement of results had been transparent.
I have gone into some length for you to have a clear
picture of the trauma the Nigerian people have just experienced.
With this, I agree totally with individuals like Nnamani and Soyinka
that it is not enough to condemn these elections. It is even naive
to tell its losers, who have been brazenly cheated on a monumental
scale, that as flawed as they were they should head to the Election
Tribunals to obtain justice. Although I don’t expect this to happen,
these elections must be cancelled. They represent an unjust, immoral
and lawless act and will simply not go away, or be swept under the
carpet in hypocritical reconciliation. The beneficiaries of these
tragic elections have sown the wind and will reap the whirlwind. The
military coups, dictatorships, general insecurity,
under-development, rebel movements, civil wars and genocide are
spawned by elections like these.
AU:
How would you compare this election to the others you’ve
witnessed?
TN:
In its 47 years of being a state, Nigeria has held just eight
General Elections. I have witnessed six of the eight, the exception
being the first two. Let me deal primarily with the ones in which
I’ve participated. Up to 1966 and Nigeria’s first military coup,
this nation practised the parliamentary system of government,
derived from the Westminister model. From 1966 until 1979, the
military was in charge. The 1979 elections which General Olusegun
Obasanjo oversaw while he was Nigeria’s fourth military Head of
State were controversial and gave rise to the famous Nigerian
mathematical theory of “122/3”. This allowed
Shehu Shagari to emerge as Nigeria’s first civilian president, after
a military interregnum of 13 years and a bitter civil war which
ended with the collapse of Biafra and the ushering of a united
Nigerian state. From 1979 until now the country has practised the
presidential system of government, based more or less on the US
model.
The subsequent elections of 1983, which represented a
transfer of power from one civilian administration to another, were
so flawed that when Shagari and his party were returned by landslide
margins, they provided the military, under General Muhammed Buhari,
with the perfect excuse to overthrow the government three months
after its inauguration. And Nigerians were so disgusted with the
fraudulent elections and the corrupt and inefficient Shagari
administration that they welcomed the return of the military.
However, this singular act of General Buhari was responsible for
sentencing Nigeria to 16 years of military rule, something I believe
people have never been able to forgive.
The military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (who
had over thrown Buhari in a palace coup) promised to restore
“democracy” and usher in a civilian government. It took Babangida
eight years to achieve this. In 1993 the General Elections conducted
by his regime were acclaimed both within and outside Nigeria, at the
time, as free and fair, and in fact the best Nigeria ever held.
However, it was open knowledge that the Babangida regime favoured
the National Redemption Party (NRP) and Bashir Tofa, a northern
Nigerian as the presidential winner over the Social Democratic
Party’s (SDP) Moshood Abiola, who was from southern Nigeria. The
National Electoral Commission (NEC) under Humphrey Nwosu, a
US-trained academic, however, acted as an impartial and efficient
impire -- so much so, that when the junta saw that its preferred
party and candidate had lost to the SDP and Abiola, it suddenly and
inexplicably annulled the General Elections.
The most significant feature of the 1993 elections was that for the
first and only time in Nigeria’s chequered history, the people voted
without the usual ethnic, class or religious biases. This saw Tofa
being defeated not only in the southern states but in the northern
ones as well, including his home state, Kano. Abiola was generally
accepted across the ethnic, economic, class and religious divides,
and widely seen as a unifying figure. Therefore, the historic
opportunity, which June 12, 1993 presented of setting Nigeria on the
path of democratic rectitude, was selfishly truncated and frittered
away. I believe people have never forgiven Babangida for this, and
like Buhari it would be highly inconceivable for him to return to
power in free and fair national elections.
But the military by now had lost all credibility. By
1999 it pragmatically decided to give way to a hastily cobbled
alliance of ex-military actors and politicians, with General
Obasanjo as head of this motley crew, on the platform of the
People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Obasanjo had just been freed from
prison where he had been dumped on trumped-up coup charges by the
Sani Abacha military administration. With public sympathy on his
side and the fact that he and the late Abiola were both from
Abeokuta in Ogun State, the military pragmatists regarded him as the
most suitable choice to usher in “democracy”. Obasanjo was also a
fellow colleague who would, they argued, protect or, at least, not
damage their interests.
The 1999 elections were not particularly free or fair, but the
Nigerian electorate was so disenchanted with the excesses,
corruption and ineptitude of military rule that it wearily and
willingly accepted whatever results it was given.
Not so in 2003! To ensure that these elections were not
spuriously cancelled, the electorate went on its best behavior. Yet
when INEC released results that were so flawed, (for e.g. votes were
awarded to a favoured PDP candidate far in excess of the number of
registered voters in the state!) It blamed Nigerians for not
literally accompanying the election results to its state
headquarters. The people were advised against violent demonstrations
and told to go to the courts for redress. On the whole, not much was
gained from these law-suits. Some lasted almost four years, (the
life of the present administration), and to the extent that those
politicians who eventually won had less than a year to actualise
their mandates.
In the 1966, 1979 and 1983 elections, the standard
rigging strategy was multiple voting and ballot-box stealing. By
2003, this had graduated to the shredding of original results and
writing new ones. Last April, electoral fraud was further fine-tuned
to include voter disenfranchisement in which a majority of
registered voters was not allowed to vote, either through the
non-arrival of INEC officials and materials, inadequate provision or
the absence of voting booths, voters’ pictures and other aids to
assist voting. Even where voting was possible as in Lagos, Nigeria’s
commercial capital, some candidates and parties had their
photographs and symbols excluded on the ballot papers. Most
disturbing was INEC’s illegally disqualifying certain candidates
from contesting, which made them to head for the courts. In this,
INEC lost almost all its cases.
Elections were only allowed in urban centres and a few
strategic areas, where photographers were opportunistically invited
by government and PDP agents to record the voting. Some states where
no elections were held, such as Anambra, a former Obasanjo aide,
Andy Uba, was announced as Governor-elect with “1.9 million” votes.
Later when it was realized that this figure exceeded the state’s
registered voters, the announcement was amended hours later to “1.09
million”.
But even before these elections, a main pre-election
complaint which characterized the activities of most political
parties, especially the ruling PDP, was the undemocratic, fraudulent
and high-handed nature of party primaries. The result was that
neither the best nor the most popular candidate emerged, as those
who “won” had been selected long before the primaries. Indeed, a
quick scan of the list of “new” legislators at both federal and
state levels indicate that the newcomers will make up around 80 per
cent of the incoming legislature.
Yet another dangerous and novel aspect of these elections was INEC’s
circumscribing the nation’s civil society organizations, to prevent
them from effective election monitoring. The CLO reported stiff
opposition from INEC and other government agencies to provide
independent and credible polling station observation. It noted that
it was harder to observe an election under an apparently democratic
administration than under the military. The CLO claimed that a
plethora of fictitious observer and monitoring groups organized by
the PDP and accredited by the National Orientation Agency were set
up to create the appearance of election oversight, especially in
areas where rigging was intended. But when the CLO investigated
these groups, they discovered they did not exist at their addresses
and in fact had never existed!
AU:
What do you think should happen to solve this imbroglio?
TN:
Most of us who care about Nigeria and are not in a state of denial
believe these elections ought to be cancelled. If you have an
unbiased understanding of Nigerian realities, and want to be honest,
you’d know that the Election Tribunals will not, and cannot, solve
the problem. But I’ll come to that later. The Senate and House of
Representatives say they will review the elections. How far their
action can go remains to be seen. I am not sure if the independence
which the legislature demonstrated in dousing Obasanjo’s third term
ambition might be evident.
Recently, calls have been made by aggrieved politicians
asking all citizens to emulate the sort of political action which
took place in Poland, Georgia, the Philippines, Madagascar and Kenya
when the people of these nations through mass protests and
demonstrations defied their leaders in order to overthrow unpopular
governments or policies.
Except for the occasional protest by the talakawas of Kano
and Bauchi, when they blocked the streets with their bodies to
ensure the votes of their leader, Muhammadu Buhari, were not stolen,
or that of labour protesting unpopular government policies, the
chances of Nigerians taking to the streets or embarking on other
forms of civil disobedience as they did in 1993 against the election
annulment and to get Babangida to leave (as he indeed did), are
extremely slim. Many Nigerians were killed and some ended in exile
or in prison as a direct result of June 12, 1993 and its aftermath.
The police and the army in Nigeria are never neutral or patriotic;
and from the colonial era have systematically sided with the tools
of oppression or become oppressors themselves. Moreover, these
agents participate or aid in election rigging and are most brutal in
their exercise of physical force. And when they do overthrow
civilian governments, their regimes are decidedly worse. Their entry
into the governmental space more than any other factor has hindered
Nigeria from nurturing and sustaining a democratic political culture
which would enable its politicians to grow and mature. The massive
fortunes the military and their civilian accomplices amass while in
power through the plunder of Nigeria’s oil wealth, they subsequently
use during the civilian phases of government to operate as
“politicians” and subvert the democratic process.
In respect of the Election Petition Tribunals (EPT) and
the Electoral Act governing them, it is extremely difficult for
election results to be overturned through the EPTs, except in rare
cases when the establishment wants to pursue a vendetta against a
specific politician. A careful examination of the Act indicates that
it is not petitioner friendly, and is tilted in favour of the
respondent. Going by the reading of the Act, it is impossible for
election petitions to be determined before the May 29, 2007 handover
of the Obasanjo government. So these election cases may continue
almost ad infinitum, except the Supreme Court in the
future reverses the case laws. Bringing an action and proceeding
with it is an extremely expensive option, and not a task for the
faint-hearted petitioner, while the incumbent-respondent has
recourse to state funds and power to prosecute it, and can, and do,
resort to delaying and expensive tactics to frustrate the
petitioner. As it is, the present Electoral Act should be revisited
and scrapped.
What else can be done? The law setting up the National
Electoral Commission has to be reviewed to make the body financially
independent and politically non-partisan. It should not be funded
from the presidency. The need for civil and voter education is
imperative both for the Agency and the electorate.
Political party funding and campaign finance are areas
which are open to abuse even in older democracies such as Britain’s
and the US. In emerging democracies such as Nigeria’s the need for
these to be reviewed, controlled and enforced is perhaps more
imperative. In the absence of party discipline and accountability,
large-scale thieving and “mismanagement” of campaign funds are
commonplace, and it is not unusual for wealthy entrepreneurs to
hijack a party with the hope of recouping their “investment” through
inflated contracts from the government they helped to install. There
is also the phenomenon of “the god-father syndrome”, in which
influential and rich individuals, usually ex-military officers, or
their civilian beneficiaries finance political prot�g�s to elective
office, in exchange for their turning over the state’s treasuries to
them to plunder. This was the case in the state of Anambra when “the
god-son” later refused to co-operate with “the god-father” and chose
to become a people-oriented Governor. There’s also the absence of
political ideology and informed political debate, so whichever party
can provide a candidate with a “winning” ticket is the party most
politicians join. Thus, it is not unusual for opposition candidates
to swiftly transfer their allegiance to the ruling party shortly
after losing an election, as is the case right now. This
“unshockable” state of affairs makes it extremely difficult for an
effective opposition to emerge and provide a viable alternative to
poor governance. In a sense it is the media, labour, the human
rights organizations and sections of the intelligentsia who
represent enlightened opposition in Nigeria. The recent calls to
make election rigging a treasonable offence demonstrate the extent
to which people are genuinely aggrieved and frustrated.
AU:
How then would you assess Obasanjo’s legacy?
TN:
Obasanjo has to be judged primarily on whether he left Nigeria
better than he found it. I don’t subscribe to the belief that
charity begins abroad and ends at home. The world’s greatest leaders
always put their national interest first, and all else followed
after. Most people regard Obasanjo’s ability to free Nigeria from
debt to the tune of $18 billion as his greatest domestic
achievement, yet fail to remember that it was under his watch in the
1970s that Nigeria first fell victim to debt entrapment.
He appointed as Finance Minister a technocrat from the World Bank,
who presided over increased foreign reserves of over $34 billion due
to high oil revenues, and insisted on financial transparency to the
extent of publishing all the monies allocated to the states, local
governments and federal government agencies. However, she fell from
favour when it was alleged that she killed Obasanjo’s third term
agenda by starving it of funds from the nation’s foreign reserves.
Reformist agencies which Obasanjo introduced such as the National
Agency for Food & Drug Administration (NAFDAC) and the Economic &
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have made life difficult for
those who made fortunes manufacturing and selling fake drugs or
involved in the abuse of office, corruption, as well as fraud in the
financial sector. Nevertheless, there is urgent need for the EFCC to
be insulated from presidential manipulation and politicisation if it
is to be more effective. For some time now, it is widely regarded as
a presidential tool to hound opponents and punish enemies. In
addition, the impetus and momentum to recover the billions of stolen
dollars from the nation’s former leaders, their relatives and
collaborators seem to have disappeared.
Another Obasanjo achievement is the consolidation of the banks,
opening up of the telecommunication space with the arrival of “GSM”
(which has democratized mobile phone ownership), and some measures
of sanity in these sectors. There’s also the re-capitalisation of
the insurance industry which led to mergers and stricter operating
rules. The privatization of key government companies has produced a
new class of billionaires, and on the whole has done little to
improve the condition of most Nigerians. In terms of per capita
income, Nigeria’s performance is less impressive than smaller and
less endowed African nations, such as Mauritius or Gabon. While
Nigeria has $2, 784 per head, Mauritius has $60,284 and Gabon,
$43,168 per head.
Nigeria’s power sector is a national disgrace. In my 33 years of
living in Lagos, Nigeria’s most sophisticated city, I have never
experienced uninterrupted electricity for 72 hours… and under the
present government the situation has become dire, to the extent that
some parts of Lagos have power outages which last a month or more!
This has impacted negatively on industrialisation and led to the
collapse of many cottage industries which can no longer survive on
generators or expensive diesel and petrol.
Other sectors, such as education, health, agriculture, employment
opportunities and security are moribund. Crime rates are high, and
the police are held in such contempt by ordinary Nigerians that they
say POLICE means: “People On Low Income Collecting Egunje”, “Egunje”
is a Yoruba word meaning “bribes“. They have also translated police
“check-points” to mean “chop-points”. In local parlance “chop” means
“to eat”; when extended it signifies bribe-taking. People are now
agitating for the police to be under the state governments.
Indeed, Obasanjo’s campaign against corruption is widely regarded
with indifference and some cynicism. Scandals which immediately come
to mind include those of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), the
controversial $1 billion (US) arms deal with Israel, the unusually
expensive Abuja National Stadium, the National Assembly complex,
COJA Games, Obasanjo’s Presidential Library and the library complex
of his Bells University. Nigerians are also quick to point out that
for eight years this man headed the Petroleum Ministry (Nigeria’s
goose and layer of golden eggs) and was accountable to no one. Then
there’s the matter of loans given to Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe,
without legislative approval, the selective implementation of the
federal budget since 1999 and the falsification of the 2005 Budget.
Under Obasanjo, the rule of law was rarely respected and his
disregard for court judgments, including those of the Supreme Court,
was legendary. One which readily comes to mind is his punitive and
continued starving of local government funds to Lagos State, despite
a Supreme Court judgment in favour of the state. He was fingered in
the destabilization of a number of state governments, particularly
that of Anambra, in order to punish independent-minded governors. As
head of the executive arm of government, he consistently undermined
the legislative branch in order to make it effete. This resulted in
a situation whereby Nigeria had five senate presidents in less than
six years.
Nowhere in Nigeria is there a mass transit system and despite N300
billion (the exchange rate is N135 to $1 US) spent between
1999 and 2003 on the ministry in charge of roads, there’s very
little in the way of roads and maintenance to show for it…. ditto
for other sectors of communications. As for the current crisis in
the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which
has escalated into large-scale kidnappings, sabotage of oil
companies and extended to activities beyond the revolutionary to
outright criminality, Obasanjo’s ad hoc fire-fighting
approach has aggravated the situation to the point of being almost
unmanageable. Now, in the dying days of his administration he has
announced a “master-plan”, which he believes will work. This for me
is a case of: “a little too late”.
Obasanjo has always wanted to be regarded as an African statesman
and a democrat in the mould of the highly revered Nelson Mandela,
hence his activities in the region and international forums. At
various times he was Chairman of the African Union (AU) and the
Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS), Chairman of the
African Peer Review Mechanism, Chair of the Commonwealth, as well as
NEPAD’s Head of State & Implementation Committee. He has also tried
to be active in the G77 and at conferences such as the one held
annually in Davos, Switzerland. While he must be commended for his
contributions in helping to bring Liberia’s debacle to an end, he
was unable to alleviate the Togolese people’s suffering, when as
Chairman of ECOWAS and the African Union, he allowed elections that
were massively rigged to perpetuate the 40-year-old dynasty of the
Eyadema family. Elsewhere in Africa, the problem of failed states
such as Somalia and genocidal, racist ones like Sudan proved too
much for both him and the AU to handle.
Reminiscent of Dickens A Tale of Two Cities, I cannot help
from making a somewhat similar comparison, though this has to do
with: A Tale of Two Leaders. Recently, the French like
Nigerians went to the polls to elect a president. France had 40
million registered voters, Nigeria, 60 million. The French elections
were not just uncontroversial, but results were announced on the day
people voted. In Nigeria, the opposite occurred. Both Chirac and
Obasanjo were faced with the possibility of political colleagues
succeeding them whom they disliked. Both men preferred having some
measure of power influencing whom their successors would be.
How did the two handle their dilemma? Chirac and Sarkozy were
rivals. Chirac preferred his Prime Minister to succeed him rather
than Sarkozy whose popularity was rather high. But Chirac is a
shrewd politician who has been in government since the 1950s and
held positions such as Mayor of Paris. He is also proud, and does
not tolerate presumptuous behaviour from politicians, especially
those younger than him. Still, when he saw his Prime Minister would
not make it, he let go. Meanwhile, the ambitions Sarkozy, the son of
a Hungarian immigrant, strategically positioned himself as Chairman
of their party and Presidential candidate, without Chirac’s
endorsement. At the time the election began, Chirac still had not
endorsed Sarkozy’s candidature. Attempts by Chirac to devalue
Sarkozy’s reputation and undermine his ambition would have
backfired, since the abuse of state power in influencing the
electoral process is not tolerated in a democracy. Early last year,
a negative newspaper publication about Sarkozy and corruption was
traced to the Prime Minister, and the scandal and public outcry
which ensued were not about Sarkozy, but the Chirac government.
On the Nigerian scene, Olusegun Obasanjo has been a highly respected
military/politico (“militician”, to quote Nigerians) since the
1970s, and has exercised a large measure of influence on most
governments since then. He was considered the best compromise
candidate to the presidency in 1999 shortly after he emerged from
prison. His Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, a self-effacing,
ex-customs officer, but clever, political strategist, had inherited
a highly efficient political machinery, the People’s Democratic
Movement (PDM) from his mentor, Shehu Yar’Adua, a “militician”, who
had ruled with Obasanjo from 1979 and was the elder brother of Musa
Yar’Adua, the President-elect. Atiku moved the PDM into the PDP to
actualise Obasanjo’s Presidency.
The two men got on well at first, and in 2003 Atiku was said to have
relegated his presidential ambition to the background and supported
Obasanjo for a second term. However, when it was obvious that
Obasanjo was determined to amend the Nigerian constitution so he
could run for a third term in 2007, and extend his tenure from two
to three terms of four years each, Atiku rebelled. He not only
refused to support Obasanjo, but scuttled any change in the
constitution. Obasanjo retaliated by hijacking the PDP, rewriting
its constitution and getting Atiku expelled. The corruption charges
against Atiku, investigative panels and the attempt to remove him as
Vice-President are all Obasanjo-inspired. In return, Atiku formed
another political party, the Action Congress (AC) and won its
presidential nomination. INEC, then, promptly disqualified him.
Atiku has fought all his battles with Obasanjo through the courts,
even going as far as the Supreme Court, and won all. This has gained
him sympathy and even admiration from Nigerians across the ethnic
and religious divide, and has done much to damage the president and
his PDP party –a party, which Atiku, and not Obasanjo, had built. He
attracted to his cause the best brains from the PDP and other
parties, and with them built a formidable party machine, which,
despite the flawed elections, somehow succeeded in capturing Lagos,
one of Africa’s most populous cities.
Atiku was allowed to contest in the presidential elections at the
eleventh hour, courtesy of a Supreme Court judgment. This created a
serious electoral impasse, in which INEC hired South African
companies a few days to the elections to print 60 million ballot
papers to include Atiku. The companies later claimed that because of
the rushed nature of the job, they did so without putting the
necessary security features on the ballots.
In his vendetta with Atiku, Obasanjo showed scant respect for the
Nigerian Constitution, and did not hesitate to misappropriate state
power and influence, manipulate the PDP machinery, and subvert and
cripple the electoral process to obtain his own predetermined
results. In doing this, he has wrought havoc on Nigeria’s political
and ethical space and left them far worse than he found them.
Obasanjo has failed to resolve the inherent contradiction between
being the head of a direct command military structure, as against
the consensus building style of leadership necessary in a democratic
dispensation.
And Chirac? Of the 40 million registered voters, 85 per cent of
France’s electorate voted. In Nigeria, the low voter turn-out was a
manifestation of distrust for the system. Unlike Obasanjo, Chirac
can go into retirement knowing no one can indict him for an election
that was the worst in his nation’s history, thus exposing it to
ridicule and contempt. Moreover, his successor would be elected, not
“selected”. Unfortunately, Obasanjo shortsightedly decided to forego
a positive historical legacy, in exchange for the ephemeral goal of
getting his own way in “a do-or-die” battle. I believe his victory
is pyrrhic and his legacy is a bitterly divided polity in greater
and more desperate need for enlightened, altruistic leadership than
when he emerged in 1999 from prison to presidency.
AU:
Do you think Musa Yar’Adua will do better than
Obasanjo?
TN:
That’s an interesting word in this context… I’m referring to the
word “better”. After all I’ve highlighted here, it’s not difficult
to be better than the present government. Here in Nigeria there’s
this saying: “The morning shows the day”. I used to admire Yar’ Adua,
because I thought he was efficient, focused and incorruptible.
Recently, I’ve begun to reassess Yar’Adua and re-adjust my views in
the light of what I’ve learnt about him.
Yar’Adua was a former member of the People’s Redemption Party (PRP)
now defunct, but one of the few radical parties in Nigerian
politics. He has been in politics since the late 1980s. A graduate
of the Natural Sciences and former teacher, Yar’Adua had high
ethical standards. He was the first governor to declare his assets
and has promised to do so at the end of his tenure. Katsina State
has undergone profound transformation in education, health, roads,
agriculture and water supply. His is a record of prudence and
accountability. After eight years he is leaving his state with a
surplus of N6.5 billion (N135.00 equals $1US) from a near empty
treasury and a back-log of debts in 1999.
But Yar’ Adua fell far short of most people’s expectations in his
handling of the gubernatorial primaries in his state, Katsina, which
led to a petition from the House of Representatives Speaker, Bello
Masari. He accused Yar’ Adua of manipulating the party’s state
machinery, and deciding the results of the ward congresses even
before Election Day. Ward congresses did not hold in 15 out of 34
local government councils in Katsina. And where they held, were
neither free nor fair. The detailed petition stated that in the
wards where no election occurred, results had been returned. Sounds
familiar? I was later informed that Yar’Adua was merely following a
presidential script meant to destroy Speaker Masari’s gubernatorial
ambitions in the state, in revenge for his aborting the Obasanjo
third term bid in the House of Representatives.
The emergence of candidates through fraudulent or non-existent
primaries was a pointer to the conduct of the General Elections. Any
government which emerges through flawed and manipulated primaries
and elections cannot be legitimate. He is also accused of
partisanship in executing and distributing projects and amenities
within the state’s three emirates, i.e. Katsina, Funtua and Daura.
While Katsina and Funtua were favored, the same was not the case
with Daura, the home and political base of Muhammadu Buhari, an
opposition presidential candidate. During the elections, INEC
displayed similar partisanship in distributing sufficient voting
materials to Katsina and Funtua, while starving Daura of theirs.
This resulted in violence, arson and the loss of lives in the state.
Recently, while speaking to a delegation of politicians who had come
to congratualate him in Abuja, Yar’ Adua said, and I quote: “We
contested the presidential elections under the rule of law and
constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria. We agreed to
play the game under the rules of the game with the constitution as
our guide. If anyone is aggrieved, the best option is to seek
redress through the way approved by the constitution. Whatever we
do, we must have respect for the constitution”.
It is obvious Yar’Adua is in denial. Beginning with the allegations
made by Masari on Yar’Adua’s questionable handling of his party’s
governorship primaries in his state, where the rule of law was
observed in the breach, right through to national elections,
disparaged as the worst in Nigeria’s political history; this
president-elect must be living on the moon or talking tongue in
cheek to actually say that Nigeria’s constitution and the rule of
law were respected.
Nigeria needs a selfless and visionary President.
Ms Therese Nweke can be contacted at: Theresenweke@yahoo.com
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